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Abstract 
This thesis examines warfare, social power, and the state in central Italy for 
the period between 900 and 343 BC.
1
 The goal of this research is to better 
understand how warfare fit into the dialogue of social power in Etruria and Rome. 
This is achieved through the fulfilment of a number of aims. The first is to 
understand the patterns of warfare present in central Italy, as these can help us better 
understand the social aspects of conflict in the region. The project assumes that the 
practise of warfare is important for understanding its role in this dialogue, and thus 
an analysis of arms, armour, and tactics is also necessary. The second aim is to 
understand how warfare and politics affected one another. The condottieri paradigm 
is challenged and the strength of central Italian states asserted. The third aim is to 
explain the interaction between warfare and economic power, and the interaction 
between these two aspects of social power. The fourth aim is similar, and analyzes 
the connections that are visible between warfare and religion. 
Through these aims, this project creates a clearer picture of warfare in Etruria 
and Rome from the Iron Age to the Archaic Period. It argues that the exchange and 
dialogue of social power was not alienated from the state, and that independent 
warfare would have been of less value than it was probably worth. To this end, the 
Servian Constitution is re-examined and the idea of an early Roman hoplite phalanx, 
and single class army, is rejected. The original contribution of this work is in 
reasserting the position of the state in Tyrrhenian warfare and rejecting the idea that 
private interest was more powerful. 
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Preface 
Classical texts cited are based on the Teubner editions, unless otherwise noted. 
Translations are all my own, except where cited. 
Classical author abbreviations follow the Oxford Classical Dictionary, 4th edition, 
except the following: 
Homeric Hymns = HH 
Note also: 
FRHist = Cornell, T. J., Bispham, E. H., Rich, J. W., Smith, C. J., Briscoe, J., 
Drummond, A., Levick, B. M., Northwood, S. J., Oakley, S. P., and M. P. Pobjoy 
(eds.) (2013) The Fragments of the Roman Historians (3 Volumes). Oxford. 
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1. Introduction 
The topic of warfare in classical antiquity is an increasingly popular avenue 
of research, primarily in historical studies. This popularity is certainly on the rise, 
and the recent launching of a new series from Cambridge University Press, 'Armies 
of the Ancient World,' reflects the academic interest in the topic.
3
 Within this ever 
expanding body of research, early Italy has received relatively little attention. The 
seminal works on the subject are now over thirty years old, and represent a dated 
approach to the topic.
4
 Since the publication of these two monographs considerable 
research has been done on the societies of central Italy and the societies of the wider 
Mediterranean which influenced the development of Etruria and Latium. Significant 
in this discussion is the progression of research on Greek warfare and its 
development throughout the archaic period, whose impact has only been lightly felt 
in research on Italy. The current work aims to begin the process of filling this gap 
and bringing the study of central Italian warfare into the modern world of 
scholarship. 
 In order to accomplish this aim, a number of methodologies will be adopted 
and adapted to better understand the evidence available. The period under 
investigation requires a number of different types of evidence to be analyzed co-
operatively to reach a thorough understanding. The earliest temporal periods treated 
by this thesis are known to us only through the archaeological record. Later periods, 
especially the closer the study comes to its end date of 343 BC,
5
 are known through 
both archaeological and historical evidence. Even when there is historical evidence 
available to the researcher, it is a period which is hotly contested, and the reliability 
of the historical narrative is questionable. Because of all of these issues, a thorough 
                                                 
3
 The first volume in the series has recently been published, Fischer-Bovet (2014). 
4
 Saulnier (1980) and Stary (1981). 
5
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and delicately constructed methodology must be adopted and explained. The 
following chapter outlines the general approach of the later analysis and then 
discusses the individual methodologies relating to each type of evidence being used 
in the study. The concluding discussion of this chapter explains how the different 
methodologies will be used together to gain a complete understanding of warfare's 
relationship to society and state in Tyrrhenian Italy through the employment and 
adaptation of the IEMP model of social power put forward by M. Mann. 
1.1 Thematic Introduction 
Warfare is a topic which is approached by many scholars in different ways. 
Traditional methods of approaching warfare in past societies can be broken into two 
relatively broad groups: tactical and grand strategic. The first type of study concerns 
itself with the 'battlefield reality' of pre-contemporary war. Studies of this kind focus 
on identifying troop types, usages on the battlefield, and often, if not always, the 
arms and armour of the belligerents involved. Classic studies on early Roman 
warfare exemplify this approach, and the study of tactics ends up as the focus of the 
work.
6
 Often, the society behind the method of warfare is forgotten or discussed as it 
suits discussions of tactics. The progress of tactical studies of this kind about the 
Greek world has yielded interesting results which have impacted on both the 
understanding of the practise of warfare and the societal implications of that 
warfare.
7
 The impact of these studies has been felt in a reduced way in research on 
early Italy.
8
 
 The importance of tactical studies, though, on pre-literate societies is 
dubious. The interpretation of a spear-head, however thorough, is limited in its 
                                                 
6
 Nilsson (1929). 
7
 Cf. Snodgrass (1965), Hanson (1989), van Wees (2004), Rawlings (2007), and Kagan and Viggiano 
(2013a). 
8
 Rosenstein (2010) and Smith (2006), 288. 
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usefulness.
9
 The same can be said of all types of arms and armour. Iconographic 
representations can be used to help fill the gap, as has been exemplified by some 
scholars in the interpretation of Greek warfare,
10
 but we lack depictions which are 
easily identified as battle scenes in Etruscan and early Roman art. Thus, earlier 
interpretations of Etruscan and early Roman tactics have been based on each 
particular author’s understanding of contemporary (ancient) Greek tactics, known 
vicariously, to readers both ancient and modern, through later, Classical, literature. 
In recent years, it has become fashionable in the history of ancient warfare to 
approach the subject from the ‘Face of Battle’ approach, based on the work of the 
same name by John Keegan.
11
 This approach emphasizes the experience of soldiers 
in combat, which is quite heavily predicated on a wealth of literary evidence.
12
 
Gregory Daly has used this methodology to write the first original take on the Battle 
of Cannae in recent scholarship.
13
 The period analyzed by this thesis, however, is not 
a good candidate for this approach as we do not have reliable and detailed historical 
accounts of battles. It is only in the concluding chapters of this thesis that the tactical 
implications of Etruscan and early Roman evidence is fully discussed and this aspect 
of warfare purposefully takes a back seat to the otherwise cultural approach adopted 
throughout the rest of this study. 
 The second traditional approach to the historical study of warfare is the 
'grand strategic' method, which analyses warfare through the eyes of strategic 
outcomes. In the study of the ancient world, this type of analysis was championed by 
                                                 
9
 Some efforts seem fruitful, if not wholly convincing, i.e. Small (2000). 
10
 van Wees (2000). 
11
 Keegan (1976). 
12
 Ibid., 13-77. 
13
 Daly (2002). A shorter study, that is still effective in its aim, has been published by Phil Sabin 
(2000). 
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the extremely controversial work of Luttwak.
14
 A study of this scope would be 
impossible for the time period under investigation. Like the ‘Face of Battle’ 
approach, it requires a thorough documentation in the guise of narrative history, as 
well as documentary sources such as plentiful epigraphy and 'non-official' historical 
evidence. Although one could attempt to discuss a specific military-political strategy 
in late archaic and early classical central Italy (c. 509-343) it would be very 
dangerous, and the results of one of these studies have been highly criticized.
15
 
 Neither of these methodologies is appropriate for this study. Evidence is 
lacking for both of these approaches to come to a fruitful conclusion. In order for this 
study to yield new, and important, results, a more progressive methodology is 
adopted. This methodology can be called a cultural approach to warfare. Rather than 
regarding warfare as a separate entity from culture more generally, this thesis 
approaches warfare as another element of culture. It exists alongside all other 
elements of a society: art, myth, politics, religion, trade, and so forth. While I do not 
disagree with the idea that 'war was central to ancient societies,'
16
 I do not believe 
that a fruitful study of warfare can be removed from the other elements of those 
societies. While this study cannot claim to be completely divorced from the more 
traditional approaches to warfare, its central methodological underpinning hopes to 
take 'into consideration the role of culturally unique dispositions, proximate 
causation, and agency in the analysis of social process,' primarily warfare.
17
 To 
further discuss this methodology I must first define war/warfare in the context of this 
study and then illustrate its perceived position within society. 
                                                 
14
 Luttwak (1979). 
15
 Alföldi (1965). 
16
 Fagan and Trundle (2010), 1. 
17
 Nielsen and Walker (2009b), 4. 
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 What defines warfare and differentiates it from other forms of violent 
interaction is a blurred space in the academic mind. Brian Ferguson provides a 
succinct definition, that war is 'organized, purposeful group action, directed against 
another group... involving the actual or potential application of lethal force.'
18
 He has 
gone on to clarify his believe that war is more than the action, that it is a condition 
which can exist between two societies, and that it can have correlates in 'every 
dimension of culture.'
19
 The idea that war must be an acknowledged condition is one 
that is difficult, if not impossible, to see in the archaeological record. Destruction on 
two sides of a 'border' may be a sign of this mutually acknowledged state, but it 
could have a number of other explanations. For the purposes of our analysis, ‘war’ 
will be seen in a broader sense. War, here defined, is the act of aggression which 
may or may not lead to violence but often leads to a transfer of material or 
geographic resources between the aggressor and the target. But the prospect that 
there are correlates of war in other dimensions of culture is useful to keep in mind. 
 The evidence analyzed in this thesis regards the period c. 900 - 343. These 
two dates represent the 'traditional' dating of the beginning of the Iron Age 
(Villanovan) and the beginning of the First Samnite War. These chronological 
bounds have been set for a number of reasons, the most important of which is the 
continuity seen in the archaeological record during this time. At the beginning of 
these bounds, the great cities of central Italy began to take shape. This is the 
transitional period between bronze and iron being the predominant materials used in 
tools and weapons, and it is shortly after this period that urbanization begins to take 
hold in central Italy.
20
 The continuity of these sites, and in many ways the material 
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 Ferguson (1984), 5. 
19
 Idem. (1990), 26. 
20
 Cf. Rasmussen (2005) and Smith (2005). 
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culture which went along with them, lasts throughout the historical period. But there 
is a logical reason for the ending date of 343. 
 This study concludes with the first ‘long distance’ war in the history of the 
Roman Republic, and the beginnings of its empire. In the period leading up to 343 
we can start to talk about an end to the Tyrrhenian way of war. The first major shock 
came in 396 when the Romans destroyed the power base, if not the power, of their 
rival city in the Tiber Valley, Veii. This is a momentous occasion even for central 
Italy, as it is the first documented instance of two primary centres coming into 
conflict with the result that one is destroyed. The second major event is the Gallic 
sack of Rome, traditionally dated to 390, which revealed some of the weaknesses of 
Tyrrhenian warfare and, again, threatened a primary centre. The third, and final, 
even which forms the conclusion to the period under study is the beginning of the 
First Samnite War (343). The outbreak of this war, and the traditional account of 
Roman involvement, shows that the Roman state had evolved to the point that it 
could insert itself into the affairs of peoples outside of a short marching distance 
from the city, and probably signalled the arrival of the Roman army as it was known 
throughout the Middle Republic. 
 It may seem odd to some that a work covering both the Etruscans and the 
Latins would be a favourable option. Monographs tend to carry titles such as ‘A 
Critical History of Early Rome’ or ‘The Etruscans,’ rather than a single volume 
dedicated to a detailed history of both.
21
 Some works purport to present a broader 
history with their titles, such as ‘The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the 
Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 BC),’ but they tend to focus on Rome, 
                                                 
21
 Forsythe (2005) and Barker and Rasmussen (1998), respectively. 
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for reasons of evidence and academic training.
22
 Looking deeper into continental 
scholarship, however, leads us to two fundamental monographs on the subject of 
Tyrrhenian warfare, those of Saulnier and Stary.
23
 Both of these works look at the 
warfare of both the Etruscans and the Romans.
24
 Besides just following earlier 
studies, there are deeper reasons to study the warfare of these peoples together, the 
evidence. 
 The literary tradition holds that the Etruscans and Romans were particularly 
indebted to one another, even if they were known to later authors as two separate 
‘ethnic’ groups.25 Etrusco-Roman dependence supposedly ran so deep that ancient 
authors held that there was a dynasty of Etruscan kings which ruled in early Rome 
(Livy 1.33-44), and that the early Roman army was modelled after an ‘Etruscan 
phalanx’ (Diod. Sic. 23.2.1).26 Even if this ancient belief does not hold up to modern 
scrutiny, there is something to be said of the similarity of conditions in Etruria and 
Latium. The archaeological evidence shows that rather than being two distinct 
‘ethnic’ groups (Etruscans and Latins), there was much cultural overlap.27 From at 
least the archaic period onward, ‘horizontal’ movement of elites and their followers 
between communities helped to create, and was a sign of, the ‘multi-ethnic’ 
                                                 
22
 Cornell (1995). Many of the longer monographs on the period in English tend to be written by 
classicists (philologists in the past) rather than archaeologists, thus Rome is an easier subject to 
approach based on their training. This has caused some problems of interpretation, see the brief but 
profound statement in Spivey and Stoddart (1990), 127. 
23
 Saulnier (1980) and Stary (1981). Add to this numerous other titles on other subjects, principal to 
our study Lubtchansky (2005). 
24
 Along with the Etruscans and Romans, Stary includes the ager Faliscus, Umbria, Picenum, and the 
Abruzzo, thus rounding out his ‘Mittelitalien’. 
25
 Speaking of ethnic groups, and ethnic identity in antiquity as a whole, is, in my opinion, 
anachronistic. On the division of the ‘ethnic groups’ of ancient Italy in the literary evidence, see 
Bourdin (2012), 25-44, 69-77, 195-214, 216-224. 
26
 Cf. Cornell (1995), 151-72; Poucet (2000). See especially Cornell (1995), 170; 432 n. 72, for the 
ineditum Vaticanum. Note, however, that Livy (8.8) has the ‘Roman phalanx’ being based on that of 
the Macedonians, showing some of the confusion of the literary tradition. 
27
 Ampolo (2009). See, however, the comments of Bourdin (2012), 62-66. 
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character of central Italian settlements.
28
 Linguistically, though, we can divide the 
two groups on non-anachronistic grounds.
29
 Inscriptions show that the Etruscans 
spoke a language which was different from that of the Romans, and this was noted in 
antiquity (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1.30.2). These differences in language, however, 
should not be exploited by attaching retrojected ethnographic terms to regions and 
thus restricting academic studies by these boundaries.
30
 
 Beyond theoretical arguments there is a very practical reason to consider the 
Tyrrhenian region as a whole in a study of warfare. The period in question was not 
one of conquest or overseas campaigning; it was one of regional conflict and 
aggression within a semi-closed system: Etruscans and Latins fighting one another 
for a myriad of reasons.
31
 Therefore the details of warfare being waged by Etruscans 
and Latins were influenced by one another. And it is through a combined approach 
that we must proceed with our study. 
1.2 Archaeological Methodologies 
Archaeology in central Italy has been influenced, like the archaeology of 
ancient warfare in general, by the researches of ancient historians and classical 
philologists.
32
 Occasionally, as in the case of Andrea Carandini, the analytical 
connection between archaeological and textual material is too close for practical 
                                                 
28
 Bourdin (2012), 532-551, has assembled a vast body of evidence on this topic. Two principal types 
of evidence have helped us to understand the phenomenon. The epigraphic evidence from Etruria, for 
instance, has shown that family groups could move from one settlement to another and integrate into 
that society. The historical sources, which favour Rome, give evidence of, especially, elite mobility 
into the city. 
29
 Ibid., 46-59. 
30
 Bradley (2000), 113-14 presents a concise argument. For a further argument against assigning strict 
cultural identity and regionalism to archaeological evidence see the essays in Shennan (1989). 
31
 This is not to claim that there were no other groups present in the Tyrrhenian arena during this 
period, but they did not have as much of an impact in Central Italy as the indigenous populations 
themselves. 
32
 See, recently, Carandini (2012) and Cifani (2012). 
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comfort.
33
 Many academics acknowledge that too close of a partnership between 
these two fields causes circular and poorly reasoned arguments. Critical approaches 
to the history of Early Rome are often prefaced by a discussion of this problematic 
connection.
34
 The approach taken in this work reflects these concerns and addresses 
archaeological data and literary evidence as complimentary, but not co-dependent. 
Sophisticated approaches to warfare through archaeology have become more 
prevalent in the academic literature in recent years. Much of this interest has come 
from pre-historians of the New World or the East.
35
 A number of these studies 
address the issue of the origin of warfare in human societies and how this knowledge 
can help us understand warfare in later periods.
36
 This research has been aided by a 
growing interest in warfare and conflict from anthropologists.
37
 The scholars 
involved in this research have progressively abandoned the techniques of processual 
archaeology in favour of a more culturally subjective analysis. This post-processual 
methodology has spawned interesting archaeological approaches to warfare that have 
looked at topics such as religion,
38
 ideology,
39
 political complexity,
40
 and others. 
Regarding the ancient Mediterranean, these new approaches have seen less 
use in examining warfare. Existing archaeological studies of Greece and pre-
Roman/Roman Italy that address conflict and warfare have been occupied with 
somewhat older, more ‘traditional’, questions: tactics, strategy, conquest. This trend 
                                                 
33
 For instance, Carandini’s (2009) close association of the foundation myths of Rome with his 
analysis of the archaeological data. 
34
 Cornell (1995) 26-30. Although note the absence of a detailed analysis in Forsythe (2005), 
including 12-13. 
35
 See summaries of recent approaches in Allen and Arkush (2006) and Nielsen and Walker (2009b). 
36
 Cf. Keeley (1996), Otterbein (2004), and Guilaine and Zammit (2005). See Gat (2006), 3-113, for a 
thorough introduction.  
37
 Cf. the discussion between Otterbein (1999) and Whitehead (2000). See also Brian Ferguson’s 
summary of his own research in the field: Ferguson (2008). 
38
 Walker (2009). 
39
 Cobb and Giles (2009). 
40
 LeBlanc (2006); Wiessner (2009). 
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is most probably the direct result of the close connections between classical 
archaeology and classical philology and ancient history. 
 The hierarchy of disciplines within classical studies has prevented, to some 
extent, the diversification of warfare studies in classical archaeology. Historically 
minded archaeologists have often looked to connect their work with that of ancient 
historians. The most obvious example of this connection is the study of the ‘hoplite 
age’ in Greece. The discovery and analysis of pieces of hoplite kit, such as the large 
round aspis, or the Corinthian helmet, are often predicated on the study of ancient 
texts.
41
 Although this trend seems to be changing,
42
 it has influenced the direction of 
archaeological studies of warfare in the Mediterranean. The present study attempts to 
evaluate the archaeological evidence of warfare in central Italy independently from 
the historical evidence, as far as that is possible. Due to the nature of the evidence, 
however, a continuous archaeological discussion spanning the entire period under 
investigation is impossible. 
 The type of evidence available in central Italy, as well, dictates what types of 
analyses may be undertaken. In the earliest phases of the Iron Age, we possess a 
considerable corpus of martial artefacts.
43
 Much of this data comes from funerary 
contexts, which forces us to understand these items through the ritual of which they 
were a part.
44
 As funerary practices change, the nature of, and volume of, arms and 
armour found in mortuary contexts changes. Over time the volume decreases, until it 
is completely phased out of the burial practices of central Italy. Standing alongside 
this type of evidence, especially in later periods of this study, is a body of art 
depicting martial activity. Whilst much art of this nature was produced domestically, 
                                                 
41
 Snodgrass (1965 and 1986); Jarva (1995). On the connections, or lack thereof, between the 
historical and archaeological disciplines in classical studies, see the essays in Sauer (2004). 
42
 See, for instance, Brouwers (2010), especially chapters 1-6. 
43
 Stary (1981) is still the best catalogue of the data. 
44
 Cf. Whitley (2002). 
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the impact of Egyptian, Phoenician, and Hellenic motifs and styles must be 
negotiated to come to an understanding of what the art is saying. In the resulting 
analysis, we see that martial art in Etruria and Rome was influenced by, but not 
produced for the same purpose of, the imports which came so readily from the 
East.
45
 In this regard, structuralist and traditional methodologies of artistic 
interpretation are both important and applied in this work. 
1.3 Historical Methodologies 
Knowledge, then seems to me 
to be nothing but the perception 
of the connexion and agreement, 
or disagreement and repugnancy, 
of any of our ideas. 
John Locke
46
 
 
The scholarly debate on the history of early central Italy is mired because of 
the nature of the evidence. No texts survive, or indeed were probably to have ever 
existed, from the earliest periods of Etruscan and Roman history. Greek authors 
whether poets, historians, or philosophers occasionally mention events relating to 
central Italy in their works from periods considerably earlier than the birth of 
indigenous Roman historical writing. For instance, Hesiod ‘knew’ of Agrius and 
Latinos, kings over the ‘famous Tyrrhenians’ in what would be known as Italy 
(Theog. 1011-1016). In the context of the ongoing conflicts between the Western 
Greeks and the Carthaginians, with whom groups of Etruscans were allied, we know 
that poets such as Pindar used their talents to bring further glory to leaders such as 
Hieron of Syracuse, thus bringing elements of Etruscan history (in this case) into the 
Greek literary tradition (Pyth. 1.71-76). Circulation of poetry such as this would 
                                                 
45
 Izzet (2007), 20-31, applies a similar methodology. Cf. the collected essays in Hodder (1982) and a 
summary of the impact of post-processual archaeology on the study of Greece in Whitley (2001), 52-
59. 
46
 Locke’s (1993), 291, conception of knowledge is very relevant to the historiographical approach to 
Early Rome, what some scholars consider knowledge others consider repugnant credulity, whilst what 
some others consider knowledge still further scholars consider disagreeable hypercriticism. 
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have brought Italian peoples, under the general moniker ‘Tyrrhenians’, to the 
attention of Hellenes throughout the Mediterranean.
47
 The historian Promathion 
wrote a history of Italy which included a discussion of the foundation of Rome (Plut. 
Rom. 2 = FGrH 817 F 1).
48
 Hellanicus of Lesbos also discussed Rome’s foundation 
(FGrH 4 F 84) and may have known some Latin.
49
 By the fourth century, the 
philosopher Heracleides of Pontus and Aristotle could speak of the Gallic sack of 
Rome, which Heracleides referred to as a Greek city (Plut. Cam. 22).
50
 Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus cites Hieronymus of Cardia and Timaeus of Tauromenium as the first 
two historians to have dealt with early Roman history (Ant. Rom. 1.6.1). Momigliano 
famously argued that Timaeus was the Greek historian who ‘discovered’ Rome.51 
Much of the Greek interest in Italy was devoted to the Etruscans, or 
‘Tyrrhenians’. The Etruscans traded with the early migrants from Greece who settled 
at Pithecusae and Cumae in the Bay of Naples, and continued this economic contact 
throughout much of the archaic period.
52
 But this contact came at a price, or so we 
are led to believe, as the Greeks remembered the Etruscans, often, as pirates (cf. HH 
7 1-11; Strabo 6.2.2). A number of specific battles were remembered, the Battle of 
Alalia between Phocaean colonists and a combined fleet of Etruscans and 
Carthaginians (Hdt. 1.166-67) and the Battle of Cumae (Pind. Pyth. 1.71-76). 
Unnamed cities of Etruria are mentioned in connection with the Athenian assault on 
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 On the politics of this type of poetry, and its circulation, see Hornblower (2009). Poems, such as the 
one cited by Pindar, would have played a part in bringing Italians to the attention of Greeks 
throughout the diaspora; Antonaccio (2006), 276-283, has pointed to the connections between this 
poetry and the dedication of arms in Pan-Hellenic sanctuaries. 
48
 Wiseman (1995), 57-58, suggests an early fifth-century date for Promathion, in the time of the 
conflicts between the Greeks and the Persians. 
49
 Wiseman (2007), 68-69. 
50
 Because Heracleides was a Pythagorean, Wiseman (1995), 58, has suggested that his view of Rome 
may derive from the Pythagorean circles of Croton and Tarentum of the sixth century. Plutarch claims 
that Aristotle received an accurate (ἀκριβής) report of the sack. This version held that the hero of 
Rome was someone named Lucius, which indicates a different version of the story than that in Livy 
(see below). It is possible, though, that Aristotle’s received version prioritized the religious saviour of 
the city, Lucius Albinius, who does appear in Livy (5.40). 
51
 Momigliano (1959). 
52
 Ridgway (1988b), 653-61, (1992). 
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Sicily during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 6.88). Etruscans are even mentioned by 
Aristotle, in a passage which shows the confused understanding of the Greeks 
regarding the Etruscans (Pol. 3.9.6 = 1280a). Although the instances of Etruscans in 
Hellenic historiography are important, they often betray themselves as topoi and 
must be interpreted delicately. Unfortunately, none of the larger historical narratives 
which either focused on Italy or included extensive discussions of early Italy have 
survived. 
The first Roman writers to address the history of Rome, and by extension 
central Italy, worked in the second century BC, but none of their works survive 
complete.
53
 The first Roman to write a history of his own city was Fabius Pictor. 
Livy refers to him as the most ancient author regarding Roman history (1.44, 55, 
2.40 = FRHist T 11). Dionysius says that Fabius Pictor and Lucius Cincius were the 
first two Romans to relate the early deeds of their city (Ant. Rom. 1.6.2 = FRHist T 
12).
54
 From Cicero (Div. 1.43 = FRHist T 10) and Dionysius (Ant. Rom. 1.6.2 = 
FRHist T 12) we know that Fabius wrote his history in Greek.
55
 Although Dionysius 
describes the treatment of early Rome by these authors as brief, what we know of the 
work points to admirable levels of detail being written about.
56
 Beginning with these 
early historians, Greek ideals and styles of historical writing helped to influence the 
creation of the narratives of Roman history.
57
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 Wiseman (1979), 9-16, gives a succinct analytical summary. See Ogilvie and Drummond (1989), 5-
9, for brief biographical descriptions of the early Roman historians. The chronological distance 
between Archaic Rome and the first Roman historians should not be considered a severe danger in 
itself. From a global perspective, we know of pre-literate societies which preserved systematic, 
technical, details and information over a vast span of time, see Zuidema (1982). 
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 On Cincius, see FRHist, 1.179-183. 
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 The commentators on Fabius Pictor in FRHist, 1.163-166, have pointed to evidence which suggests 
Fabius’ may also have circulated as a Latin text. Whether or not it was written by the historian in 
question is impossible to determine but the commentators’ working hypothesis that the same historian 
wrote both the Greek and the Latin texts seems plausible. Chassignet (1996), lxi-lxii, proposed that 
the Latin version of Fabius Pictor was a translation of the Greek text, created by the historian himself. 
56
 FRHist, 1.169-173. 
57
 Mellor (1999), 6-19. See also Beck and Walter (2001), 17-26. 
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Besides the narratives of Livy and Dionysius, of the annalistic tradition, a 
handful of brief statements on archaic Rome, in particular, are preserved in 
antiquarian sources. The antiquarians did not write historical narratives but rather the 
analysis of certain topics of interest in an historical manner.
58
 This type of work has 
been described as ‘encyclopaedic.’59 From our knowledge, the most productive of 
these ancient scholars was Marcus Terentius Varro, who is supposed to have written 
between 490 and 620 works throughout his life.
60
 Two of the most important 
antiquarian sources to which we have relatively good access are Festus and Aulus 
Gellius. Sextus Pompeius Festus compiled a Latin dictionary in the second century 
AD, of which the portions from M to T have been preserved in one manuscript and 
the rest in an abbreviated epitome by ‘Paul the Deacon.’61 Aulus Gellius wrote a 
miscellany in the second half of the first century AD, most of which survives.
62
 
Though claiming that we should not call Gellius an antiquarian ‘scholar’, Stevenson 
has compared the topical essays found in the Noctes Atticae (Gellius’ surviving 
work) as ‘comparable (in spirit at least) to many of those in early editions of, for 
example, The Classical Weekly or Quarterly.’63 Although these sources provide 
alternative versions of some stories, or references to otherwise unknown traditions, 
events, and rituals, they were still not absence of bias.
64
 
Unfortunately, very little of the antiquarian tradition survives, and that which 
does survive in reference to Early Rome is preserved as quotations and fragments. 
Within the Ciceronian corpus, we find a number of his own antiquarian deductions 
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 On the possible research methods of antiquarian writers, see Stevenson (2004), 134-141. 
59
 Bispham (2007), 31. 
60
 Cornell (1995), 19. Varro’s actual outputs were probably many fewer than this, perhaps around 
forty works? See FRHist 1.415-423. 
61
 FRHist 1.67. 
62
 Book eight is lost to us except for chapter headings. On the composition of the work, see Holford-
Strevens (2003), 27-47. 
63
 Stevenson (2004), 123. 
64
 As observed by Bispham (2007), 30-32. 
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about Archaic Rome that are quite important as they represent the understanding of 
one of the most learned men of the Late Republic, however there are not many of 
them.
65
 The information preserved in these fragments, however, is often considered 
to be important for our understanding of Early Rome because it is devoid of the 
problems of the narrative tradition in construction and judgment.
66
 
We are left with secondary material which dates, primarily, from the first 
century BC onward. The usefulness of these authors has often been questioned and 
academics are split on how much, if any, of the information preserved in these texts 
is historically valuable.
67
 In the ultra-sceptical camp, it is believed that the narratives 
of Livy and Dionysius, especially, are not to be trusted for historical fact; some 
sceptics go so far as likening these texts to ‘science-fiction.’68 On the other hand, 
there are scholars who believe that we can draw on the preserved narratives quite 
readily.
69
 Tim Cornell goes so far as claiming that ‘the most important evidence for 
the early history of Rome comes from [these] literary sources.’70 There is no 
consensus among scholars as to how to approach the narratives of Early Rome and 
central Italy, except that caution must be used in our analyses.
71
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 Rawson (1972). 
66
 Cornell (1995), 18-26, Forsythe (2005), 64-65. Whilst it is important to realize that we do posses 
traces of a different, if not entirely different, history of Early Rome and Etruria in the antiquarian 
fragments, I do not believe, as some modern scholars, that the antiquarian tradition is any better a 
source than the annalistic tradition. Without possessing the antiquarian works in their entirety they 
cannot be sufficiently and scientifically analyzed and thus our use of these sources in their 
fragmentary form must be restrained and just as cautious as our use of the annalists. 
67
 Miles (1995), 8-74, has argued that Livy’s history, while certainly having moralizing elements, was 
also written within a developed historical method. 
68
 Rathje (2004).  
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 Carandini (1997), 13-37, believes that the continuity of oral tradition would have preserved Early 
Roman history somewhat well throughout the Republican period. Carandini’s up-to-date views can be 
found in English now as Carandini (2014). His view is in the extreme as, for example, he reads 
Romulus as an historical person. The reviews of Wiseman (2000; 2001) are important to read 
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 Cornell (1995), 1. 
71
 Forsythe (2005), 59-77. We may look at the trends of Homeric scholarship as a cautionary tale of 
adhering to any one orthodoxy on the ‘usefulness’ of our narratives. While the influential article of 
Anthony Snodgrass (1974) had for some time championed the view that we should not see a ‘unified 
Homeric society’ the arguments against this point of view have continued and the subject of ‘Homeric 
Greece’ has become a minefield in which scholars are forced into tightly packed orthodoxies on the 
19 
 
The earliest stories of Rome, presented as history by ancient authors, are 
certainly elaborated legends and myths.
72
 Poucet has laboriously demonstrated the 
problematic nature of this material.
73
 By the time that Roman history was being 
written down, the influence of Greek mythology and the Hellenic obsession with city 
origins had taken hold of Roman thought and heavily influenced their foundation 
myths.
74
 The problems of the historicity of the foundation stories can be extended to 
the legends of the early kings of the Regal Period.
75
 While the names of the kings are 
plausible,
76
 the deeds associated with each, and the chronology of the period, are 
problematic. 
Especially troubling are the diametrically opposed kings, Numa Pompilius 
and Tullus Hostilius. The first is credited with the creation of many of Rome’s 
religious practices (Livy 1.18-21; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.63-73; Plut. Numa 7-20). 
Numa’s successor, Tullus Hostilius, was his opposite and was known for his 
conquests and warfare (Livy 1.22; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.2).
77
 The history of the 
later kings, those of the so-called Tarquin dynasty, is considered by some to be more 
historical in nature than those before.
78
 The narratives at this point read more 
believably and contain less overtly mythological elements. Some elements of the 
stories surrounding the Tarquins, though, may have been created because of political 
                                                                                                                                          
subject. See Raaflaub (1998) for a relatively up to date discussion and bibliography. I would hope that 
the scholarly views on the narratives of Early Rome do not appear or become this tightly contested 
and the view that I express here is one of, hopefully, moderation. 
72
 Cornell (1995), 57-73; Wiseman (1995), 1-17. Cornell rightly argues that the foundation legends of 
Rome were formed or forming by the end of the sixth century, but this does not mean that we should 
rely on them as historical evidence. 
73
 Poucet (1985). See, though, the positivist analysis of Grandazzi (1997). While I am sympathetic to 
some of his ideas, his intimate reading of the archaeology into the narrative tradition is problematic.  
74
 Wiseman (2004), 13-36. 
75
 Cornell (1995), 119-21. 
76
 Forsythe (2005), 97. 
77
 Cornell (1995), 119, describes these successors as ‘little more than contrasting stereotypes.’ 
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 Especially by Cornell (1995), 127-30, who believes that it is with the accession of Tarquinius 
Priscus that we can begin speaking of Roman history. Forsythe (2005), 99-108, is perhaps even more 
erudite in his claim that this period of regal history is, if nothing else, full of ‘more complex 
problems.’ 
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or economic motives. This has been suggested for the Corinthian genealogy 
associated with the dynasty, which may have been a Cumaean creation.
79
 What 
seems probable is that the historical tradition of the kings was patched together 
throughout the centuries from a number of different sources, and contains a complex 
web of myths and facts.
80
 
The history of the Early Republic has been preserved in a more believable 
form than that of the Regal Period.
81
 The mythological overtones are considerably 
lighter, even if the presence of religious and divine occurrences is still prominent.
82
 
It is possible that the narrative of the early Republic reads more believably than that 
of the Regal Period because the surviving narratives are structured in a more familiar 
way, recalling events for years based on the magistrates in power during those 
years.
83
 It is commonly believed that the narratives for this period are based on a 
smattering of ‘facts’ preserved until history was being written in Rome.84 Principal 
among these sources are the annals of the Pontiffs, Annales Maximi (Cic. De Or. 
2.52-53; Serv. ad Aen. 1.373). Scholars have debated the reality, usefulness and 
accuracy of these records, what form they took, and how exactly they were 
organized.
85
 It has often been questioned how far back into the Republic the Annales 
existed, and why there is a discrepancy between the historians of the annalistic 
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tradition and the antiquarian notice that at the beginning of the Republic there was 
one, not two, supreme magistrates of the Roman people.
86
 In addition to the Annales 
Maximi, other documentary evidence probably survived from the earliest periods of 
Rome which could be and were used by later historians to help form their 
narratives.
87
 
Inscribed documents are occasionally cited by ancient authors. The most 
famous and discussed of these is the first treaty between Rome and Carthage, at least 
the first known, which was preserved by Polybius (3.22).
88
 Polybius tells us that this 
treaty dated to the consulship of Lucius Iunius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, 
traditionally the first consuls, and elaborates this telling us this was twenty-eight 
years before Xerxes crossed into Greece (480 BC). The language of the treaty was in 
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 Smith (2011c). 
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 Documentary sources which diverged from the traditional story could be used to challenged the 
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(1975). 
88
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Civ. 1.16), held the treaties Rome made with other peoples. The recovery of a number of bi-lingual 
inscriptions, arguably from this temple, dating to the second century support this identification, 
Coarelli (2007),35-36. There have been other attempts to identify the treasury of the aediles, all 
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Polybius would have been confused by the name of the building than to have fabricated entire treaties. 
I am inclined to follow the conclusions of Scullard (1989), 520-26, that the first treaty is historical and 
fits into the historical setting of the late 6
th
 and early 5
th
 centuries. Cornell (1995), 211, bluntly states 
that the first treaty is ‘accepted by all serious scholars,’ noting that even in Alfödi’s (1965) 
controversial treatment of the period he accepts the authenticity of the treaty; cf. Scardigli (1999). The 
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an archaic form of Latin, which was difficult for even the learned men of the time to 
understand. Importantly, Polybius goes on to tell us that this treaty was still 
preserved in the ‘treasury of the aediles’, on the Capitol, but most Romans and 
Carthaginians did not know of its existence (3.26). Cicero knew of another archaic 
treaty preserved in his time, the treaty of the so-called Foedus Cassianum with the 
Latins, which could be seen in the Forum (Balb. 53).
89
 It is possible, if not probable, 
that further treaties were preserved from the archaic period and used, not cited, by 
the sources of our sources.
90 
Further archaic documents are known to have survived, 
such as religious documents (cf. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.26, 10.32).
91
 Hypothetical 
documentary sources have been suggested by some modern scholars, as well.
92
 
Other types of evidence were used by Roman historians to help form their 
narratives. Funeral eulogies are often seen as being an important, if not self-serving, 
source for Roman history. According to Polybius, in his day it was customary to 
recount the accomplishments of the deceased man’s ancestors all the way back to the 
most ancient (Polyb. 6.53-54).
93
 Cicero and Livy were both negative in their views 
of the usefulness of these orations, as they often were designed to give greater glory 
to the family than was deserved (Cic. Brut. 62; Livy 8.40). This does not mean that 
these extraordinary stories would have been copied whole heartedly into the Roman 
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inquiry; Beck and Walter (2001), 29-31. 
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historical tradition. The description of the work of an historian by Sallust is 
important in this regard: 
 
The writing of history is, in my opinion, a peculiarly difficult task. You must work 
hard to find words worthy of your subject. And if you censure misdeeds, most people 
will accuse you of envy and malice. When you write of the outstanding merit and 
glory of good men, people are quite ready to accept what they think they could easily 
do themselves; but anything beyond that is dismissed as an improbable fiction (Sall. 
Cat. 3.2). 
 
While it was indeed the job of the historian of the ancient world to write an 
entertaining piece of literature, their audience would not necessarily believe 
extraordinary deeds. Whether or not audiences were able to ‘police’ the stories being 
told or written down, there must have been some recognition of events which did not 
fit into the popular view of Roman history. This would not necessarily have 
prevented their inclusion in the surviving narratives. When this invention did occur, 
it may have been the replacing of one historical figure with a member of the family 
who created the false history. This, however, does not mean that we should reject 
familial stories, such as that of the gens Fabia at the Cremera, as being false, 
although it is prudent to question the names involved.
94
 
Unfortunately for modern scholars, even less has survived of the historical 
past of the Etruscans. We know that there were native historians amongst them, 
although we do not know of when these authors were writing.
95
 Varro knew of 
Etruscan histories (Tuscae historiae) written in the eighth ‘saeculum,’ whose date we 
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do not know for sure (Censorinus DN 17.6). And the emperor Claudius knew of 
Etruscan histories (ILS 212.I.8-27).
96
 He went on in his later days to write twenty 
books of Etruscan history, none of which survive unfortunately (Suet. Claud. 42). 
Writers of Etruscan history, in the ancient world, would have had very similar 
sources to those of Roman historians. It is generally assumed that family histories, 
biographical histories, religious histories, and possibly even civic histories all 
existed.
97
 What is painfully obvious, however, is that very little of this material was 
used by Roman authors in the creation of their narratives.
98
 The confusion of the 
tradition of Servius Tullius/Macstarna in the Roman tradition is strong evidence of 
this.
99
 
Beyond a critique of the possible sources of our sources, Livy and Dionysius 
are often criticized for their preservation of the evidence which they had at hand.
100
 
Livy, in particular, has been attacked for his narrative.
101
 The first pentad, the portion 
of Livy especially under study in the present work, is often approached for its 
literary characteristics rather than its historical interests.
102
 Much criticism has fallen 
on Livy from his heroic characterization of many of the heroes of Early Rome.
103
 
Dionysius has been rehabilitated, to some degree, in recent years with his frequent 
use of cited sources as a primary factor in this.
104
 However much modern scholars 
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wish to criticize the surviving narratives, we cannot dismiss the fact that they 
represent the closest things in our possession to the original sources and must be 
used in any reconstruction of early central Italy. 
 Although we have seen that caution must be exercised regarding the 
historicity of the literary evidence relating to central Italy during the period under 
investigation, use of the historical narratives and miscellaneous literary sources is 
essential to the study of warfare during the period under question. Archaeological 
evidence for and of warfare is scanty for the fifth century in Roman contexts, 
although it is more plentiful for Etruria. A balanced and moderate approach to the 
textual evidence is adopted in this work. Certain topics can only be discussed 
through the use of these much maligned texts, such as political organization and 
leadership in war. On these points the texts appear to be extremely valuable. But, 
statements by the ancient authors, especially those of Livy and Dionysius, are not 
used as evidence without question. Stories of an overtly mythological or aetiological 
nature are questioned for their usefulness on a case-by-case basis. 
Further, this is not a historiographical study; it is an historical study in the 
classical sense and aims to develop a better understanding of the history of warfare 
during this period as it is presented to us, but the complex and problematic narratives 
are never used unquestioningly. With that said, I follow the august words of Jacques 
Heurgon in my approach to early Roman, and by extension Etruscan, history: to 
approach it with a ‘mood of restrained confidence, of cautious acceptance,’ and to 
examine ‘events which are not necessarily true, nor yet necessarily false.’105 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
calling Dionysius ‘highly conscientious’ and ‘thoughtful and reliable and much more fair-minded in 
his judgement of his fellow-historians than most.’ 
105
 Heurgon (1973), 250. 
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1.4 Mann, IEMP, and Structure 
 The place of warfare, or the potential of violence, is an important theme 
throughout sociological research.
106
 Coercive force is famously the basis for Max 
Weber’s understanding of ‘the state’ and of social organization in general. The 
monopolization of ‘legitimate’ force is the underpinning of circumscribed 
domination.
107
 In this sense, warfare is an intrinsic part of the state as a sovereign 
and supreme entity. The sweeping assumptions made by some scholars regarding the 
usefulness of sociological and anthropological universalisms have occasionally been 
applied to the study of Mediterranean warfare. Quite often, these universalisms are 
more directed at the analysis of the Greek polis and trying to force it into a 
categorical setting in which it will likely never fit.
108
 The present work does assume 
that warfare was an important element in the formation of states and civil structures 
in Tyrrhenian Italy, but does not follow strict universal applications of theory.
109
 
 Underpinning this approach is the philosophy of Max Weber. His 
development, and the subsequent academic discussion of, the concepts of Verstehen 
social science methodology contributes to my own technique. The general concept of 
Verstehen is that the analyst of social phenomena, in this case warfare in central 
Italy, attempts to understand the material under analysis from the point of view of 
the individual actors involved in the creation of said phenomena.
110
 A form of this 
analysis has become fashionable in archaeological analysis under the guise of 
‘agency’.111 Through this line of thinking, warfare must be seen not only from a 
collectivized position, in which war is an action of collected actors (i.e. ‘the state’), 
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but also as an action committed by a group of actors each with individual 
motivations. This type of approach has been refined by a number of social scientists 
and sociologists and has seen a revival under the moniker neo-Weberianism. 
Through these approaches we should understand societies as being ‘constituted of 
multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power.’112 
 An important reappraisal of the role of warfare in society, or a suggestion of 
its place, has been made by one of the neo-Weberians, the sociologist Michael 
Mann.
113
 In his magnum opus, The Sources of Social Power, which is spread across 
four volumes, he argues that military and political (state) power are two separate 
entities.
114
 It is in the separation of military and political power that Mann’s 
understanding of society is different from most, and important for the current 
study.
115
 This version of the structure of social power is often abbreviated as ‘IEMP’ 
which stands for Ideological, Economic, Military, and Political, the four most 
important types of social power. These are the most regularly present throughout 
human societies. This type of approach helps to develop our understanding and 
explanation of certain phenomena of early central Italy, such as the so-called 
condottieri. In the best discussion of this topic to date, the author was forced to 
discuss the warlords of central Italy as being in direct opposition to the state.
116
 As 
will be shown in chapter 3 of this thesis, this is not necessarily the case. 
 We should begin our questioning of the historical phenomena under study by 
looking at how individual ‘humans pursuing goals’ affected the history of warfare in 
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central Italy.
117
 From this starting point, we can question the goals of the actors in 
our historical drama and then analyze their actions through the complex web of 
social power. This type of analysis moves away from neatly defined images of 
society, such as that of E. Lenski.
118
 In this traditional type of power diagram (Fig. 
2), we see entrenched classes which are separated based on the source of their social 
power. Merchants and artisans are empowered through economic processes, the 
governing class and the ruler through political (vis. military as well) power, and the 
priests through ideological power.
119
 If we deconstruct the power structure of central 
Italy as it is visible archaeologically and historically, however, we see that this type 
of rigid structure does not fit. We are also forced to abandon such universalisms as 
Dumézil’s ‘idéologie tripartite.’ 
 We should not separate warfare from political (sc. collective) society entirely, 
though. As Spencer has observed, violence is typically a social activity and that it is 
both constructed and interpreted by cultural processes.
120
 John Keegan has forcibly 
claimed that war ‘is always an expression of culture.’121 Warfare’s interaction with 
culture is complex and is multifaceted. War leads to contact with and occasionally 
absorption of extra-local cultural elements: trends, technology, and social 
organization. Its role in the development and evolution of other networks of power, 
especially political, is influenced by these external contacts as well as internal 
changes.
122
 The complex relationship between military power/warfare and the other 
networks which constitute societies can be visualized easily thanks to Claus Bossen 
(Fig. 1). 
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 Ultimately, though, it is from Mann’s IEMP model that the structure of this 
work has been devised. Following on from this introduction is an examination of the 
arms, armour, and tactics with which the peoples of central Italy waged war. After 
this comes a general survey of the patterns of warfare in central Italy, taking into 
account the archaeological and historical evidence. This knowledge is used as a 
building block to discuss the cultural forces and social-power interactions of warfare 
throughout the period in question. This chapter is followed by an analysis of ‘warfare 
and the state’ which endeavours to address the ‘problem’ of both civic and ‘private’ 
armies of the period. The fifth chapter examines the interplay between the economy 
and economic power and that of warfare, looking especially at the ability of military 
power to create or enhance economic power. Following on from this chapter we 
address the deep seated connections in Tyrrhenian Italy of warfare and religion. 
 The aims of this project are to show that warfare was deeply connected to 
other aspects of society in central Italy, the state in particular. This is done by 
analysing certain characteristics of this society, politics, economics, and religion, and 
their connections to warfare. To the extent that it is possible, the actions of 
‘individuals’ are discussed within this framework with the assumption that their 
actions are being taken in pursuit of certain goals and objectives. By this, the author 
does not mean that individual historical figures guide the study, but that evidence is 
read from the point of view that it reflects individual choices and actions. This 
project also aims to address a number of traditional issues in central Italian warfare 
which relate both to the execution of warfare as well as the relationship between war 
and other sources of social power, principally the issues of ‘hoplites’ and condottieri. 
In some areas of this study, I must concede that the findings are as much reasoned 
30 
 
and scholarly probabilities as they are definitive conclusions, and it is with a healthy 
scepticism that I proceed; je pense donc je ne sais rien. 
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2 Arms, Armour, and Tactics: changes over time 
 Be they clubs and arrows or swords and helmets, arms and armour play an 
important role in the practise of warfare throughout history. Technological 
developments relating to warfare have influenced the development of societies 
around the world. Cases have been argued that changes in arms and armour 
dramatically changed the history of the Late Bronze Age, bringing on the collapse of 
the Near East and eventually a new social order.
123
 The major social change 
supposedly brought on by the introduction of hoplite arms and tactics in Greece will 
be discussed fully below (chapter 4) and introduced in this chapter, but we should 
note that the arms themselves are often pointed to as the defining feature. Culture 
also plays an important role on the battlefield and influences tactical procedures. The 
hoplite and his phalanx in their most rigid sense have been argued to have been as 
much a product of Hellenic cultural developments as the arms and tactics were 
influential in the tactics and their reflections in cultural developments.
124
 In the age 
of the musket, culture determined tactical deployment to an even more ludicrous 
extreme which produced rank and file volley tactics. In stark contrast to this were the 
tactic employed by partisans, rangers, and natives who used the exact same arms as 
their enemies yet fought with guerrilla style tactics. This chapter examines arms and 
armour and their use on the battlefield through a thorough examination of the 
evidence, emphasizing archaeology and iconography for the earliest periods and a 
combined approach to the historical period. 
 In this study, arms are not merely implements of warfare; they are also an 
element of culture and cultural expression dependent on the mores of their users. A 
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number of approaches to this topic have examined central Italy in the Iron Age.
125
 
The scholarly discussion on arms and armour in central Italy during the Archaic 
Periods, however, has generally omitted this approach to weaponry in favour of 
traditional approaches which emphasize the tactical use of said artefacts.
126
 Much of 
this discussion, until recently, has been tactically deterministic. But the use and 
display of arms and armour outside of warfare is an extremely important element in 
the construction of social power in central Italy from the Bronze Age onward, and is 
reflective of Bossen’s theoretical description of warfare’s permeating nature in 
societies.
127
 This chapter, then, will examine how arms, armour, and tactics changed 
over time, and how this was connected to larger cultural changes. 
2.1 Arms and Armour 
 Arms and armour played an important role in the Late Bronze Age in Italy (c. 
1200-900). Although they are not often found in burials, many hoards of bronze 
items contained weapons, especially spear heads and swords.
128
 During this period, 
exchange of bronze and bronze weapons occurred throughout the Italian Peninsula, 
as recent metallurgical analyses have shown.
129
 This trade does not seem to have had 
a considerable impact on central Italy, as much of the evidence is spread down the 
Adriatic coast.
130
 External influences on the arms of central Italy may date to this 
period, however, as represented by a number of swords found in Etruria which are of 
types more common to the Atlantic coast of modern France and the southern coast of 
modern Spain (Fig. 3).
131
 Influence from outside of central Italy is a recurring point 
in the discussion of this section and it is important to keep in mind that this influence 
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is not necessarily new to the Iron Age and should be considered as a continuation of 
an already globalising European Bronze Age.
132
 This section examines the 
development and change in arms and armour in central Italy from the Early Iron Age 
to the close to our period, approximately 343. It is laid out in a chronological order to 
show that the trends in arms and armour changed throughout time, but that there was 
overlap, and also elements which did not change as much as others. 
 At the beginning of the Iron Age we have little evidence for arms and 
armour.
133
 The evidence that we do posses comes from a relatively small number of 
burials.
134
 Over time, the number of arms deposited in tombs increases.
135
 In this 
early period the most common form of defensive protection that we find in the 
archaeology is the helmet. Two types of helmets predominate the evidence between 
the beginning of the tenth century and the end of the ninth century. The most 
recognizable of these helmets are the crested ‘Villanovan’ helmets found throughout 
Etruria, the Ager Faliscus, Picene territory, and Campania.
136
 This type of helmet 
had a life of about 150 years, perhaps longer, in central Italy. The design of the 
helmets continued to change throughout that period. Examples have been found in 
both bronze and impasto copies.
137
 These helmets are spectacular for their large 
crests (Fig. 18). The illustration provided is of the helmet from Tomb 871 at Veii 
with a ludicrously large crest measuring 64 cm from the base to the top of the 
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crest.
138
 The nature of these crests has been described as decorative and evidence of 
conspicuous consumption and/or ritual rather than of actual warfare.
139
 The example 
from Veii may be strong evidence of this, as the size of the crest would make it 
somewhat impractical to wear into battle. Additionally, we do not possess any 
iconographic depictions of this kind of helmet being worn into battle, although this 
absence could also be attributed to artistic conventions of the time which did not 
show scenes of battle in paintings or engravings.
140
 
 The diameter of the crested helmets averaged between 25 and 35 cm. The 
size of the crest varied considerably, but a range of 15 cm to 63 cm is representative; 
the measurement is typically taken from the base of the helmet to the tip of the 
crest.
141
 The crest, and the helmets themselves, are made of sheet bronze which has 
been hammered and then fastened together.
142
 They were heavily decorated with 
pearlettes and geometric designs, although the level of decoration is not consistent. 
The style of decoration is similar to styles north of the Alps in the contemporary 
Hallstatt culture, which we also see in other types of helmets from this period and on 
other types of vessels, discussed in detail below.
143
 The purpose of this decoration is 
not entirely clear. If the helmets were meant to be worn in life, whether on the 
battlefield or ceremonially, the decorative elements would have increased the visual 
prestige of the helmet and would be a readily visible element distinguishing the 
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wearer from a wearer of a less decorated helmet. If these helmets were expressly 
made for use in ritual and/or the grave, the decorative elements may be taken as a 
sign of social differentiation between those individuals using or being buried with 
less decorated helmets and those with the heavily decorated helmets. It is also quite 
possible that the designs and intricacies were simply a matter of preference or 
fashion. 
 Within the general category of crested helmets existed one other 
differentiating element besides decorative elements. The most widespread style of 
crested helmets used a skullcap shape with a spike at the top (Fig. 19).
144
 This style 
of construction is found in examples from central Italy, north western Italy, 
Campania, Basilicata, and Picenum.
145
 The other style of construction of these 
helmets consisted of a skullcap shape with no spike (Fig. 19).
146
 These helmets are 
more limited in their distribution, being primarily concentrated in areas near the 
Tiber.
147
 It is unclear whether or not these two types of construction would give any 
type of structural advantage to the helmets. Those with a spike used at the top of the 
helmet may add more structural stability to the crest, although without experimental 
reconstructions it is impossible to gauge how important this would have been in 
combat or in ritual use. 
 The second style of helmet common during the Early Iron Age is the cap 
helmet. This type of helmet, again, can be divided into two different general designs. 
The first style is that with a knob on top (Figs. 20-21).
148
 This style of the cap helmet 
is most commonly found in central Italy, with some examples coming from the 
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Adriatic coast east-northeast of Etruria and Latium.
149
 The principle concentration of 
these helmets is in the Early Iron Age cemeteries of Tarquinia.
150
 This type of helmet 
is not unique to Italy. Examples which have been linked to the Italian specimens 
have been found in the Carpathians and seem to have been an element of the Bronze 
Age Urnfield culture.
151
 It appears that they were markers of social rank and were 
restricted to a rather small number of individuals. In Tarquinia these helmets played 
a particular role in the evolution of identity in burials and were also an indicator of 
social status or rank.
152
 
 The bell helmets without knobs are less common than those with knobs.
153
 In 
Etruscan contexts they appear to only have been produced in Tarquinia. Two 
examples have been found here (Fig. 20).
154
 These were found in the eighth century 
necropoleis of the settlement. The style of these helmets does not appear to be 
connected to the same areas outside of Italy as the knobbed cap helmets do. Those 
without knobs, however, are similar in style to a number of examples found in the far 
upstream of the Po River and in the foothills of the Italian Alps.
155
 The decoration on 
these helmets is similar to that of the other helmet types from the region. This could 
be an indication that these helmets were produced by and for residents in central 
Italy, although their rarity in the region and relative commonality in the foothills of 
the Alps may indicate that they were imported wares. 
 The practical differences between these two general types of helmets (crested 
and bell) are negligible. Their usefulness as pieces of armour must have been 
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somewhat similar. Both helmet types cover the top of the head, sitting above the eye 
line. They do not provide protection to the back of the neck or any parts of the face. 
This type of protection is helpful against blows coming from above, such as a 
downward slash from a sword or a lofty thrust of a spear. They would have also 
provided adequate protection against missiles of all types. Perhaps the biggest 
difference between the two helmets on the battlefield was the extra height which 
they provided the wearer.
156
 In later times, and other contexts within the 
Mediterranean, crested helmets of a different fashion functioned similarly.
157
 Greek 
art, and a number of physical examples, evidence the use of crests in that sphere of 
warfare.
158
 The use of crests on helmets may be explained by its increasing the 
perceived height of the user, thus creating a more intimidating figure to the enemy. 
 The importance of these helmets off of the battlefield, in both social and 
funerary contexts, may have been quite different. The ornate nature and expense 
related to the production of the crested helmets must be related to the status or 
wealth of the wearer, whether dead or alive.
159
 In Tarquinia, crested helmets covered 
the four biconical urns which are often cited as the earliest funerary evidence for the 
development of political status which was divorced from kin related status.
160
 These 
four burials stand out from their peers as not being within established familial burial 
patterns. Bell helmets with knobs were probably used for similar purposes in the 
funerary ritual. This has been discussed quite thoroughly especially in recent 
literature.
161
 That helmets were an indicator of social position is supported by the use 
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of both bronze and impasto imitations in burials. At this point in the archaeology it is 
impossible to know whether political and military power or office overlapped, 
although it is probable that they did. Scholars tend to connect the two, which is a 
well established connection and practise in archaeological literature from a world 
perspective. It is difficult to prove this for central Italy, however, and a discussion of 
the Tarquinian evidence is important. 
 It is from this settlement that we see the first differentiation between familial 
and non-familial burial practices.
162
 Warrior identity, though, was common to all 
burial types.
163
 The burial type most commonly associated with family strength, the 
hut-urn burial, is also noted for its wealth in vessels, ceremonial tools, and arms and 
armour.
164
 In Tarquinia, hut-urn burials occur in central positions within familial 
burial groups.
165
 This positioning, and the wealth of these burials, has been 
interpreted as signalling that the interred was a paterfamilias figure, or the head of an 
Etruscan gens. It cannot be said with certainty that helmet burials were of a lesser, 
superior, or equal social standing as hut-urn burials with arms. 
 The geometric designs which adorn many of the Villanovan helmets provide 
an important piece of evidence regarding their manufacture. As we have seen above, 
the typologies of some of these helmets are linked to examples from central Europe, 
especially the Urnfield culture. The geometric designs, as well, are common between 
central Italy and Europe north of the Alps.
166
 Along with these patterns, the 
concurrent use of hut/house urns in Northern Germany, Scandinavia, and Pomerania 
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have been linked to the existence of elite networks connecting much of Europe.
167
 
Metal smiths from north of the Alps are often cited as being present in central Italy 
during this period, crafting many of the bronze objects, including the helmets, for 
their elite patrons.
168
 The culmination of this contact and cultural exchange can be 
seen in the funerary remains of tomb AAI from Quattro Fontanili, Veii.
169
 Taken 
together, the contents of this tomb closely represent the idealized Urnfield warrior 
(Fig. 22):
170
 small shield with bronze facing, short sword, spear, ornate helmet with 
geometric designs, and a ritual amphora (Fig. 23). The amphora from this tomb is 
particularly important, as it is among the Veio-Gevelinghausen-Seddin group, which 
are stylistically similar, in construction and decoration.
171
 The construction of 
warrior identity, especially through the use of helmets, was influenced from outside 
of central Italy, but was shaped and solidified using uniquely Villanovan models, 
such as the crested helmet. 
 During the Early Iron Age we also find evidence for two other pieces of 
defensive arms in central Italy. The first types of armour, shields are not abundantly 
attested during this period.
172
 Oval shields are represented iconographically and in 
miniature at Veii and Bisenzio-Capodimonte.
173
 They are characterized by a number 
of ‘spindles’ radiating from what appears to be a central strong point (Fig. 24). 
Bronze round shields are also attested beginning in the eighth century, although 
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fragmentary and rare.
174
 The remains of a shield found in the Tomb of the Warrior at 
Tarquinia, dating to the eighth century, had traces of a leather backing.
175
 It is 
possible, if not probable, that these shields are evidence of a progressive 
development, which began with a type of round shield made of stretched leather over 
a wooden frame, which eventually came to be sturdier shields with a bronze 
facing.
176
 Bronze facing would have given extra strength and value in combat for the 
bearer. This would also give the user a more formidable appearance in battle, and the 
metal facing on shields may have helped to establish the status of its bearer on the 
field. 
 The final type of armour found throughout the Early Iron Age is chest 
armour. The normal form of this was the pectoral, found throughout central Italy.
177
 
Pectorals of a style most commonly associated with Etruria, square with geometric 
designs, have also been found in Picenum (Fig. 25).
178
 These are more common in 
Southern Etruria and Latium, and do not occur in Etruscan contexts in the north.
179
 
Four examples have been found in Rome.
180
 The protection gained by wearing these 
devices was not extensive. It is possible, along with many other pieces of kit from 
this period that the value of these items was in display or identity. Rarely, 
breastplates are attested during the Early Iron Age, with the notable example being 
the cuirass of the seventh century from Narce.
181
 Some commentators have noted 
that this was constructed out of thin bronze sheet, and would have been less 
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protective than a similar piece made of thick leather.
182
 No Early Iron Age leather 
armour survives intact from central Italy, and it is only a hypothesis that it would 
have existed. This hypothesis also ignores the opportunity for display on the 
battlefield, provided by bronze armour.
183
 
 Offensive arms during the Early Iron Age (c. 900-750) are represented by 
swords and by spears. Swords are the most resource intensive of these two groups.
184
 
They require a substantial amount of labour and resources to construct and could not 
have been common to all members of society.
185
 Antenna swords are found in a 
number of Etruscan contexts. These are mostly in Southern Etruria, with a number of 
finds in Northern Etruria.
186
 There are also a number of finds of this type of sword 
on the fringes of the Po Plain. An example of this type of sword has also been found 
in Rome.
187
 In Italian contexts antenna swords are more often found in Picene 
contexts than in Etruria.
188
 A type of antenna sword, with associated production in 
Tarquinia, is commonly found in northern Italy.
189
 A number of examples also exist 
from Apennine contexts, as well. These swords are characterized by their hilt which 
has a pommel consisting of two so-called antennae which wrap in on themselves 
(Fig. 26). Antenna swords were long swords which could imply that they were meant 
for slashing attacks, although their use as a stabbing weapon is not to be dismissed. 
These types of swords are not unique to Italy and are closely associated with the 
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cultures of the Alps and of the Hallstatt culture throughout Bronze Age Europe.
 190
 
This is further evidence that the arms and armour of central Italy during the Early 
Iron Age was influenced by cultures north of the Alps. 
 The second type of sword found in central Italian contexts is the so-called 
mushroom hilted short sword (Griffzungenschwerter mit pilzförmigem Knauf).
191
 
These swords are shorter than antenna swords and have a considerably different 
shape (Fig. 27). Whilst the antenna swords have a relatively even shape all the way 
down, tapering to a point at the end, and a relatively narrow character, the mushroom 
hilted swords have a very wide profile at the base and taper almost in a wedge shape 
towards the tip. These swords are closer in style to the swords commonly associated 
with later Roman armies of the Republic.
192
 These swords were probably used as 
stabbing weapons; although, like the antenna swords we should not pigeon hole 
these weapons into one method of wounding. The development of this type of sword 
may have been the result of heavier armour coming into usage in Italy, and it has 
been argued that they would be more effective as a piercing weapon than antenna 
swords.
193
 Unlike antenna swords, the mushroom hilted swords are not found north 
of the Alps. They are considerably more common in central Italy than other sword 
types, with examples also existing from south of the Bay of Naples as well as the 
farthest points of Southern Italy. These are possibly of a Mediterranean type or 
influenced by other Mediterranean types, although there is some precedence in 
Bronze Age Italy for swords with similarly shaped blades.
194
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 Antenna swords were a common Bronze Age phenomenon in Europe, overlapping with the Early 
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Stary (1979), 185. 
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 During the Early Iron Age the axe seems to have been a popular weapon.
195
 
Single faced axes are common in Etruria (Fig. 28). Simple, undecorated, examples 
are found throughout a very extensive area, from the farthest reaches of Northern 
Etruria and the Po Plain south to the Bay of Naples.
196
 In Etruria proper this is one of 
the most commonly found weapons in Etruscan burials.
197
 Decorated axe heads are 
found in the cemeteries of a number of large settlements. These may be indicators of 
social rank and position and may be more related to political office or symbolism 
than to warfare. If these decorated examples are related to political status they may 
be the precursors to the fasces of the historical period. Axes and palstaves may have 
originally been influenced by contacts with Europe north of the Alps, where Bronze 
Age use of the axe was widespread.
198
 
 With the coming of the late eighth/early seventh centuries the arms and 
armour found throughout central Italy changed. Helmet design drastically changed in 
this period, shifting from the crested ‘Villanovan’ helmets and cap helmets to those 
shaped like a semicircular dome (Fig. 29). Archaeologically recovered examples of 
this type of helmet are limited in central Italy.
199
 The design has been found in the 
environs of Veii, Rome and Vetulonia.
200
 They are attested in the Apennines. This 
type of helmet is found widely on the Adriatic coast of Picenum. It is a similar style 
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to the double ridged helmet found at Populonia, which is itself a style more common 
in the Eastern regions of modern Slovenia.
201
 
 It is during the early seventh century that chest protection also changes, with 
the appearance of the disc shaped heart protector (kardiophylax) (Fig. 30).
202
 This 
round disk protector covered the centre of the chest and was typically supported by a 
harness of sorts which held it in place.
203
 Some scholars see these as a continuing 
development of the pectorals of the earlier Iron Age, but point out connections to 
Assyrian models.
204
 Examples of these have been found across a wide range of sites 
in Etruria. The style of these heart plates is not unique to Etruria, and occurs more 
often in Picenum and regions just south.
205
 Examples of this type of armour have 
also been found on Corsica. The defensive value of these types of armour is 
negligible. Using the so-called Capastrano Warrior (Fig. 31) as an example of how 
much surface area these would protect shows us that only a small area of the chest 
would benefit.
206
 It could be that these items were more an element of prestige and 
identity than they were of practical military kit. Whether or not more practical 
options were available and made of organic materials, such as leather, which did not 
survive in the archaeological record is impossible to tell.
207
 
 The Near East has also been pointed to as the source of a number of other 
developments in central Italian arms and armour from the eighth to middle of the 
seventh century.
208
 Round bronze shields, which had a central boss, are found 
                                                 
201
 This type of helmet is typically associated with the Hallstatt C2 to D2 periods, Stary (1981), 65-66. 
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throughout Etruria, and can be equated to Near Eastern precedents.
209
 The bronze 
facing of these shields is thin and was not the core defensive element of the device. 
These bronze façades were affixed to either wood or wicker rounds, which would 
have provided much of the defensive protection of the shield.
210
 Daggers, similar to 
those visible in evidence from the reigns of Sargon II and Sennacherib, were in use 
in Etruria during this period.
211
 Spears also saw continued use in this period. This 
combination of arms and armour led Stary to equate the central Italian warriors or 
soldiers of this period to the image of contemporary Assyrian soldiers (Fig. 34). This 
depiction shows an Assyrian soldier during the reign of Ashurbanipal (r. 668-627) 
who is wearing a kardiophylax, of the type now common in central Italy, carrying a 
spear and a dagger, and armed with a wicker shield.
212
 
 The last major adoption in central during this period regarding warfare was 
the chariot.
213
 This piece of technology is linked, again, to Near Eastern imports.
214
 
The existence of war chariots throughout the Near East and early Greece provides 
evidence that these types of vehicles could and were used successfully in warfare.
215
 
Iconography from a slightly later period (especially from the sixth century) shows 
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chariots being used by armed riders.
216
 Chariots are found in the burials of both 
males and females throughout central Italy.
217
 The existence of chariots in female 
burials indicates that they were not necessarily, and probably not, used in actual 
warfare. The most probable use of chariots in central Italian warfare was to ferry a 
warrior to and from the battlefield. The most common use of wheeled vehicles, 
though, was in processions or simply as a status symbol.
218
 
 Adoption of the Greek style ‘hoplite’ panoply began around the middle of the 
seventh century in central Italy. It has long been pointed out that types of arms and 
armour found in the archaeology and iconography of Etruria, especially, began to 
shift at this point.
219
 One of the most important changes during this period was the 
adoption of the Corinthian helmet (Fig. 35).
220
 This type of helmet represents a leap 
in protectiveness from its central Italian antecedents.
221
 Unlike the helmets of the 
Early Iron Age, the Corinthian helmet provided considerable protection to the back 
of the head as well as the cheeks and face. This type of helmet is traditionally 
thought of as a strong factor in the development of tightly packed combat.
222
 It was 
quickly adapted for warfare in central Italy, however, with the development of the 
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Etrusco-Corinthian or Etrusco-Illyrian helmet (Figs. 36).
223
 These helmets had 
considerably larger openings for the eyes and ears, with cheek guards that more 
closely followed a man’s beard line rather than the entire face. In time the Negau 
helmet also became popular throughout central Italy, which gave the wearer 
completely unimpaired vision and hearing.
224
 
 All three styles of helmets were in use from the end of the eighth century 
until the end of the period under study, although the evidence for precise styles falls 
off as time progressed.
225
 The adoption of the Corinthian helmet and the Negau type 
helmet show a continuing trend in central Italian armour, a willingness, or a need, to 
adopt designs from outside. The origin of the Corinthian helmet was with the 
Greeks, perhaps in phalanx warfare. The Negau helmet is a widespread helmet 
design found throughout Italy, the Alpine regions, and into Slovenia.
226
 The exact 
origins of this type of helmet are not entirely clear, and it could have been designed 
first in central Italy, the Alps, or Slovenia.
 227
 The development of the Etrusco-
Corinthian/Illyrian helmet, and subsequent development of the Negau type, shows 
that although there was an impetus to import new helmet designs, there was also a 
need to adapt imported designs to local requirements.
228
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Two spectacular examples of the Negau helmet were those dedicated by the 
Syracusan tyrant, Hieron I, after a victory over the Etruscans at Cumae in 474.
229
 
The trophy also included a Corinthian helmet (see above). Each of these helmets was 
engraved ‘Hιάρον ὁ Δεινομενεος/ καὶ τοὶ Συρακόσιοι/ τοι Δὶ Τυρ<ρ>αν’ ἀπό Κύμας’ 
‘Hiaron [the son] of Deinomenes and the Syracusans to Zeus [dedicated these arms 
captured from] the Tyrrhenians at Kyme.’230 This battle was also commemorated by 
Pindar (Pyth. 1.71-76).
231
 Presumably all three helmets were captured arms which 
had been used by Etruscan sailors or ‘marines’ during the battle (cf. Diod. Sic. 
11.51). If this is a correct assumption, then it shows contemporaneous use of both the 
Negau and Corinthian type helmets. 
 Large round shields, along the lines of the Greek aspis, called a clipeus by 
the Romans (Livy 1.43), are also found from the middle of the eighth century 
onwards.
232
 Although round shields were in use before this period, the development 
of larger, bronze faced, shields only began at this point. These were probably made 
with a core of wood and only faced with bronze, like their Greek counterparts.
233
 As 
is often pointed out in the development of Greek arms and armour, the development 
of the double grip (porpax/antilabe) on these shields allowed for greater mobility 
and use.
234
 Some scholars go so far as to claim large shields like these were usable 
only because of this double grip system.
235
 Evidence of the double grip, though, is 
not always present. A number of surviving bronze shields/facings have remnants of 
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these two grips.
236
 Artistic depictions of the porpax and antilabe are present in native 
art, although the import of Greek artistic styles makes the interpretation of these 
images complicated (Fig. 39).
237
 It is probable, though, that the depiction was 
reflective of the shields in use in central Italy during this period. 
 Chest protection was left to two principal types. The first of these was the 
bronze cuirass. Surviving examples in central Italy are not common, although this is 
also true of Greece, where the bronze cuirass is often associated with the full hoplite 
panoply.
238
 As we have seen above, some modern commentators have pointed out 
that the Italian examples are made of relatively thinly hammered bronze sheet and 
would have been less protective than chest protection made of other materials, such 
as organics. This conclusion presumes the existence of organic body armour, usually 
described as leather, something that does not survive in the archaeological record.
239
 
Although this is a widely held belief in the modern scholarship, it cannot and should 
not be taken as fact. There is no evidence for the use of leather armour in central 
Italy, which could be due to circumstances of survival of organic materials in the 
archaeological record, but any conclusion drawn on this point must be speculative, 
rather than authoritative as this conclusion is often stated. Scholars who believe that 
the protection afforded by bronze body armour was inferior, thus precluding them 
from actual combat use, overlook the importance of display in combat, just as we 
have seen with the tall crested Villanovan helmets above.
240
 Glittering metallic 
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armour provided a fearsome image for the enemy, with the prime example from 
Italian antiquity being the Samnties described by Livy (9.40).
241
 
 The second type of chest protection found in central Italy in the Archaic 
Period was the linothorax, linen armour.
242
 Depictions of this type of armour are 
widespread in art during this period. It is represented in statuary (Fig. 40) of warriors 
and depictions which show the Etruscan Mars, Laran. Pseudo-historical figures such 
as the Vibenna brothers are shown wearing this type of armour when ambushing and 
kidnapping the prophet Cacu.
243
 In figurative art, individual warriors are depicted 
wearing linothorakes (Fig. 41), as well as are men in armed groups. Armed riders are 
also depicted wearing this type of armour. This type of armour is well attested 
throughout the Mediterranean. Twice it is mentioned in the Homeric poems (Il. 
2.529, 830; cf. Strabo 13.1.10 and Pliny NH 19.6). A linen corselet was good enough 
for a king of Veii to wear in the latter half of the fifth century (Livy 4.20). Their use 
in the central Mediterranean in general is attested for the early fifth century by the 
dedication at Olympia of three linothorakes by Gelon after the battle of Himera 
(Paus. 6.19.7). Recent reconstructions of ancient linen armour have shown that it was 
incredibly strong. It could have stopped arrows from penetrating from a distance as 
close as four meters.
244
 The level of protection granted by linen was more significant 
than that of thinner bronze plate, and possibly leather, if armour was actually made 
of leather. Linen armour was lighter than its metallic counterparts, and would have 
been well adapted to use in open warfare. Linothorakes could also occupy the 
                                                                                                                                          
plate was not an effective armour for protection, but its value for display is still important. It is worth 
noting that the remains of bronze corsets and shield facings from Olympia show that they could be 
pierced by enemy weapons, but this does not seem to have stopped the Greeks from using this type of 
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important place of display in combat through the weaving of metal scales or other 
artistic elements into or onto the armour. By themselves, fresh linen corselets may 
have provided an element of this as well, as Alcaeus includes thorakes of new linen 
among the other spectacular arms of the period (Frg. 2.19). 
 The importance of this type of armour should not be underestimated. Besides 
the actual combat advantages that have been noted above, there was another practical 
advantage to linen armour: it could be made in the home with a readily available 
material.
245
 Weaving was an important element of the household economy 
throughout the Mediterranean, and was possibly a defining element of central Italian 
women’s activities.246 The image of the Roman wife diligently sitting at home doing 
her weaving is embedded in the probably anachronistic story of the rape and suicide 
of Lucretia (Livy 1.57). What this means, though, is that Etruscan and Roman 
soldiers could have their armour made at home, rather than hiring out to a smith. 
 Changes in offensive arms begin to appear in the seventh century. At this 
point we see a new type of sword emerge in the Ager Faliscus, Picenum and in 
Umbria; the so-called double edged bat swords (Zweischneidige Hiebschwerter) 
were long swords with a simpler style of hilt than the antenna swords.
247
 The blade 
tapered from the hilt to a narrow point and then tapered wider and finally tapering 
again to the point. This created a slightly leaf shaped blade, although completely 
unrelated to the leaf shaped bladed short swords of the Aegean. Examples of this 
type of sword are also found in Southern Italy. The Faliscan, Picene, and Umbrian 
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swords were probably used as slashing weapons as their size and blade shape would 
have given them an advantage when used in this manner.
248
 This type of sword was 
not adopted in Etruria or Latium. 
Offensive arms of the Archaic Period differed from the Early Iron Age. 
Swords were fashioned after the curved blade designs of the Greeks, or possibly a 
design from south-central Europe, including a knuckled hilt (Figs. 42).
249
 Short 
swords with straight blades were also in use, similar in design to the Early Iron Age, 
and similar as well to designs used in later Roman periods (Figs. 43).
250
 The first of 
these would have been effective as a slashing or ‘chopping’ weapon, although a 
distinct point was present. Straight bladed short swords would have been designed as 
a stabbing weapon, similar to their use in later Roman legionary combat. A type of 
dagger with a hilt similar to the antenna swords also existed in Latium and the ager 
Faliscus which are typologically associated with examples from the Hallstatt 
culture.
251
 Spears were an important and well attested element of the arms of this 
period. Spearheads are found throughout central Italy in the Archaic Period (except 
for Rome) and range in size from large leaf blades to smaller, perhaps javelin, 
points.
252
 Larger spearheads may indicate a larger spear in general, and would have 
been used as a stabbing weapon, giving its wielder a good amount of reach. Smaller 
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spears could have been used as missiles, an action attested in the later narrative 
history of the period.
253
 
 Axes are attested in the Archaic Period, in slightly different styles than seen 
in the Early Iron Age.
254
 As opposed to the palstaves of the Early Iron Age, the axes 
of the Archaic Period were often double headed.
255
 Use of axes is shown in 
depictions of both infantry and cavalry. Modern commentators have a mixed history 
of interpreting these weapons.
256
 Most have dismissed their use in combat, with 
prominent members of the field like Mario Torelli describing them as archaising 
elements of Archaic art.
257
 This traditional consternation is based in the supposed 
incompatibility of the double headed axe in orthodox hoplite warfare.
258
 A helmet 
from Etruria, though, provides evidence of damage sustained from the blow of an 
axe.
259
 As we see below, the traditional view of hoplite warfare has been questioned 
in recent scholarship, and in this work, and there is no reason to restrict what we 
consider viable combat weapons to a limited interpretation of this kind. Moving 
away from a hoplite based understanding of combat in central Italy means that the 
axe should be viewed not as an archaising element but as a common weapon, if not 
culturally unique, in the context of the central Mediterranean. 
 The bow and arrow are not well attested in central Italy.
260
 Remains of 
arrowheads exist, but are not exceedingly common. A number of depictions in native 
art show archers operating within a mixed combat, including ‘heavy infantry’ and 
cavalry. We also see two figures armed with round shields, spears, and bows and 
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arrows on a set of horse face-guards (Fig. 44). These depictions are not common, 
though. Archers are also depicted onboard ships in Etruscan art (Fig. 16).
261
 They are 
not the only armed members of the crew, and are counted amongst non-missile 
infantry. Arrowheads were amongst the recovered items from the Giglio wreck.
262
 
 This survey of the changes of arms and armour in central Italy reveals a 
number of important concepts. The first is that the cultures of central Italy were 
receptive of foreign designs in arms and armour from a very early time. Actively 
acquiring new types of arms helped to expand the contact networks connected to 
central Italy and helped influence non-military elements of culture, with the northern 
influences on geometric art being very prominent. Through these networks, the 
social power of Etruscan elites was enhanced, allowing them to acquire prestige 
objects from abroad, with arms and armour providing an easy opportunity to display 
these connections within their communities. 
2.2 Tactics 
 The use of warriors, soldiers, weapons, and technology on the battlefield 
collectively make up the concept of tactics. Execution of certain types of tactics, 
such as the Greeks’ use of the phalanx in pitched battle or the Roman manipular 
organization, is often pointed to as being a decisive factor in either victory or defeat. 
Scholars have traditionally promulgated the idea that tactics followed technology.
263
 
For example as defensive armour became heavier and mobility, visibility, and 
audibility became more restricted, it is often argued that the Greeks were forced to 
adopt the phalanx tactics of the traditional literature. Within this view, the arms and 
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armour of the Greeks directed how they fought their wars.
264
 While technology does 
play an important role in guiding the development of tactics, cultural considerations 
are as or more important than their technological counterparts. Using the Greek 
example again, along with heavier arms and armour, cultural mores of the period are 
traditionally thought to have guided the practise of warfare, if not as strictly adhered 
to as the practices described by Mardonius (Hdt. 7.9).
265
 Perhaps the most extreme 
example of tactics being shaped by cultural trends was the practise of rank and file 
musket volleys of the Enlightenment (c. eighteenth century AD).
266
 While musket 
armed forces in Europe were fighting in controlled lines exchanging civilized 
volleys, the native peoples of North America used the same types of arms to wage a 
type of guerrilla warfare on their enemies, eventually being adopted by the American 
colonials.
267
 This section looks at how technology and culture may have guided the 
development of tactics in central Italy. 
 In the Early Iron Age we have no literary or artistic evidence to help us 
understand the tactical situation. We can only try to reconstruct battle during this 
period based on our general knowledge of society at this time and our knowledge of 
the arms and armour in use. The types of helmets in use during this period sat high 
on the head and did not impede either vision or hearing. It is possible that this 
indicates an open style of combat in which situational awareness is more important 
than maximum protection.
268
 Spears, especially long spears, have been proposed as 
the primary weapon amongst the panoply described above, and that battle usually 
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took the form of a scrimmage between individual combatants duelling with spears, 
or if that had broken swords and axes.
269
 
The advantage of the crested bronze helmets, in particular, may have come to 
bear in combat such as this. As their purpose was to enhance the perceived height of 
the wearer, thus creating a more formidable persona on the battlefield, in individual 
duels, combatants with less impressive headwear would have been at a psychological 
disadvantage. We have also seen above that both crested and bell helmets may have 
been used to create an identity associated with arms in burial; if this identity 
transferred into the world of the living, the value of these helmets on the battlefield 
may have been in establishing the identity of seasoned warriors or of men from a 
warrior ‘class,’ or perhaps just particularly wealthy or otherwise powerful 
individuals. If there were combatants present on the field who were of a perceived 
lesser class, then the tactical application of this kit was in a rudimentary type of 
psychological warfare. 
 Examples of this type of effect being cause by arms are present in poetic 
evidence, although not from strictly ‘historical’ sources.270 In the Homeric epics, 
elaborate arms and armour helped to differentiate different warriors. Their arms and 
armour helped to establish and communicate their legend and their prowess in 
warfare.
271
 The Greek army’s bronze armour lit the sky, for how polished and 
gleaming it was (Il. 19.359-363).
272
 This effect is echoed in Virgil’s description of 
Aeneas’ ‘star-bright shield and celestial armour: a vision of fire,’ (Aen. 12.165-
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167).
273
 There is some indication that this was a genuine element of early Greek 
society and that the ‘biography’ of artefacts could be transmitted through time.274 If 
similar cultural practices were at work in central Italy it is possible that the ornately 
decorated bronze helmets that we know from funerary contexts would have helped to 
circulate these stories throughout the region, thus adding a legendary element to the 
perceived combat prowess of those individuals, their compatriots, and those warriors 
who wore similar items. 
 The effects of this psychological battle cannot be fully understood in any 
recreation of Early Iron Age battle and tactics. The perceived standing, whether in 
physicality or class, of an opponent would have affected the combat potential of 
individual combatants, especially if someone of a lower standing was fighting a 
renowned warrior. This would give an advantage to wealthy or elite combatants in 
single combat. This could also give an advantage to warriors or soldiers who were 
associated with fighters who possessed this type of battlefield gravitas. Although it is 
quite impossible to prove, it is possible that tactical ‘units’ on the battlefield mirrored 
the social organization of Etruscan settlements during this period. If this is true, 
groups of fighters would have been drawn together around prominent members of 
elite families. This is reflected by the clustering of burials around centralized, 
wealthy, burials throughout the period.
275
 These groups are typically associated with 
kin groups.
276
 In Tarquinia, the leaders of these kin groups were buried within hut 
urns for a period in the Early Iron Age.
277
 This type of burial can be contrasted, 
though, in the late eighth century with a number of burials found outside of the kin 
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structure, which have consistently been interpreted as representing the existence of 
an early state structure beyond the family group. 
 Hut urns/family leaders were surrounded by burials with arms, possibly 
representing armed retainers or family members. If these were indeed warriors or 
soldiers, it seems plausible that they would have fought together as a unit. As we see 
towards the end of the Early Iron Age, though, this familial society is contrasted with 
extra familial, perhaps ‘state’ burials.278 Based on this social change, armies of Early 
Iron Age Tarquinia, and perhaps Etruria in general, may have been drawn up by state 
leaders, but at the most basic levels were still based on familial links. Tactically, 
these armies may have fought in a single battle line, but the possibility of 
micromanagement by family groups may have allowed for smaller, more 
manoeuvrable, tactical units. 
 Throughout the Orientalizing period, we have little reason to propose much 
of a different tactical organization than described above. The introduction of the 
chariot, however, has been pointed to as signalling a change in tactics.
279
 Other 
scholars do not see this introduction as a drastic change.
280
 Depictions of the chariot 
in the iconographic tradition beginning in the late seventh century often show an 
armed figure ascending into a chariot at the back end of a line of other armed men 
(Fig. 45). This appears to be a position of command or prestige, and the chariot, far 
from being an instrument of tactical superiority, was a means of conveyance.
281
 This 
is the usual practice found in the Iliad.
282
 Fitting in with the above emphasis on 
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display in combat, some chariot riders in Homer choose not to dismount, but to stay 
on their chariot to display their glory (Il. 12.110-115). This was one of the reasons 
that the chariot was adopted in central Italy. 
 During this period we also see an increasing amount of evidence that horses 
were regularly ridden.
283
 The use of horses in warfare may date to an earlier period 
in Italian history, though, as domesticated horses are attested at least as far back as 
the Terramare culture.
284
 Italians, the inhabitants of central Italy in particular, had a 
penchant for horsemanship, and by the Archaic period it is obviously an important 
element of the regional culture.
285
 In their earliest usage, horses may have been used 
in a similar way to chariots, being a means of conveyance to and from the 
battlefield.
286
 It is probable that they were used in raiding, though, which is well 
attested behaviour in early equine cultures.
287
 
 If it is difficult for us to say much about the tactics of warfare in the Early 
Iron Age, it is slightly less so as we move towards the historical period. Organized 
groups of armed men begin to appear in at least the seventh century. The Tragliatella 
oinochoe is a prime example of this (Fig. 11).
288
 This vessel has had a long and 
difficult history of interpretation.
289
 Besides showing a line of figures carrying 
shields and three spears or javelins each, the other images show a labyrinth, two 
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riders on horseback (along with a captive?), a lone figure, and then an erotic 
scene.
290
 The image of the labyrinth bears an inscription which reads ‘TRUIA’, 
which has been suggested to mean ‘Troy.’291 While it may show a line of soldiers, it 
has been persuasively argued that what is depicted by the line of figures bearing 
arms is an armed dance.
292
 Less problematic depictions begin with another series of 
oinochoes which are quite similar and currently held in the Royal Ontario Museum 
of Archaeology, in Toronto (Figs. 12-13).
293
 Native depictions of organized groups 
of warriors or soldiers eventually become relatively common, and their 
representation on Etrusco-Corinthian ware becomes more detailed (Fig. 46).
294
  
 The importance of these depictions is not immediately clear. To some 
commentators, they imply that there existed some sort of military organization in the 
communities which produced these images.
295
 To others, these images are not 
directly linked to actual warfare, but to ritual or to dance.
296
 It is very appealing to 
try to claim that organized lines of men apparently armed for war is evidence for 
tightly organized lines of battle, or at least of organized units. The increasingly 
‘heavy’ nature of arms and armour during this period may indicate closer knit tactics 
as well, which is particularly reflected in the use of the Greek style Corinthian 
helmet. This helmet was extremely restrictive and was most effectively used in a 
tightly organized line of battle.
297
 As we have seen above, though, this helmet was 
not used for a long period of time in its most basic form, and was improved upon to 
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fit a looser form of combat. The existence of tightly packed battle arrays could be 
true, and may have been reflected in the Early Iron Age through familial links, 
although we cannot prove any definite opinion to be true. They are, in both the least 
and the most, evidence that something brought men bearing arms together into 
groups: ritual, dance, or perhaps actual warfare.
298
 
 During this period (c. 650), as we have seen above, Greek style arms and 
armour begin to make their way into the material record of central Italy. Scholars 
have often taken this evidence, alongside depictions of ‘ranks’ of identically (or 
similarly) armed men to be indicative of the practise of hoplite warfare in central 
Italy for this period.
299
 A number of theories exist as to how hoplite arms and tactics 
would have made their way into central Italy, with many scholars believing that their 
transmission from the Greeks of Southern Italy is the most probable.
300
 This seems to 
be a clear example of the concept of peer polity interaction, in which the advanced 
military technology and tactics of the newly arrived Greeks forced the Etruscans and 
then the Romans to adopt said methods.
301
 This conclusion is problematic for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the type of combat which would have been encountered 
by Etruscan and Greek traders would have presumably been aboard ships, which 
certainly did not include phalanx combat. Secondly, when we do hear of combat 
between Etruscan and Greek armies, it is the cavalry that is emphasized in the 
narrative.
302
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The situation in general is made complicated by two other points: current 
discussions on Greek tactics of relatively similar periods, and the evidence of battle 
in the literary evidence. Because of these two issues, the possibility of hoplite 
warfare in central Italy must be addressed. 
 The idea of Etruscan and Roman hoplite phalanxes, in a tactical sense, is long 
rooted in the modern historical tradition.
303
 The most thorough early discussion in 
English can be found in McCartney’s landmark, if not flawed, article.304 McCartney 
believed that both Etruscans and Romans fought in a Greek style phalanx from 
sometime in the archaic period. This position was echoed in the coming decades, 
notably by Nilsson, for whom the introduction of this particular tactical formation 
had resonating socio-political consequences.
305
 For all these early scholars on the 
subject, the most convincing, and unquestionably ‘reliable’ according to Nilsson, 
piece of evidence for central Italian phalanxes was not to be found in the 
archaeological evidence, but rather in the Ineditum Vaticanum.
306
 This problematic 
text gives evidence for the adaptation of bronze shields (χαλχάσπιδες) by the Romans 
during their wars with the Etruscans. The text also tells us, though, that at the time of 
this adoption, the Romans also began to fight in phalanxes. 
 The Ineditum Vaticanum is not the only literary evidence marshalled in 
support of central Italian hoplite phalanxes. In the case of Rome, it has been 
proposed by a number of authors, and followed by many others, that the introduction 
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of the Servian Constitution signalled the introduction of the hoplite phalanx.
307
 This 
requires that the Servian Constitution be viewed as an egalitarian measure and that 
under this reform there was only one military class, known collectively to the 
Romans as classis. As we have seen in chapter three, however, the form of the 
Servian Constitution handed down to us by Livy, Dionysius, and Cicero cannot be 
discarded this quickly; thus, we should not readily accept the existence of a Roman 
hoplite phalanx based on the re-reading of this reform. It is obvious that direct 
knowledge of the tactics of this period were confused by the period in which our 
evidence was written, this is exemplified by a passage of Livy in which he claims 
that the Romans changed from a Macedonian style phalanx to the manipular army, 
changing from clipeii to scuti when pay was introduced (8.8). The proposal that the 
Roman army fought along the lines of a Macedonian army is certainly false and is 
reflective of the Late Republican and Augustan periods’ interest in the Hellenistic 
East and a conflation or misunderstanding of the extent to which ‘phalanx’ was a 
Classical concept. It is interesting that Livy is the only source which mentions this, 
which betrays it as his own confusion rather than that of his sources. 
 Modern arguments have typically supplemented this snippet of literary 
evidence with the body of archaeological and artistic evidence which indicates that 
Greek arms and armour were in use in central Italy.
308
 This evidence used to be 
extrapolated through the line of thinking that if the Etruscans and Romans had 
adopted the hoplite panoply, they must have also adopted the hoplite’s phalanx; this 
is because of the physical limitations put on a soldier by the hoplite kit. Stary, 
following the consensus of scholars on Greek armies (especially from the German 
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school), believed that ‘the panoply, especially the armour, the large hoplite shield 
with a diameter of 1 to 1.20m, and the Corinthian helmet which covered the whole 
head, was of no advantage but a positive obstacle for the single combat man-to-
man... the panoply was advantageous only in close formation, that is to say in the 
phalanx, and therefore depended on the phalanx-tactics.’309 Various scholars have 
iterated similar, if not almost exact, arguments in favour of this idea. Authorities on 
Greek warfare were the source of this conclusion.
310
 
 V. D. Hanson was very specific in his description of the ‘burden of hoplite 
arms and armour,’ as he called it.311 He believed that hoplites could only fight within 
the confines of a phalanx because of this burden. From Hanson’s seminal 
publication, which brought the study of Greek warfare up-to-date for the common 
twentieth-century reader, though, opinion on this point has differed and two general 
schools of thought have developed. The first, the ‘traditional,’ school accepts that the 
hoplite was so weighed down by his arms and armour that he could not but fight in 
relatively static square formations. The second, the ‘new,’ school argues that Greek 
battles and the hoplites which fought therein were more fluid and varied. Besides 
supposed ‘practical’ considerations on the size and weight of Greek arms and 
armour, there are a number of pieces of literary evidence which lend themselves to 
each side of this debate. 
 Much of the support for the idea that hoplites could only fight within the 
phalanx comes from Thucydides and Xenophon. Thucydides provides two good 
examples of hoplites being defeated by light armed troops (3.97-98; 4.32-36). In 
Xenophon’s Hellenica, two instances of hoplite forces being defeated by attacking 
                                                 
309
 Stary (1979), 193. 
310
 Cf. Schwartz (2009). A complete summary of arguments relating to the hoplite ‘debate’ can now 
be found in Kagan and Viggiano (2013b). 
311
 Hanson (1989), 55-88. 
65 
 
their ‘unprotected side’ are given: the first an army of Argive hoplites are defeated 
by Spartans, and in the second a group of Spartan hoplites are defeated by a group of 
missile troops (4.2.22; 4.5.13). The ‘naked’ side of these forces which were attacked 
has been assumed by translators and historians to mean the ‘right’ side of the 
hoplites, as this is the supposed side where the protection of the great hoplite aspis 
fell short.
312
 Recently, Schwartz has argued very strongly in favour of this view of 
hoplites and their phalanx, restating the supposed physical limitations and 
elaborating on the literary evidence which he views as proving the weaknesses of 
hoplites in terms of their mobility.
313
 
 Arguments against this theory, though, are becoming more abundant. From a 
period after the adoption of the hoplite kit, van Wees has argued that many ‘hoplite’ 
battles were probably fluid, involving missiles and hand to hand combat, rather than 
just the latter.
314
 He argues that the use of a ‘sideways on’ stance would allow a 
hoplite to shield himself completely with an aspis, not requiring a fellow to his 
right.
315
 Importantly, these arguments are founded on evidence for the Archaic age, 
precisely the period when the phalanx was supposedly adopted in Etruria and Rome. 
This would mean that even in battles between armies of hoplites, there would not 
necessarily be a need to fight in a tight formation, unless other factors, perhaps 
cavalry, were involved. This reconstruction would see battles somewhere in between 
the individual nature of Homeric duels and the rigidly set piece affairs described by 
earlier modern commentators. Further arguments by Rawlings provide historical 
examples of hoplites and their ‘burdensome kit’ fighting, and fighting well, outside 
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of a phalanx.
316
 He also draws an important parallel to the kit of Assyrian infantry of 
a relatively contemporary period, who are depicted as being able to perform a 
number of tasks which required a high level of mobility.
317
 
 Although a number of academics have refuted the claims and ideas put 
forward by the ‘new’ school, especially those of van Wees, these refutations lack 
much substance. Their arguments are based often in the camp of ‘physical 
limitations of the hoplite shield’ and provide little new analysis, simply restating 
earlier arguments. There has not been, to my knowledge, a direct refutation of the 
evidence provided by Rawlings for combat success outside of the phalanx and the 
literary sources that he has cited. If the contemporary Greeks were not restricted to 
the phalanx then why should we view the warfare of central Italy through this lens? 
 Bruno d’Agostino suggested, some years ago, that the Etruscan social system 
would have been unable to adapt to the egalitarianism which the hoplite phalanx 
supposedly brought with it.
318
 For Rome, Nathan Rosenstein has rightly pointed out 
that a phalanx along the Greek lines could not have developed in the Archaic period, 
at least influenced by an Hellenic antecedent, if that antecedent had yet to be 
developed.
319
 Other scholars have voiced their doubts about Etruscan and Roman 
phalanxes, but it is only the two aforementioned pieces which discuss it in any 
detail.
320
 Alternatively, Saulnier puts forward a theory that the ‘Servian Army,’ at 
least, fought in two different lines of battle: one, the phalanx of the wealthy, the 
other, a line of differently armed ‘light’ troops.321 Accepting that we can no longer 
securely use Greek parallels to describe central Italian warfare during the Archaic 
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period, we must go back to the original evidence, iconographic and literary, to create 
a new model. 
 Most modern authors consider the early battle narratives as being historically 
worthless. While this may be true, they represent our only knowledge of the legends 
and stories which survived into the historical period. Though suspect to hyper-
critical historians, there is value in examining these stories even if it is impossible to 
build a conclusive picture from them. It is clear from the narrative of the Regal 
Period that cavalry was remembered as being very important. Besides the mysterious 
figures of the celeres, bodies of riders were continually in need by the Roman kings. 
Both Tullius Hostilius (Livy 1.30) and Tarquinius Priscus (Livy 1.36) were 
remembered as having expanded the cavalry. Hostilius drew his new cavalrymen 
from the newly integrated people of Alba Longa, while Tarquinius attempted to add 
more centuries to the existing tribes of Roman cavalry. The latter of these stories has 
a deeply religious tone and may reflect a real religious conundrum faced by the king, 
or a false aetiology developed by later Romans in order to explain an oddity in the 
tribal system surrounding the cavalry.
322
 The first story, however, is unnecessary for 
the Livian narrative and there is little explanation as to why this particular fact was 
fabricated, unless it was to simply add depth to the narrative. We see in the 
narratives of both Livy and Dionysius, as well, that the cavalry was often highlighted 
as the centrepiece of combat and of victory. 
 The importance of the cavalry continued into the Republican period. The first 
battle fought by the newly founded Republic and its recently evicted king is decided 
in the main by an early cavalry charge which killed the consul Brutus and the son of 
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Tarquinius Superbus, Arruns (Livy 2.6-7). At the Battle of Lake Regillus, not long 
after the founding of the Republic, the important scenes in the narrative are again 
about cavalry manoeuvres, particularly around the consul Marcus Valerius (Livy 
2.20). This battle also sees the cavalry dismount and fight alongside the infantry to 
bolster their courage and secure a Roman victory. The legend of Castor and Pollux 
associated with this battle may be indicative of the real importance of the cavalry to 
victory.
323
 Caeso Fabius in a later battle against the Veientines needed to use only his 
cavalry to rout the enemy (Livy 2.43). In a later war against the Sabines we hear of 
the cavalry being urged on to better the infantry and again was forced to fight on foot 
to help bolster the infantry (Livy 3.61-62). This occurs again in 423 (4.38-39). A 
battle against the Volsci in 446 saw the cavalry in the middle of the battle line 
(mounted) and was apparently the decisive element in the Roman victory (Livy 
3.70). The cavalry again appear in the middle of the battle line in 437 (Livy 4.18). A 
number of artistic depictions show mêlées in which cavalry and infantry are 
fighting.
324
 Other iconographic evidence shows that the cavalry of central Italy were 
equipped to fight hand to hand, perhaps as a type of shock cavalry (Figs. 9-10). 
These depictions are evidence that cavalry could have fought along the lines 
described in the literary evidence. The value of these stories may be limited, but they 
show a departure from the regular pattern of Roman battle during the Late Republic 
and may date to at least the earliest Roman historians. 
 Raiding was an important element of central Italian warfare, as we will see 
below in chapter three. It is probable that some of this raiding was carried on by 
warriors or soldiers on foot. The arms and armour of the period would not have 
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precluded this, even if a rather full version of the hoplite panoply was adopted.
325
 
Cavalry, however, would have been the most successful and useful raiders. Mounted 
warriors and soldiers allow for quick insertion and extraction from hostile territory 
and allow a raiding army to carry off more plunder than they would be able to on 
foot. These assumptions can be corroborated through examples from other 
cultures.
326
 Cavalry raids may be depicted in iconography from the period under 
question. A number of so-called oikos temples were decorated with scenes depicting 
armed riders at the charge, armed in a realistic fashion for the period (Figs. 9-10).
327
 
These could be meant to represent the role of the cavalry in warfare in general, not 
just in raiding, but the absence of infantry from these scenes may be evidence that 
they do represent raids. We hear from the literary sources, as well, that cavalry could 
be used alone to drive off raiding armies (cf. Livy 3.22). Earlier commentators have 
had considerable difficulty in reconciling the preponderance of evidence which 
points to the importance of cavalry in central Italy with the strict version of hoplite 
warfare associated with the period and region.
328
 As we have seen above, if we 
discard the notion of strictly organized hoplite phalanxes it is not impossible, nor 
difficult, to speak about cavalry as being a very prominent combat arm both in 
pitched battle and in raids. 
 Infantry tactics are not easily elucidated from the evidence. We receive little 
description of how these men fought on the battlefield in the narrative. In a number 
of instances we hear of ‘wings’ of armies being commanded by individual 
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commanders, who were themselves usually mounted, which may point to an army 
broken up into different units.
329
 This type of organization was common in Greek 
warfare, even in periods where the classical idea of the hoplite phalanx could well 
have been used; this was often the case in armies composed of citizens from multiple 
poleis.
330
 It is probable that smaller groups existed within these larger tactical units, 
again, not different necessarily than in a traditional hoplite phalanx. Many scholars 
have recognized that Etruscan elites played an important role in the recruitment of 
armies through their clients and other dependents, best evidenced by the description 
of the Etruscan army at Veii provided by Dionysius (Ant. Rom. 9.5.4). There is 
evidence that the gens Fabia fought together as a unit as well (Livy 2.46).
331
 
Diodorus’ description of the so-called Fabian Expedition reads as though the Fabii 
fought together as a unit, which was the cause of their mass casualties (Diod. Sic. 
11.53.6). Although this type of micro-organization could have existed, and was 
something shared with the armies of the Early Iron Age, there is no reason to 
presume that there was not an overarching mechanism of control exercised through 
the means of the state. Magistrates could marshal armies, whether raised by 
individual elite groups (gentes?) or through pseudo-constitutional mechanisms (see 
chapter 3) and this would have been the source of massed battles. 
 Individual units were integrated into a larger line of battle. This is what is 
suggested by the narratives. As individual armies clashed these smaller units may 
have operated on their own, tactically. There is some evidence that the units of 
bodyguards kept by consuls on campaign operated separately from the general 
organization of the army, and we may be able to see a snippet of how the rest of the 
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smaller familial units operated.
332
 This is, however, hypothetical. The success of 
Roman cavalry of breaking up armies, especially from attacks straight to the middle 
of an opposing battle line, may suggest that the cohesion of different smaller units 
may not have been great. This would also suggest a more open form of battle than 
the traditional phalanx battle organization allows. That cavalry units could dismount 
and make their way to the front of a battle line, in an effective way to bolster the 
ranks, also indicates a loose organization in which individuals could work their way 
forward.
333
 The arms and armour of the period, as represented in archaeology and 
iconography, also suggested a more open form of combat. Rather than adopting and 
continuing to use the restrictive Corinthian helmet, a style of helmet developed in 
central Italy which allowed for considerably improved vision and hearing over Greek 
designs. This helmet was then overtaken by the Negau type helmet, which provided 
unimpaired vision. This loose organization is in contrast to the traditional ‘push’ of 
the hoplite battle, which scholars of the traditional school usually maintain was 
based on the physical force of a densely packed block of men. 
 It is also worth exploring the proposal of Saulnier, that the Roman armies of 
the Servian Constitution fought in a two line battle formation, with a densely packed 
phalanx of elites armed as traditional hoplites and retainers or dependents armed 
with ‘lighter’ skirmishing equipment.334 This is based on a somewhat credulous 
reading of the Servian reforms, as advocated below. A reconstruction of this type 
also pre-empts the later development of the tripartite battle line of the Middle 
Republic.
335
 There is some evidence, though, as we will see again below, that armies 
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with mixed gear did exist in Archaic Italy.
336
 This evidence comes from a number of 
situlae from Bologna (Figs. 7-8) which depict armies with some soldiers armed with 
oblong ‘scuti’, smaller oblong shields, and then a single figure at the rear with a 
clipeus. Some recent commentators have cited these as explicit evidence for the 
existence of an army along the lines of the Servian Constitution.
337
 While this is 
possible, we cannot discount that these represent armies which included mercenaries 
from different cultures using their traditional arms and armour.
338
  
It is problematic that these images come from situlae, a type of vessel which 
was produced primarily in the Veneto and the area of modern Slovenia.
339
 This is a 
considerable distance from the region under discussion and may have no relation to 
south Etruria and Rome. It is striking, however, how similar the armed groups shown 
on these vessels are to the description of an army based on the Servian Constitution. 
It is possible that these images are reflective only of an army structure in the Veneto. 
It is also possible, however, that these situlae were created for Etruscan patrons, 
illustrating an aspect of their way of life, war.
340
 But, if these images are accepted as 
evidence for armies along the lines of the Servian Constitution then it is worth 
reconsidering the proposal of Saulnier. These images do not show a core phalanx of 
clipeus wielding elites, but rather seem to show an army of differently armed soldiers 
carrying oblong shields with a leader at the end of the march armed in the traditional 
‘hoplite’ fashion. Tactically, this may imply an army of retainers which did much of 
the fighting, while an ornately armed commander urged them on from the rear. This 
is not entirely detached from the narrative sources, and could line up with the stories 
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of the cavalry having to bolster faltering lines of infantry, the commander and his 
bodyguards, being the cavalry, only coming when it is absolutely necessary.
341
 
2.3 Conclusions 
 As we have seen above, the arms and armour of central Italy changed over 
time. A number of themes emerge, however. Central Italian cultures embraced arms 
and armour designs from abroad, ranging from the cap helmets of the Early Iron Age 
to the Corinthian helmets of the Archaic Period. Adoption of these foreign arms and 
armours helped to influence the cultural development of the region, impacting 
artistic developments in the Early Iron Age geometric designs and guiding the 
creation of Hellenizing art in the Archaic. Although there may have been practical 
reasons for the adoption of certain elements discussed above, especially the 
linothorax, there is also evidence that a fashion process was at work, which utilized 
foreign elements to emphasize the social position of people already associated with 
war making, as different styles of warfare do not necessarily seem to have been 
adopted. By adopting the image of the foreign warrior, then, central Italian elites at 
once distanced themselves from ‘commoners’ and asserted their role in the practise 
of warfare. 
 Imported styles of arms and armour also helped central Italian elites interact 
with the wider world. The identities that they created using these imported styles 
may have allowed them to be recognized as part of a warrior class even among 
foreigners.
342
 While the actual execution of war allowed for the accumulation of 
economic and religious social power quite readily, as we see below, the material 
aspects related to warfare (arms and armour) allowed for the construction and 
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acquisition of political power through creating a very specific image, whether this 
operated on the level of certain classes or on the level the individual. The Servian 
Constitution is an important example of this. The first class armed themselves with 
clipeii, large round shields, which would easily allow an onlooker to identify them as 
being of a certain standing. This contrast is easily seen on the Situla Arnoaldi, where 
what appears to be a commander, carrying a clipeus, stands to the rear of a much 
larger group of soldiers carrying scuti. Creating this division may have been one of 
the motivations of the Servian classes; following this line of thought it could imply 
that when we hear of the Romans abandoning the clipeus and adopting the scuti that 
it was both a social and a military revolution. This may also be indicated by the fact 
that a number of sources place the introduction of the stipendium at the transition 
between these two shield and tactical types. Keeping in mind the above discussion, 
the analysis will now move onto analyzing the patterns of warfare in central Italy and 
the connections between military power and the three other major sources of social 
power. 
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3. Warfare in Tyrrhenian Italy 
 Patterns of warfare are influenced by many of the same social forces which 
act on the day-to-day aspects of warfare, such as the recruitment of armies or the 
tactics employed on the battlefield. In the case of warfare patterns, or types of 
warfare being waged, it is in the goals of those in command or leadership positions 
which usually have the greatest influence. In smaller social units, such as those 
below the traditionally defined ‘chiefdom’ sized society, warfare is often 
characterized by raiding and counter raiding for various economic, religious, and 
cultural reasons.
343
 With increasing social complexity it is generally assumed that 
more complex patterns of warfare emerge. Chiefdoms, for example, are often 
categorized as participating in small scale conquest on a regional level.
344
 Complex 
chiefdoms and early/archaic states have traditionally been seen as the origin points of 
‘traditional’ warfare: battle and conquer.345 The data from central Italy show a more 
complex pattern than these evolutionary categories allow for. 
 It is readily deduced that conflict was present and probably escalating during 
the period of transition from Bronze to Iron Age. Throughout the years 2200 to 730, 
defensibility of settlement locations becomes increasingly important. This has been 
explored using agent-based modelling by Federico Cecconi and his team, and when 
compared to excavated data it appears to be similar.
346
 The authors of that study 
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concluded that in the phase of settlement immediately preceding the urbanization of 
central Italy, defensibility, and thus warfare, was increasingly present.
347
 The 
fortification of sites in central Italy continued throughout the period under study in 
this work, becoming more elaborate over time. Southern Etruria and Latium see the 
most rapid and numerous constructions of fortifications in the archaic period and 
later.
348
 Rome, the largest city of the region throughout much of the archaic and 
classical periods, perhaps came late onto the scene of fortified cities, probably 
building its first monumental and all-encompassing wall in the sixth century.
349
 
These data all point to a region in which conflict was prevalent enough to invest 
communal resources in the construction of walls.
350
 
But what kind of warfare were these settlements being protected against? 
Was it traditional warfare, as seen from a Western point of view,
351
 involving 
pitched battles and conquest, or was it more uncivilized, as some would have it, 
consisting of raiding and small encounters? This is what historians of the early 
modern and modern world describe as ‘la petite guerre.’352 But if ‘small war’ was a 
major social and economic force within central Italy should we still describe it in 
such a diminutive fashion? This chapter examines the patters of warfare as we can 
see them in the archaeological and historical records. While the historical evidence 
may be seen to be treated in a ‘credulous’ fashion, care has been taken to explain 
controversial choices of evidence where they come up. 
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3.1 Traditional Warfare/ Early Conquest 
 Traditionally, Western scholars have emphasized that pitched battles and 
conquest of territory constitutes the proper form of war.
353
 The sacking of cities as 
part of a pattern of warfare can be seen as far back as the Homeric tradition.
354
 This 
position can be seen in some traditions of scholarship regarding central Italian 
warfare. The German tradition is especially guilty of this, often using Greek parallels 
to discuss Roman and Etruscan evidence; such as Homer and the hoplite narrative.
355
 
Other schools of scholarship practise this same procedure.
356
 Although Greek 
evidence is cited throughout this study, it is not a starting point for analysis, as it has 
been in the past. This is not to say, however, that we lack evidence for pitched battles 
and conquest during this period. We have some evidence from archaeology for this 
type of warfare and considerable evidence from the historical sources.
357
 
3.1.1 Sieges and Conquest
358
 
 This section looks at the evidence for ‘siege warfare’ in central Italy. It 
should be noted that the author uses this term to mean a number of different things. 
The first is a siege along traditional lines, circumvallation, assaulting walls, and the 
like. The second type of warfare that is considered under this heading, though, are 
attacks, or the threat of attacks, on settlements, whether or not they involved the 
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more complex practices of siege warfare known from the eastern Mediterranean or 
later history. 
The comings and goings of small centres in the Early Iron Age are not well 
enough known to conclude whether those which were abandoned were destroyed in 
conflict or whether their populations moved for other reasons. With the development 
of the large centres which would eventually become the Etruscan cities we begin to 
see evidence of some larger settlements being destroyed or abandoned, most 
probably in conflicts over power or economics.
359
 Marsiliana d’Albegna was 
abandoned or destroyed sometime in the sixth century, possibly because of pressure 
from the expanding primary centre of Vulci.
360
 Acquarossa was destroyed or 
abandoned between the end of the sixth century or beginning of the fifth century. 
Like Marsiliana d’Albegna, Acquarossa probably met its fate in the face of an 
expanding city.
361
 Murlo may be added to the list of larger settlements destroyed 
during the archaic period, although the interpretation of its destruction is disputed. 
Some scholars have argued that the monumental complex at Murlo, and the site as a 
whole, was destroyed as a ritual act,
362
 whilst others maintain that its demise came 
because of its position in a politically volatile site.
363
 Besides these sites, there is no 
visible destruction of primary or other large centres in Etruria until the Roman 
conquest of Veii in 396.
364
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 In the narratives, though, we do hear of some sieges of large centres 
throughout the period.
365
 Within the narrative of the Rape of the Sabine women, we 
hear that the Sabine army, led by Titus Tatius, captured the Capitol, traditionally 
with the help of Tarpeia, daughter of Spurius Tarpeius (Livy 1.11; Dion. Hal. Ant. 
Rom. 2.38-41). Usually portrayed a traitor, trading the Capitoline Hill for her own 
vanity (or infatuation), some traditions of Tarpeia portrayed her as a failed hero, 
attempting to disarm the Sabines.
366
 While the legend of Tarpeia and the aetiological 
explanation for the name of the Tarpeian Rock are certainly mythological, that a 
Sabine army captured the Roman citadel during the eighth century could be a 
genuine historical memory; if it did happen, though, there is no hard evidence. An 
army of Etruscan condottiori, either led by Caelius Vibenna or Mas(c)starna could 
have captured the Caelian Hill by force sometime in the sixth century.
367
 Lars 
Porsenna was the next to lay siege to a major city, which was Rome, but never 
captured the city according to the traditional accounts (Livy 2.9-14; Dion. Hal. Ant. 
Rom. 5.21-35).
368
 Arruns Porsenna, the son of Lars, besieged Aricia after his father’s 
army made peace with Rome (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7.5). We may also see Rome 
being besieged by an army from Veii in the aftermath of the dubious episode of the 
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Fabii at the Cremera (Livy 2.51; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 9.24-26).
369
 Besides these 
instances, we do not hear of primary centres being besieged before the fall of Veii.
370
 
 Smaller centres, however, regularly fell prey to the armies of both the 
primary centres of the region, as well as the expeditionary armies of the hill tribes 
which began in the fifth century. The first act of foreign policy undertaken by 
Tarquinius Priscus was to sack the town of Apiolae (Livy 1.35; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 
3.49).
371
 Tarquin’s next siege may have been of the town of Collatia (Livy 1.37-38; 
Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.50).
372
 The king’s attention was then turned to a number of 
Latin cities, Corniculum, Old Ficulea, Cameria, Crustumerium, Ameriola, Medullia, 
and Nomentum (Livy 1.38). Livy tells us that he ‘ad singula oppida circumferendo 
arma omne nomen Latinum domuit.’373 Dionysius has Tarquin taking Corniculum by 
storm but a number the other cities capitulating to terms of friendship, giving as a 
reason that the Latins had no national army assembled at the time (Ant. Rom. 3.50-
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51).
374
 Even if the version of the story preserved by Dionysius is to be preferred, it is 
apparent that Corniculum did fall by a siege and subsequent storming. The threat of a 
siege and sack led cities later in the reign of Tarquin to acquiesce more quickly to the 
Romans (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.66). 
 By the expulsion of the kings in 509, Rome had conquered and controlled a 
considerable portion of Latium. The first treaty between the Roman Republic and 
Carthage, dated by Polybius to 509/8, gives us a list of towns which were under the 
direct control of Rome: Ardea, Antium, Lavinium, Circeii, Tarracina, and more 
(3.22).
375
 We cannot say for sure how Rome came to exercise control over these 
towns, as they are not those present in the conquest narratives of the kings.
376
 It is 
possible, however, that they were taken by force in sieges. Whatever the foundations 
left by the kings, the Republic continued to grow, and within this growth practised 
siege warfare. The earliest Roman siege we hear of during the Republic was that of 
Fidenae by Publius Valerius Publicola and Titus Lucretius (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 
5.43).
377
 The sources are confused on the next siege in the Republic’s march to 
domination, listing it variously as Suessa Pometia (Livy 2.17) and Cameria (Dion. 
Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.49). Both Livy and Dionysius list the same consuls for the year, 
Opiter Verginius Tricostus and Spurius Cassius Vecellinus and the details of the 
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sieges are very similar.
378
 In both sources the Romans used siege engines to bring the 
city into submission. Whilst it is very unlikely that sophisticated siege engines were 
used to bring either of these cities into submission, it is possible that a genuine 
memory of an important siege during this year may have helped to create this 
anachronistic narrative.
379
 
 Two or three years after the siege of either Pometia or Cameria, possibly 
both, Rome besieged Fidenae, and we are told that Crustumeria is also captured in 
this year, although we are not told how.
380
 In the consular year of Publius Veturius 
Geminus and Publius Aebutius Elva, besides a Roman siege of Fidenae, Sextus 
Tarquinius, one of the sons of Tarquinius Superbus, besieged the Roman town of 
Signia, but he was not successful in his attempt to take the town by force (Dion. Hal. 
Ant. Rom. 5.58).
381
 Dionysius knew of another siege of Fidenae the consular year of 
Titus Larcius Flavus and Quintus Cloelius Siculus (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.59-60).
382
 
The narrative during the period of the Battle of Lake Regillus is confused, but we 
hear of the Latin army taking Corbio by storm (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.3) and in an 
almost certainly anachronistic speech, put in the mouth of Titus Larcius by 
Dionysius, he reminds the Romans of the many instances in which they captured 
cities by storm (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.19).
383
 A number of years later the Romans 
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 The cognomina of the consuls are provided by Dionysius but not Livy. 
379
 On the anachronism of siege engines during this/these siege/s, see below 6.3. 
380
 Dionysius has the siege of Fidenae take place the year before Livy does. Dionysius (5.52) lists it as 
occurring during the consulship of Servius Sulpicius Camerinus and Manius Tullius Longus while 
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consulship of Titus Aebutius and Gaius Vetusius. Dionysius (5.58) does record a siege of Fidenae 
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 The sources are, again, confused on the events of this year. Livy does not record the siege of 
Signia by Sextus Tarquinius, rather he records that four years later colonists were sent to re-found the 
colony, originally having been established by Tarquinius Superbus (Livy 1.56). 
382
 Livy simply says that for three years, starting in this year, there was neither peace nor war, ‘nec 
pax nec bellum.’ 
383
 Speeches were an important element of Greek historiography and employed readily by Dionysius. 
Dionysius, in fact, criticized Thucydides for his neglectful and improper use of speeches throughout 
his narrative (Dion. Hal. Thuc. 14-18). See Gabba (1991), 68-73. The trope that the Romans were 
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reduce the Volscian settlement of Velitrae by siege (Livy 2.30; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 
6.42). 
 Although Rome was rife with social strife during the first secession of the 
plebs during this period, following the return of concord to the city Rome continued 
her success in sieges.
384
 In the year immediately following the first secession, 
Postumus Cominius captured the Volscian towns of Longula and Polusca, both 
settlements belonging to the Volsci (Livy 2.33; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.91). The 
Romans then besieged Corioli, described by Dionysius as the μητρόπολις (mother-
city/capital)
385
 of the Volsci (Livy 2.33; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.92).
386
 The Volsci 
strike back against the Romans after the supposed defection of Gnaeus Marcius 
Coriolanus, the Roman hero of Corioli. They proceed to take twelve towns of the 
Latins and the Romans.
387
 In 468 the Romans again captured a large Volscian 
settlement through a siege, supposedly lasting a number of days, when they took the 
town of Antium (Livy 2.65).
388
 In 459 an army of the Aequi took the citadel of 
Tusculum, supposedly in a night attack, although the reality of the event may have 
been a siege (Livy 3.23). From this point, the number of sieges we hear of strikingly 
declines. 
                                                                                                                                          
accustomed to besieging cities is used again in a speech by Agrippa Menenius during the first 
secession of the plebs (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.50; cf. 6.51, 55, 57, 74, 75). 
384
 On the so-called conflict of the orders, see generally Raaflaub (2005b). 
385
 On the settlement patterns of the Volsci, see Cristofani (1992). 
386
 Although the story regarding Gnaeus Marcius Coriolanus is almost certainly highly mythologized, 
Cornell (2003), the siege and sack of Corioli is not itself un-historical. 
387
 Circeii, Satricum, Longula, Polusca, Corioli, Mugilla, Lavinium, Corbio, Vetelia, Tolerium, 
Labici, and Pedum (Livy 2.39). Livy does not tell us how these towns were captured. According to 
Dionysius, Circeii surrendered to the Volsci, having seen how large their army was (Ant. Rom. 8.14). 
When the Volsci move on to Labici, Dionysius does tell us that they took the city through a siege and 
repeated attacks on the walls (Ant. Rom. 8.19). He later describes a series of sieges of Latin cities, and 
then surrenders without fights, but they do not match up with those named by Livy (Ant. Rom. 8.20-
21). 
388
 Dionysius (Ant. Rom. 9.58) says that the city surrendered because of a discord between the Aequi 
reinforcements and the soldiers of Antium and the Volsci. He does note a successful Roman siege of 
Antium a number of years later (Ant. Rom. 10.21). 
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 The most significant and spectacular siege that we hear of next is that of 
Fidenae in 435. The dictator, Quintus Servilius Priscus (or Structus), invested the 
city and then took it through a stratagem of digging a tunnel to the citadel (Livy 
4.22).
389
 This same town was besieged again in 426 when it abandoned its alliance 
with Rome in favour of Veii (Livy 4.31-32). Labici was then captured by the 
Romans, encircling the town and capturing it through the use of ladders (Livy 4.47). 
Livy explicitly mentions a siege in connection with the capture of the Aequian town 
of Bolae in 415, which was retaken by the Aequi in the following year, and then 
taken by the Romans later in the same year (Livy 4.49). In 412 Lucius Furius 
Medullinus captured the Volscian town of Ferentinum, possibly in a siege although 
we are not explicitly told (Livy 4.51).
390
 The Aequi captured Carventum in 410, with 
the Romans driving them out shortly after (Livy 4.53). The citadel, at least, of this 
town was then retaken by the Aequi in 409, and the Romans failed to retake it in a 
prolonged siege lasting into 408 (Livy 4.55). The Volscian town of Verrugo, 
however, was captured by the Romans. 
 The greatest siege of this period was that of Veii, which traditionally began in 
405, which is handled in a separate section below (Livy 4.60). But during the period 
of the ten year siege a number of other centres were captured. In the year after the 
war was declared against Veii, the Romans besieged and destroyed the Volscian 
town of Artena (Livy 4.61). Anxur, a town of the Volsci, was besieged in 401, and 
was retaken the following year (Livy 5.12-13). In 397 the Volsci again besieged 
Anxur, while the Aequi besieged the Roman colony at Labici (Livy 5.16). Camillus 
                                                 
389
 This stratagem is repeated by Camillus at Veii in 396, and is discussed further below, 6.3. 
390
 Although, the emphasis in the narrative on the plunder taken from this battle may betray a different 
historical truth, possibly that this was a raid rather than a siege. 
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besieged Falerii 394 (Livy 5.26).
391
 In the same year another Roman army captured 
the town of Verrugo, again (Livy 5.28). The Roman colony of Vitellia
392
 was taken 
by storm by the Aequi in the following year (Livy 5.29). 
 The next sieges that we hear of were at the hands of the Gauls, who had 
recently come into Italy.
393
 We are told that they overran many of the Etruscan 
settlements in the north (Livy 5.33, 35; Plut. Cam. 16; Polyb. 2.17; Scyl. 2.18).
394
 
This territory may not have been conquered in the traditional sense, through military 
force, but rather through a process of relatively peaceful immigration.
395
 The first 
town that we hear of being besieged by the Gauls was Clusium (Livy 5.35-6; Dion. 
Hal. Ant. Rom. 13.11; Plut. Cam. 17). The literary evidence is consistent in believing 
that the Gallic ‘invasion’ of central Italy was because of their search for land. 
However this element of the narrative came about, it seems unlikely that the 
Romans, or the Clusians, would have had any idea about the motivation of the Gauls. 
Tim Cornell has pointed out that the tradition that they were searching for land on 
which to settle is contradicted by the narrative actions which fit better with a large 
war party led by their chief, Brennus.
396
 The motivation for investing Clusium, and 
later Rome, was probably plunder, rather than land.
397
 
 The year after the Gallic Sack of Rome, the armies of Rome, led by Camillus, 
resumed their regular schedule of siege warfare. The town of Bolae was taken in a 
swift assault (Livy 6.2) while an Etruscan army, of unknown origin, besieged the 
Roman ally Sutrium (Livy 6.3; Plut. Cam. 33). Sutrium was retaken by Camillus not 
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 In this instance, even though we know that this was a siege, thanks in part to the possibly 
mythological tale of a treacherous Faliscan teacher, Livy’s narrative sounds as though the original 
intention of Camillus’ incursion was as a plundering raid. 
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 It is probable that this colony is the same as Vetelia, which had been seized in the war against 
Coriolanus (Livy 2.39). 
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 See below, 2.4. 
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 Frey (1995); Sassatelli (2004a), 190-91. Cf. Holliday (1994). 
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 Sassatelli (2013). 
396
 Cornell (1995), 314-16. 
397
 See below, 2.4. 
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long after it had been taken by the Etruscans.
398
 Throughout the early decades of the 
fourth century this pattern continues. An Etruscan army took Sutrium and Nepet by 
siege (Livy 6.9), only to have those two towns almost immediately retaken by a 
Roman army (Livy 6.10). A Volscian army, along with forces from Praeneste, 
captured Satricum after an assault in 381 (Livy 6.22). In one of the most prolific 
campaigning years that we hear of, the Romans took nine towns by storm (Livy 6.29; 
Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.5). This is the general pattern as presented by the narrative 
sources. 
 The threat of siege and capture of small centres left an impact on the 
landscape of central Italy. We have seen above that between the Bronze and the Iron 
ages, settlement sites trended towards defensible positions atop hills, which is a 
process that continued into the Etruscan period.
399
 The further fortification of some 
of these positions is indicative of a hastening pattern or threat of warfare which 
directly threatened the settlements, rather than just the hinterland. It is unclear when 
the process of fortification began.
400
 In one frontier zone, that between Caere and 
Tarquinia, in the mineral rich Tolfa Hills, the fortification of small centres as a 
matter of territorial strategy may have been begun in the sixth century.
401
 The 
chronology of fortification of the large centres is also unclear.
402
 Roselle is 
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 Sutrium was supposedly recaptured within the same day that it was captured (Plut. Cam. 35). 
Evidence of this campaign of Camillus’ was visible in the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the 
Capitol until it was destroyed by fire in 83 (Livy 6.4). 
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 Barker and Rasmussen (1998), 158-72. For example, Perkins (1999), 18-64, on the development of 
the Albegna Valley. 
400
 For example, the class of site which Hilary Becker (2002-2003) describes as a ‘castellum’ is not 
well attested before the Hellenistic period, though see Becker (2008). Bonghi Jovino (2010), 33-43, 
reviews the chronological arguments regarding the walls of Rome and provides an interesting 
approach to dating walls in the region. 
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 Cerasuolo (2012). Strategic defense of the Tarquinian hinterland may be datable to the 
Orientalizing period, Perego (2012). See Zifferero (1995) for the religious nature of the frontier 
between Tarquinia and Caere. 
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 Fontaine (2002-2003; 2008). 
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traditionally cited as the first large Etruscan centre to be fortified with walls.
403
 The 
dating of most of the circuits, though, has been debated.
404
 The fortifications of 
Veii
405
 and Vulci
406
 may date to the eighth century, as argued on new evidence. 
Recently, the earliest walls of Tarquinia have been reaffirmed as sixth-century in 
origin.
407
 Those of Caere may date from the same period.
408
 It is apparent, as well, 
that the concentration of fortified centres was denser in Southern Etruria than in the 
north.
409
 
 The fortification of sites in Lazio occurred in a similar time frame to that of 
sites in Etruria.
410
 In parts of Latium, fortifications can be dated back to the eighth 
century. These defenses consisted of earthen ramparts and defensive ditches, with 
walls appearing in the sixth century.
411
 Gabii built its fortifications between the late 
seventh and early sixth centuries.
412
 Crustumerium, a settlement caught between 
Rome and Veii, was naturally defended on all sides but one, where, during its 
urbanizing phase, a protective trench or moat was dug.
413
  In the Pontine region 
fortification is first detected at the end of the sixth century, and further fortification 
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404
 Barker and Rasmussen (1998), 273-74. 
405
 Boitani et al. (2008). 
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et al. (2008). Cf. Gianni (2013). 
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 Cerasuolo (2012), 123. 
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 Fontaine (2008), 203-9. This could indicate a lower frequency of warfare in the north, although 
this is not a guarantee. There are many different types of defensive measures a settlement can rely on, 
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of strong sites may have been an element of Roman protection strategies.
414
 The 
fortification of indigenous settlements, though, is from about the same period.
415
 
 It is evident that protection of settlements throughout the period under 
question was important. Fortification of large centres from the eighth century, if that 
dating is correct, implies that the emerging primary centres, which became the large 
city-states of central Italy, were threatened by the pattern of warfare at work during 
that time.
416
 As smaller centres were fortified we may be able to read an increased 
threat to these towns. It is also possible that the fortification of these settlements 
played into the defensive strategies of the primary centres, such as Tarquinia and 
Rome. The narrative tradition provides ample evidence as to why these fortifications 
were necessary, with small centres in the environs of Rome falling often, 
occasionally more than once in a given year. While we lack a definitive narrative 
tradition for other parts of central Italy, the pattern of fortifications throughout 
allows us to extrapolate the tradition regarding Rome and her hinterland to the rest of 
the region, or at least in the southern region. The more sparsely fortified northern 
region could indicate an environment in which warfare was less prevalent, or 
perhaps a pattern of warfare which did not emphasize the siege and sacking of 
settlements. 
3.1.2 Pitched Battles 
 Pitched battles are often thought of as the primary execution of warfare. This 
is, of course, a very Western and modern outlook. Pitched battle often brings to mind 
the concept of Greek warfare held by the Persian Mardonius: ‘when they declare war 
on one another they seek out the best, most level piece of land, and that’s where they 
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 Attema (1991). 
415
 Attema et al. (1998), de Haas (2008), 19-31. On the development of these centres, in general, see 
Attema (2005), 122-27. 
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go and fight’ (Hdt. 7.9).417 These were envisioned to be set piece, pre-arranged, 
battles, and definitive of Greek warfare.
418
 In reality they play a role no more or less 
important than sieges, and in the case of central Italy, raids. With this being said, 
pitched battles are attested throughout the period under question in the historical 
evidence, although they are almost impossible to detect archaeologically. What little 
evidence can be gleaned from the material remains is through iconography, although 
that itself is quite limited. 
 Historians of Greek warfare have often looked to iconography to trace the 
development of the hoplite battle, pitched battle par excellence. A small 
Protocorinthian vase known as the Chigi olpe, found near the site of Veii in 1881, 
typifies this form of identification.
419
 We should not take the presence of this Greek 
artefact in Etruria as evidence for hoplites or pitched battle in central Italy. It is 
echoed in domestic Etruscan production by the Tragliatella oinochoe, which some 
scholars have argued shows an Etruscan phalanx, but is more likely an armed 
dance.
420
 Depictions of groups of armed figures become more common over time in 
central Italy.
421
 Even if we are to take these examples as evidence for pitched battle 
in central Italy, we have to admit that the evidence is not overwhelming. As we see 
below, it is no longer tenable to accept the equation of ‘hoplite’ arms in iconography 
or actual examples thereof as testament of ‘hoplite,’ thus pitched battle, warfare.422 
 The historical record preserves many examples of pitched battles being 
fought in central Italy. Under the kings we hear of a number of pitched battles which 
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fit importantly into the narrative, such as that fought by Tullus Hostilius against a 
combined army of Veii and Fidenae (Livy 1.27; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.24-26). This 
same king supposedly won an important victory over the Sabines at the Malitosa 
forest, our sources telling us that the increased size of the cavalry, after the 
incorporation of the Alban nobles into the Roman state, was the deciding factor 
(Livy 1.30; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.33). Tarquinius Priscus supposedly expanded the 
cavalry during his rule, presumably expecting an increased advantage in pitched 
battle (Livy 1.36). The most influential battle which included one of the Roman 
kings was that of the Silvian wood. 
 The recently evicted Tarquinius Superbus solicited Veii and Tarquinii for an 
army with which to take back his kingdom. They submitted to his requests and 
allowed Tarquin to lead a combined force against the Romans. The Romans, under 
the consulship of Lucius Iunius Brutus and Publius Valerius, met this army in full 
force. We are told, however, that the decisive element of the battle was a cavalry 
clash, in which Brutus and the son of Tarquinius, Arruns, killed one another. The 
details of this battle may be quite fictitious, but there are two elements which are 
important and stand out, the cavalry was thought of as decisive and the consul and 
Arruns engaged in a single combat (Livy 2.6-7; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.14-17). 
 The emphasis on cavalry’s importance is reiterated in a number of battles 
throughout the early Republican period. In the Battle of Lake Regillus, we hear that 
the cavalry dismounted in order to help stay the breaking Roman infantry, but earlier 
in the narration of the battle we hear of multiple cavalry duels, which may indicate 
that the memory of this event revolved around the cavalry and that the emphasis on 
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the infantry line was a later invention (Livy 2.20; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.3-13).
423
 
The Roman cavalry proved decisive in the victory over a Sabine army in 494 when 
their initial charge sent the enemy ranks into disarray (Livy 2.31). 
 Our literary sources give us a plethora of further pitched battles throughout 
the period under question. The narratives of these battles are rather unusual, when 
we get full narratives rather than simply notices. The most spectacular Roman loss 
came in 390 at the Allia when the army was routed and all but destroyed by the 
Gallic horde which would go on to sack Rome. This battle has lived on in infamy in 
the Roman calendar.
424
 The occurrence of pitched battles, as well as of sieges, are 
predicated on the existence of large organized armies in central Italy, probably those 
of states, or other types of polities. 
3.2 Raiding 
For the majority of the period in question, the pattern of warfare included the 
almost annual, if not annual, raiding of neighbouring peoples into one another’s 
lands for booty. It is a pattern which can only be traced through the early histories of 
Rome, as we possess no narratives of Etruscan history. It seems probable, however, 
that the pattern of warfare described in this section for Rome and her environs fits 
into the overall pattern of warfare in Tyrrhenian Italy. It is for this reason that I have 
borrowed a concept from earlier authors in attempting to describe a ‘way of war’ for 
a certain people or region. 
 The earliest possible description of a war that we hear of in Rome was the 
result of the so-called Rape of the Sabine Women (Livy 1.9; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 
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 Dionysius’ account (Ant. Rom. 6.11-12) emphasizes even more than Livy’s the centrality of the 
cavalry. The supposed presence of the Dioscurii and subsequent dedication of the temple in Rome 
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2.30).
425
 This episode, possibly a war itself, elaborately embellished in the historical 
tradition, saw the abduction of a number of virgins from the neighbouring Sabine 
peoples by Roman youths.
426
 The response to this was for the men of Caenina to 
mount a counter raid into Roman territory (Livy 1.10; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.33-
4).
427
 On this occasion, Romulus is said to have captured another kind of plunder as 
a result of catching the raiders from Caenina, the spolia opima.
428
 As the Romans 
launch a counter raid into Caeninan territory, their citadel is captured by a group of 
Sabines which leads to a number of the most famous, if not fictitious, events of regal 
Rome, such as the circumstances around the naming of the Lacus Curtius and the 
merger of Sabine and Roman through Titus Tatius and Romulus (Livy 1.12-13). It is 
possible that raiding for females occurred again between the Romans and Sabines, 
when in 501 a group of Sabine youths abducted a group of Roman prostitutes while 
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 Although our sources agree that the Sabine women were abducted during a festival for Neptune 
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attending games in Rome (Livy 2.18). This episode, like those discussed previously, 
was probably remembered in a romanticized way rather than a simple raid, which is 
possibly the actual source of the story. 
 In the following centuries covered by the first book of Livy, and the first five 
of Dionysius, the practise of raiding is very prominent. That a genuine tradition 
concerning raiding existed in the sources available to the first-century historians may 
be evidenced by a Livian statement about the years following the Rape of the Sabine 
Women. When the fever of war had spread from Fidenae to Veii, ‘they overran 
Roman territory as if conducting a raid rather than standard warfare,’ (1.15).429 The 
evidence of the following centuries of warfare shows that rather than this episode of 
Etruscan raiding deviating from the normal (or just?) practise of war, it was precisely 
the standard model of war until the beginning of the fourth century.
430
 
 The numbers of times we hear of raids occurring are too many to number 
here. It could be argued that this was a topos employed by later historians in their 
narratives of early Rome, that raiding was ‘what they did back then.’ There is 
evidence, however, that raiding was part of an earlier tradition which was used as 
evidence in the literary narratives. Livy expresses a continued confusion as to why 
the armies that he reads about in his sources were not committing to real war. During 
the first bought of conflict between Veii and the Roman Republic, Livy notes that 
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 Dionysius does not mention this deviance from supposed normality (cf. Ant. Rom. 2.53-54) which 
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above), though, may be reason to assume that Livy’s contradiction was found in his sources. 
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the Veientine raids were more of an affront to Roman feelings than something which 
would do actual harm (2.48). This confusion appears again when the Aequi and 
Volsci, whilst raiding Roman lands, did not see fit to invest the walls of Rome (Livy 
3.7). In this instance, the gods are given credit for saving Rome. Similarly, Livy’s 
Sabines ask why the Romans were flittering about raiding and ravaging their lands, 
in the manner of bandits, rather than committing to an actual battle (3.61). During a 
year of pestilence in Rome, there were no plundering raids executed beyond the 
borders of Roman territory and there was no thought of ‘war’ by senators or plebs 
(4.21). Here we see the division between raiding, praedationes, and wars, bella, 
clearly presented. They were certainly two different actions, but Livy’s confusion 
may indicate that his sources did not always differentiate the two. This confusion 
suggests a legitimate tradition of raiding from the archaic period. 
 The nature of this raiding may not have different entirely from later epochs of 
Roman warfare. Pitched battles are remembered during this period, but are often 
preceded or followed by ravaging of enemy lands.
431
 A similar situation occurred 
after Lucius Lucretius and Gaius Aemilius defeated the army of Volsinii in a pitched 
battle and proceeded to plunder the territory (Livy 5.32). Plundering armies were 
occasionally caught by their victims’ armies and forced into a pitched battle. This 
was the case when Quintus Fabius ambushed a plundering army of the Aequi. We 
are led to believe that part of the reason for the defeat of these Aequi was that they 
were loaded down with booty (Livy 3.3). Even when an army was committed to a 
siege, raiding and plundering was to be carried out. In an historically questionable 
example, we hear that this occurs when Lars Porsenna besieges Rome and occupies 
the Janiculum (Livy 2.9-14; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.22-34). Later in the fifth century, 
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Sabines and follow it up by plundering their lands. 
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we hear of the Aequi besieging a Roman camp but continuing their raids for plunder 
on Roman lands (Livy 3.5). We should be mindful that the occurrence of pitched 
battles may not have been much rarer than raiding, as we hear that in 406 the men of 
military age complained that not a year had gone by without a battle (Livy 4.58). 
 Possibly the most infamous instance of Roman raiding was the expedition of 
the Fabii. Both Livy (2.49) and Dionysius (Ant. Rom. 9.15) give a very patriotic 
reasoning for the entire clan of the Fabii to march to war against Veii, that the state 
did not have the resources to fight on so many fronts at once, so they would relieve 
some of the burden.
432
 They go on to raid and plunder the lands of Veii, though, 
rather than attempting to fight a decisive battle (Livy 2.49-50; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 
9.15). Dionysius’ account is the most poignant, claiming that the army of the Fabian 
consul of that year, an actual levy of the Roman people, left all of the plunder from 
their raids with the garrison of the Fabii at their hilltop fortress (Ant. Rom. 2.15.4-5). 
In chapter 4, however, it is argued that this was an elaborate version of an event 
whose historical reality was much different than that presented in Livy and 
Dionysius. 
 We see below that an early term denoting the population of Rome in arms 
was populus.
433
 It is quite possible that this term was derived from the verb 
populo/populare, meaning to lay waste, ravage, or pillage.
434
 Coincidentally, this is 
the most common verb used by Livy when narrating early Roman raiding. If we are 
right in associating these two terms, the early Roman army would have been directly 
associated with raiding and ravaging. We may have visual representation of this type 
of a raiding force in a number of terracotta plaques recovered in central Italy. The so-
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called Veii-Rome-Velletri system included scenes of armed riders at the charge, with 
arms aloft (swords and axes) (Figs. 9-10).
435
 A similar set of designs adorned the 
face of a so-called oikos temple in Tuscania (Fig. 47).
436
 It is possible that these 
images are meant to represent units of cavalry in a larger army, but it is equally 
possible that they represent mounted raiders. The elite context of the structures upon 
which these images were set encourages this interpretation.
437
 
 Raiding is not only an activity carried out by armies on neighbouring 
settlements. Raids can also come from the sea, and in the case of central Italy these 
may have been regular.
438
 We do not have direct evidence of Etruscan or Roman sea 
raiders but we know that their lands were the subject of sea borne raids. Dionysius I, 
tyrant of Syracuse, raided the Caeretan port of Pyrgi in 384 and removed from there 
500 talents worth of plunder (Diod. Sic. 15.14.3-4; Strabo 5.2.8). Some scholars 
believe that this raid may have been accompanied by a coordinated attack from 
Celtic mercenaries on land.
439
 In 349, Livy records that the sea and land around the 
Latin coast was infested by Greek raiders who were plundering the land, 
spectacularly fighting a battle against a force of marauding Gauls (Livy 7.25). The 
coast of Latium, and possibly Etruria, also fell prey to the Carthaginians. In the first 
treaty between Rome and Carthage reported by Polybius we hear that the 
Carthaginians are forbidden from doing harm to a number of communities in Latium 
                                                 
435
 Winter (2009), 311-32. 
436
 Ibid. see Roof 4-6. 
437
 See below, 3.2.1. 
438
 I differentiate between sea borne raiding and piracy, see below 4.3. 
439
 This theory is based on a number of passages in the ancient sources which tie the Gallic horde 
which sacked Rome in 390 to mercenary service with Dionysius I. Justin (20.5) says that the Gauls 
were enlisted as mercenaries in the wars against the Italian Greeks which then implies that on their 
return from Southern Italy they fought a battle against an army from Caere at the orders of the Sicilian 
tyrant (Diod. Sic. 15.14.3; Strabo 5.2.3). Cornell (1995), 316, calls this theory ‘most attractive’ but it 
cannot be proven. If this theory were to be proven true it would be indicative of the internationalizing 
nature of warfare in the fourth century in Central Italy. 
97 
 
which fell under the power of Rome.
440
 The Punics are not supposed to attack other 
Latin communities, but if they do those communities are to be handed over to the 
Romans; likewise the Carthaginians are not to build fortresses in Latium (Polyb. 
3.22). Many scholars emphasize this treaty as being a phenomenon of economics, 
but that is not the entire story. This treaty provides evidence that the Carthaginians 
had been raiding communities in Latium, certainly from the sea, and that they had 
been hauling the plunder off with them. Why else would these clauses be included in 
this treaty? 
This treaty has a long scholarly history.
441
 For Scullard this treaty was 
primarily an economic one, especially from the Carthaginian side.
442
 Heurgon does 
not explicitly call the treaty primarily economic in nature, but does emphasize the 
economic aspect in his analysis, almost ignoring the comments on Latium.
443
 Cornell 
emphasizes how this treaty was helpful as a legitimizing agent for the newly founded 
Roman Republic.
444
 Forsythe sees the conditions of the treaty dealing with Latium as 
a political statement of the Romans’, possibly even one of the Romans of Polybius’ 
own day.
445
 Serrati describes the first two treaties preserved by Polybius as ‘almost 
wholly economic’ with ‘few military clauses.’446 He goes on to postulate that the 
treaty would have been important for Rome, as a fledgling Republic, to be 
recognized by such a powerful neighbour.
447
 Hoyos believes that the Romans were 
the lesser power in the treaty, pointing out that they were not prohibited from raiding 
Punic territories, probably because the Romans lacked a fleet.
448
 Richard Miles 
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acknowledges that the treaty had wide ranging details, but still categorizes it within 
the Punic desire to ‘secure commercial advantage’ in the region.449  
In analyzing this treaty, we must first ask if it was primarily economic, what 
the advantage to Rome in signing it was. The treaty limited their ability to trade in 
Carthaginian territory and limited the extent of the Western Mediterranean in which 
their merchants could ply the seas. Serrati proposed that the treaty may have had 
something to do with the Roman need to import grain during periods of famine, the 
first being noted in 508 (Livy 2.9).
450
 The problem with this suggestion is that we do 
not hear of specific origins for the Sicilian grain in this episode. During later 
famines, when we do hear of the sources of Sicilian grain, they are not from the 
Carthaginians but from the Sicilian tyrants (cf. Livy 2.34, 4.12-16; Dion. Hal. Ant. 
Rom. 5.26, 7.20, 7.37, 12.1-4). It seems that the Romans were eager to sign this 
treaty more because it would limit Punic raiding from their coast than any of the 
economic benefits that it would entail. This is even more evident in the second 
treaty, usually dated to 348, in which the Carthaginians are allowed to raid towns in 
Latium, keep the plunder and slaves, so long as the turn over control of the town 
itself to the Romans (Polyb. 3.24). This fits the pattern of coastal raiding in which 
the Greeks were participating, and I believe that this behaviour was ongoing in 
central Italy from a relatively early period. 
 Raiding, then, was an important element in the practise of warfare in central 
Italy. This has been recognized by previous authors, but is not regularly reviewed in 
detail.
451
 This type of warfare had a direct impact, and a different impact from 
‘traditional’ warfare, on the society of central Italy. This impact was felt in many 
                                                 
449
 Miles (2010), 94-95. 
450
 Serrati (2006), 118. 
451
 For instance, Cornell (1995), 308, describes warfare in fifth-century Central Italy as ‘an indistinct 
pattern of annual razzias.’ Strangely much of the literature specifically examining warfare during this 
period does not address the issue of raiding. This is especially true of the French school. 
99 
 
ways, politically, economically, and religiously, all of which are explored in the 
following chapters. 
3.3 The Conquest of Veii 
Conflicts between Rome and Veii must have been regular. Two primary 
centres but 15 kilometres apart would have been a tenuous situation.
452
 Elites from 
each city probably came to blows in raiding parties and in small conflicts often, 
although there is little evidence. Of the conflicts that we do hear of between the two 
they are often broken down into three separate ‘wars’ and all fall within the fifth 
century.
453
 The first of these Veientine Wars was fought between 483 and 474. It was 
precipitated by Veientine desires for more than just countryside plundering, or at 
least that is what Livy would have us believe (2.43). It was during this war that the 
Fabian clan suffered its famous defeat at the Cremera (Livy 2.50; Dion. Hal. Ant. 
Rom. 9.15, 18-22). On the whole, the Romans came off poorly in this conflict, 
suffering more defeats than they inflicted on the armies of Veii. The sources attribute 
this, at least in part, to civil discord in Rome. It was only with the destruction of their 
Sabine allies outside of the walls of Veii that a peace was finally pursued (Livy 2.53-
54). 
 The Second Veientine War (437-435) saw the focus of conflict shift from 
Veii and Rome themselves to the town of Fidenae. This important post at the river 
gateway to Veii had been the site of battle before, and in the 500s was taken and part 
of its land probably formed the donation made to the gens Claudia. This second war 
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was precipitated by the murder of four ambassadors from Rome at the hands of Lars 
Tolumnius, the king of Veii. Rome fared considerably better during this conflict than 
during the first. As Livy says, though, it was not a bloodless victory (4.17). Losses of 
Roman soldiers were so high that they appointed a dictator, Mamercus Aemilius, to 
lead the state as one man. The most notable exploit by a single Roman was the single 
combat and killing of Lars Tolumnius by Aulus Cornelius Cossus, for which he was 
allowed to dedicated spolia opima in the temple of Jupiter Feretrius (Livy 4.19-20). 
The close of the war came only after a plague devastated Rome, spurring on the 
appointment of another dictator, Quintus Servilius (Priscus or Structus). Servilius 
successfully led a Roman army against the armies of Veii and captured Fidenae by 
digging a tunnel into its citadel (Livy 4.21-23). 
 The third, and probably final, conflict with Veii began, according to Livy, 
because of the repulse of an embassy sent by Rome asking for reparations for the 
previous war (Livy 4.58).
454
 Typically, scholars have dismissed many of the details 
preserved in the historical tradition as being part of a highly developed mythical 
tradition about the long siege which ended in the destruction of Veii.
455
 The most 
common critical evaluation of the narrative surrounding the siege of Veii was that 
the Roman historical tradition equated it with the ten year siege of Troy, the end of 
which is narrated in the Iliad.
456
 Not all scholars have so quickly dismissed the 
length of the war, notably Scullard who cites the introduction of pay for the legions 
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as a reason to believe in a ten year siege.
457
 If the war is contextualized in the 
circumstances of Tyrrhenian war the idea of a lengthy siege or war makes more 
sense. 
 As we have seen above, one of the practices of Tyrrhenian warfare of which 
we are well informed throughout the narratives is that some raiding armies would 
establish a base of operations. The most celebrated instances of this were the 
incursion of Coriolanus into Roman territory (Livy 2.39) and in the traditional 
narrative of the expedition of the Fabii to the Cremera (Livy 2.49-50), the latter is 
historically dubious. This was not a phenomenon restricted to warfare in central 
Italy. When the Spartans fortified Decelea in 413, they completely deprived Athens 
of its hinterland, giving the Peloponnesian allies a major advantage (Thuc. 6.91-92, 
7.19-20, 27-30). What we see happening at Veii is probably similar.
458
 According to 
Livy, eight military tribunes were elected to the high office in the first year of the 
war, and constructed fortifications in the territory of Veii (5.1-2). While we are led to 
believe that these fortifications were built directly against the walls of the great 
Etruscan city, this seems unlikely (Livy 5.7).
459
 What is probable, however, is that 
there was a disaster at at least one of the camps which prompted a large number of 
Romans to volunteer service in prosecuting the war.
460
 This may have been what 
prompted the election of eight military tribunes, which Livy notes was more than 
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ever before (5.1.2). It is evident that there was not a single Roman army investing 
Veii, but a coalition of armies led by individual consular tribunes.
461
 Animosity and 
competition between the tribunes caused Lucius Verginius to not come to the aid of 
Manius Sergius.
462
 Over the next ten years the situation stays the same. Roman 
‘siege’ camps are occasionally attacked and Roman defeats encourage social 
problems at home.
463
 It is possible that the establishment of semi-permanent raiding 
camps in the territory of Veii is what led to the creation of the ten year siege 
narrative, although the differences between the siege of the city and the 
establishment of raiding camps in Veientine territory are negligible. 
 When Marcus Furius Camillus was elected dictator in 396 an important 
change came to the war against Veii. Rather than having a number of camps 
dispersed throughout Veintine territory, he consolidates the army into a single force 
(although we are told there were still multiple camps) (Livy 5.19).
464
 The army 
which Camillus raised may also have been unique among those levied to attack Veii 
over the previous nine years.
465
 We are told that no one in the city tried to avoid 
military service, and it is possible that mercenaries came into the army from the 
Latins and Hernici (Livy 5.19).
466
 The city was eventually taken by Camillus, 
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through a tunnel dug from his camp under the citadel, specifically the temple of 
Juno, in the city. With his soldiers inside, the city fell after a bloody fight, and the 
spoils were taken back to Rome. 
 The fate of the plunder from the sack of Veii became the most divisive social 
issue of the following years.
467
 Although certainly an exaggeration, the plunder from 
Veii was expected to be greater than that from all of Rome’s previous wars put 
together (Livy 5.20). This exemplifies one of the problems of a large city falling to a 
conquering army. The excessive wealth which could be seized from a defeated city 
was clearly a concern in some situations, and has been argued to have led Sparta to 
not destroy Athens in 404/403.
468
 The version of events with which we are left 
makes the plebeians out to resent that one tenth of the plunder was to be dedicated to 
Apollo based on a vow made by Camillus at the beginning of his dictatorship.
469
 It is 
interesting that we do not hear of patrician complaints regarding this tithe. 
 Archaeologically, the fall of Veii is much more difficult to interpret. The 
original interpretation of the survey data from the British School at Rome’s study 
was that there was no noticeable disruption dating to the traditional period of the 
Roman siege.
470
 There is no destruction layer which can be identified with a fire or 
razing by the Romans. With the reinterpretation of the Veii survey, this conclusion 
has not changed considerably. Although Veii goes through a long period of decline, 
the early fourth century does not show evidence of a steep drop off in population or 
productivity.
471
 We cannot ignore, however, that the political sovereignty of Veii 
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disappears from the historical record after the Roman siege. While the city itself was 
not destroyed, its power was.
472
  
That the city was not physically destroyed is hinted at in the literary sources. 
During the Gallic siege of Rome, an Etruscan army, from an unnamed settlement, 
pillaged Roman lands and considered an attack on Veii (Livy 5.45). While there was 
a Roman garrison there, perhaps being the target, it would make more sense if this 
Etruscan army contemplated attacking Veii based on its lingering wealth, which 
likely had not been completely stripped away by the Roman attack. The presence of 
a Roman garrison, as well, is evidence of a population which needed to be kept 
under guard. In brief, the capture of Veii did not result in a catastrophic fire, or the 
razing of the city, or the slaughter of the population. The city and its territory were 
annexed by Rome, only the sovereignty of Veii was destroyed. This is an important 
moment for the history of central Italy and for our interpretation of the pattern of 
warfare. The vacuum of power created by the destruction of Veientine political 
sovereignty was very great, and is probably to blame for some of the later incursions 
of military forces from further afield.
473
 The absorption of the lands of Veii into 
Roman hands increased the latter’s political power immeasurably. 
3.4 The Gallic Sack, The Etruscans, The Samnites 
 The seizure of Veii signals a change in the pattern of warfare in central Italy. 
Besides the siege being the first time that a primary centre fell to another power, 
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after this point we hear of incursions into central Italy from further afield, such as the 
Gauls, and soon after the expedition of forces from central Italy, notably Rome, 
fighting wars considerably further afield.
474
 This is the end of warfare as a regional 
practice. This is best reflected in the Roman change of tactics in 340, while fighting 
the Samnites (Livy 8.8; Diod. Sic. 23.2.1).
475
 
 In the years following the Roman conquest of Veii, bands of Gauls begin to 
be encountered throughout central Italy.
476
 Groups of their people had for some time 
been making incursions into Etruscan lands in the north of the Italian peninsula. 
Eventually, the Gallic horde made its way to the city of Clusium, at which juncture 
embassies were sent to Rome, who in turn sent an embassy to Clusium to observe the 
Gauls (Livy 5.33; Plutarch, Camillus, 17).
477
 The three envoys sent were the sons of 
Marcus Fabius Ambustus. While the historiographical circumstances surrounding the 
inclusion of members of the gens Fabia in this story are disputed, the true character 
of their mission is not likely to have followed the version presented by the literary 
sources.
478
 We are invariably told that the Clusines sought help from Rome, and 
Livy specifies that help was requested from the senate (Livy 5.35).
479
 Diodorus’ 
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source claimed that the Roman ambassadors were sent into Etruscan lands to spy on 
the Gallic army (14.113). By the time the story had reached Plutarch, the help being 
requested from the Romans is clearly ridiculous; the Clusines supposedly asked that 
the Romans send ambassadors, πρέσβεις, and letters, γράμματα, to the Gauls 
(Camillus, 17). According to the tradition, these ambassadors joined the battle line of 
the Clusians and brought the hatred of the Gauls on Rome.
480
 
 The first problem that we must realize in this story is that the Clusines are not 
remembered as having sent for help from their fellow Etruscans. If there was ever a 
period in which the meeting of the twelve peoples (now eleven with the fall of Veii) 
at the Fanum Volturnum would have acted as a political or military body it was now. 
There is absolutely no indication that this was the case. We have no reason to assume 
that the appeal to Rome is historical, but what of the inclusion of the three Fabii in 
this story? It could be a creation of later historical writers.
481
 Their presence, 
however, may have been historical, if we disregard the claim that they had been sent 
as ambassadors. If, as the historical tradition records, the Gauls had been ravaging 
northern Etruscan lands and the Po Valley, it is not impossible to think that some of 
the elites in the Etruscan cities would have organized an army to confront these 
barbarians. As we see below, the organization of this army would have been quite 
complex.
482
 One element of such an army could have been mercenaries. These 
members of the gens Fabia, then, could have been mercenaries.
483
 This would 
explain the presence of the Fabii Ambusti in the Clusian line of battle, and military 
action independent of the state was not uncharacteristic of the Fabii. Although the 
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presence of these Fabii is blamed for the Gallic attack on Rome in the ancient 
literature, this is not probable.
484
 
 When the Gauls advanced into Roman territory, the state sent an army to 
meet them in battle. The army was led by six military tribunes (Livy 5.36).
485
 As in 
most other occurrences where a Roman army was led by many consular tribunes, 
they were defeated. Unlike in other instances where feuding tribunes caused a 
Roman defeat, Livy does not blame disputes in command but cowardice from both 
sides: command and soldiery (5.38). After this defeat, the infamous Battle of the 
Allia, the Gauls sack the city itself.
486
 This echoes the warnings of the fall of Veii, 
that primary centres in central Italy are vulnerable to attack. The continued presence 
of the Gauls in central Italy, as well, is one of the major changes in Tyrrhenian 
warfare. They remain in the region, acting as a roving band of brigands (Livy 6.42, 
7.9-10, 7.15, 7.25; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 14.8-10; Plut. Cam. 40-41). Some elements 
of the Gallic horde may have also been engaged as mercenaries by any number of 
regional powers (Just. Epit. 20.5).
487
 
 At the same time that the Gauls were forcing Tyrrhenian warfare to change, 
the changing landscape of power created by the Roman destruction of Veii caused 
further alterations to the pattern of warfare. While in the past raiding was generally 
limited to neighbouring polities/peoples, the removal of Veii allowed for raids to be 
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conducted by enemies further afield, namely between Tarquinia and Rome (Livy 6.9, 
7.17-22). The distances involved with these campaigns altered the relationship 
between the state and the army, and dictated a new level of reciprocation between 
soldier and state. The one was required by the other to be away from domestic life 
for a longer period of time, much as we saw during the siege of Veii. 
 The First Samnite War is a distinctive change in the practise of Roman 
warfare.
488
 Livy summarizes these differences as being ‘the force of the enemies, the 
remoteness of the regions, and the extent of the periods involved’ (Livy 7.29). We 
may also add to this list the meddlesome nature of Rome’s involvement with these 
peoples.
489
 For the first time, Rome meddles in the affairs of the peoples outside of 
her hinterland, entering the war on the side of the Sidicini and Campanians who were 
being pressured by the Samnites (Livy 7.29-31). This extended excursion to the 
south caused enough dissention in the Roman state and hinterland that the soldiers 
and the Latins revolted.
490
 These conflicts foreshadow the coming theme in Roman 
expansion, war abroad with occasional trouble at home.
491
 Some elements of 
traditional Tyrrhenian warfare continue, such as raiding,
492
 but the changes in 
patterns of warfare discussed in this brief section precipitated changes in the way 
that the Tyrrhenian states, Rome in particular, waged war. 
3.5 Conclusions 
 The pattern of warfare in central Italy was complex. It appears to have been 
common from the Final Bronze Age through to the end of the period under study. 
                                                 
488
 Cornell (2004) has pointed out the dangers of regarding this period as the period of the Samnite 
Wars, and that we should not overestimate the importance of the conflicts between Romans and 
Samnites. The preoccupation of the literary narrative, however, cannot be ignored and I still maintain 
that the so-called First Samnite War, or the events described under that title, does mark a change in 
Roman war-making. 
489
 Forsythe (2005), 281-88. 
490
 Cornell (1995), 347-52. 
491
 Cf. Harris (1979); David (1996). 
492
 Harris (1979), 58-67, (1990). 
109 
 
Raiding was a common practice, and was possibly the earliest form of violent 
conflict to be found in the region. Overtime this behaviour became more complex 
and included piracy, as we see below in chapter 6. Evidence for pitched battles 
begins to appear, if we read supposedly organized images of armed men as being 
evidence for large, organized, armies, which fought in battles. When we come to the 
early historical period, pitched battles seem to be common. The Roman memory, 
reflected in the narrative histories, is full of instances of pitched battles. Although 
these stories may not be strongly grounded in historicity, there is no reason to 
completely dismiss them from our analysis. 
 From the Final Bronze Age onward, we have seen that the defence of 
settlements was extremely important. This began with the movement of the settled 
population from valley floors to defensible sites, often on heights or hills. With the 
synoecism and growth of the large settlements, which would eventually become the 
great city-states of the region, defence became more complex. Defence in the form 
of ditches and walls began sometime in the eighth century, and quickly spread 
throughout the region. This may be a reflection of peer polity interaction, with 
constructed defensive systems encouraging success in settlements which were thusly 
defended. Although these defensive systems had a cultural value, their primary 
purpose was defence. Settlements were clearly the targets of warfare, whether that 
was raiding or sieges. 
 The first primary centre to fall to an enemy, and have its power destroyed, 
was Veii. After the Romans conquered their Etruscan neighbour the pattern of 
warfare beings to change. We hear very little about Roman raiding after this point, 
with all of their attention going to fight against the continually intrusive hill tribes. 
By destroying the political sovereignty of Veii, the Romans were allowed to 
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concentrate their efforts further afield, mostly in Latium, leading to the eventual wars 
against the Samnites. The turning point which allowed all of this, though, was the 
fall of Veii. 
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4. Warfare and the State 
Discussions of warfare, especially in prehistory, often go hand in hand with 
discussions of states and state formation.
493
 The centrality of warfare to Carneiro’s 
now foundational theory on state formation is well known.
494
 Warfare as a primary 
cause of state formation, however, has not gone unchallenged.
495
 The role of warfare 
in shaping Mediterranean states, however, has been somewhat constituently 
reaffirmed, especially in the Greek world.
496
 Hoplite warfare’s role in the formation 
of early Italian states had been quite fashionable until recently. Both d’Agostino and 
Rosenstein have shown in two very different ways that we must not remain chained 
to the concept of the hoplite in our understanding of Etruscan city-states and archaic 
Rome (respectively).
497
 It is essential, however, to re-examine the connection 
between states and warfare in Tyrrhenian Italy through a critical approach rather than 
dismissing the connection as ‘unknowable.’ 
 We must first answer the question of ‘what is a state?’ before moving on to 
seeing how the states of Tyrrhenian Italy practised warfare. This question is made 
difficult by the many interpretations of what constitutes a state throughout the 
academic community. To many nineteenth-century scholars on early Italy it was ‘the 
strict conception of the unity and omnipotence of the state in all matter pertaining to 
it, which was the central principle of the Italian constitutions, placed in the hands of 
the single president nominated for life, a formidable power, which was felt perhaps 
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by the enemies of the land, but was not less heavily felt by its citizens.’498 This 
totalitarian idea of the state has not completely disappeared from studies on the 
ancient Mediterranean, but is not necessarily current in all disciplines. 
 While some classical scholars have introduced more complex discussions of 
the state into the field, no major re-evaluation of Tyrrhenian warfare has been written 
since these ideas have been introduced.
499
 Part of the problem with bringing modern 
discussions of the state into play when examining archaic Italy is that even some 
scholars who specialize in social relations consider the concept of the state to be a 
‘messy’ one.500 Others have not been so negative. Wright provides a succinct 
definition from an anthropological perspective, that the state ‘can be recognized as a 
cultural development with a centralized decision-making process,’ that contains a 
multiplicity of specializations.
501
 While this is a somewhat rudimentary definition of 
the state, I hope to avoid being bogged down by the theoretical issues surrounding 
‘early state,’ ‘archaic state,’ and ‘developed state,’ differences.502 
 For the purposes of this study ‘the state’ will be defined along similar lines to 
what Hansen refers to as the sociological, anthropological, archaeological, and 
historical (i.e. as used by historians) definition of the state, which is traceable back to 
Weberian ideals.
503
 The state is ‘a centralized legitimate government in possession of 
the sole right to enforce a given legal order within a territory over a population.’504 
Seeing warfare as a type of ‘legal order’ in this case, practicable only by the state 
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(legitimately), has been one of the major areas of discussion in central Italian warfare 
studies.
505
 The state, in the contexts of this study, is seen as a mechanism which 
possessed legitimate power and exercised this power through some form of legal 
tradition.
506
 It has been pointed out by many anthropological archaeologists that the 
warfare waged by states is different than that waged by complex chiefdoms or 
chiefdoms.
507
 Conquest is often seen as the typical type of war waged by states, 
while raiding is typically the ‘less severe’ sibling associated with chiefdoms.508 The 
primary objectives of this chapter are to outline the evidence that Tyrrhenian Italy 
was a ‘city-state culture,’ thus consisting of a landscape of states, and then to 
examine how these states actually behaved in patterns of warfare. 
 Within the general approach that states possessed legitimate power within a 
circumscribed territory, this study makes one modification. States are viewed as 
collectives of individuals, all of whom had their own pursuits and goals. Social 
power did not exist within the institutions of the state itself, but with the people who 
held these positions. This is not to say that the state was a diffuse, or federate, entity 
in central Italy.
509
 Rather, the states should be seen as the active dialogue between 
social actors using social power to effect desired outcomes. 
Social stratification, as revealed by the archaeology of burial, is a strong 
indicator of the level of social progression a society has attained. Social stratification 
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and the emergence of a privileged class are core components in this theory.
510
 The 
burial pattern in Etruria shows little social differentiation in the period of the Final 
Bronze Age.
511
 Transitioning into the Iron Age, burial patterns indicate a 
differentiation of status, especially along the lines of gender and age, within the 
familial group.
512
 There is corroborating evidence from certain centres, such as Veii, 
that social differentiation based on wealth existed at the level of the settlement as 
well.
513
 A similar phenomenon occurred in Latium in the earliest periods of the Iron 
Age.
514
 This differentiation is a sign that the processes of state formation were 
underway in the transitional period into the Iron Age. 
 The emergence of the state in central Italy has been quite widely accepted in 
some lines of scholarship, especially regarding the period from the eighth century 
forward.
515
 These explanations for the emergence of both urban and state culture has 
almost always been tied to a diffusionist approach to contacts with the eastern 
Mediterranean. It was contact with Phoenicians and Greeks that supposedly spurred 
on the development of both of these concepts in Tyrrhenian Italy.
516
 Archaeological 
work over the past three decades, however, has shown that urbanization, at least, was 
a process began before extensive contact with the eastern Mediterranean.
517
 Warfare, 
or conflict, could have played an important role in this change of settlement 
pattern.
518
 Along with increasing signs of a process of urbanization, in the period 
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from the Final Bronze Age into the Early Iron Age there is significant evidence that 
the defensibility of settlement sites became more and more important.
519
 
 Recently it has been pointed out that urbanization, whether it is the ‘proto-
urbanization’ that we see in Etruria during this period, or elsewhere in the 
Mediterranean, is a complicated topic to discuss hand in hand with the state. 
Although cities used to be considered a marker of the state proper, there has been a 
recent methodological backlash against this.
520
 It is an important step forward that 
scholars have begun to divorce urbanism and state formation, but it leaves us at a 
problematic point in the analysis of warfare, in particular, if we accept to be ‘in the 
dark’ in terms of state formation.521 This is especially true if we push state formation 
into the realm of the seventh and sixth centuries in Etruria and Rome, as some 
scholars do.
522
 For this period there is quite convincing evidence that infrastructure 
development was underway in a highly organized fashion, indicating the presence of 
a developed state.
523
 It is during this time that the first paving of the forum occurred 
in Rome, as well as the construction of possibly the first public building, the 
Regia.
524
 
 Throughout the region, as we have seen above in chapter three, we begin to 
detect the construction of fortifications in central Italy. Roselle may have had the 
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earliest fortifications in the region, possibly dating to the seventh century,
525
 
although the picture is much more complex with the advent of recent research. Veii 
and Vulci were both fortified with walls in the eighth century, at least a century 
earlier than the usual dating of the walls at Roselle.
526
 The sixth century seems to 
have seen a great expansion in the number of fortified settlements, with Tarquinia 
and Caere adding walls during this century; smaller centres between these two cities 
were also fortified during this century.
527
 Walls and other defensive projects were 
undertaken throughout Latium from the eighth century.
528
 The construction of walls, 
and other large fortification projects, such as defensive ditches, all require a great 
amount of labour. The manpower which constructed these fortifications probably 
came from the fortified settlements themselves, as there is no reason to suspect an 
external labour force.
529
 The ability of a settlement’s inhabitants to organize this 
much labour is an indicator of the existence of some sort of state or state-like 
mechanism of control.
530
 If these defensive structures were primarily built to protect 
against conquering armies, this may be a sign of states and their type of warfare. 
 The question of the existence state is further complicated by the epigraphic 
evidence. We now know two important terms in Etruscan which are applicable to the 
current situation, ras- and spur-. The first of these was thought to mean ‘Etruscan’ 
until recently.
531
 Recently, however, ras- has been argued, and I am convinced of it, 
to be more closely equated to Latin publicus.
532
 It seems to indicate the body of 
people rather than the physical city. The second Etruscan term relevant to the current 
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discussion is spur-. Bourdin has recently discussed the complexity of this term and 
its probable equivalence to ‘cité-État’ or a similar idea.533 Though the argumentation 
and exact definition of these terms may not be accepted by all, it is clear that they 
denote recognition of a certain community that does not appear to be kin related, 
thus a political community, or possibly a ‘state’ community. 
 Although the existence of proto-urban or urban centres does not necessarily 
signal the development of a state, the use of these terms in the epigraphic record 
supports the idea that there were state entities during this period. Although ras- 
(rasna) is attested quite late (the earliest being from the middle of the fourth century 
[ET Vs 1.179]), spur- is attested already in the second quarter of the seventh century 
in Narce (ET Fa 3.1, Fa 6.1).
534
 It is probable that the idea of a political community 
existed before this first attestation and that this evidence provides grounds for a 
belief in state like communities at least in the seventh century. The existence of state 
structures in the seventh century is further strengthened by the attestation of zilaθ (a 
magistrate) in an inscription from Rubiera, dated to the end of the century (ET Pa 
1.2).
535
 This evidence, albeit scant, from two separate sites strongly points towards 
states, or at least developed political communities by the end of the seventh century. 
 Epigraphic evidence also gives us evidence for the existence of identities 
based around both ethnicities and city/state origination. Attestations of gentilicial 
names based on an ethnic origin are common throughout Etruria. One of the earliest 
iconographic pieces of evidence for warfare (seventh century) contains the ethnic 
gentilicial Feluske (ET Vn 1.1).
536
 Attestations of civic associations are common in 
Etruscan inscriptions all the way into the fourth century, as evidenced by another 
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important piece of evidence, the depiction of Cneve Tarχunies Rumaχ in the François 
tomb in Vulci.
537
 The importance of these identities, however, may not lie in 
community or state solidarity but as individualistic markers of identity.
538
 It is fairly 
clear that most, if not all, of the proto-urban and urban centres in Tyrrhenian Italy 
were multi-ethnic ‘open’ societies from an early date.539 As Ruth Whitehouse has 
pointed out, the absence of explicitly state related inscriptions from the early periods 
of Tyrrhenian literacy is problematic, although it does not necessarily preclude the 
existence of states.
540
 
 Thus the situation is complex. Conclusive signs pointing to the existence of 
strong, Weberian, states are not common in the Early Iron Age. This may indicate 
that the region was in a period in which proto-states or short lived temporary states 
existed. The emergence of monumental defensive structures in the eighth and 
seventh centuries are evidence of warfare which threatened entire settlements, a type 
of warfare that can be called state like, one of conquest and expansion. During this 
period, as well, developing social stratification and the elaboration of socio-political 
positions indicate the emergence of some type of states.
541
 By the seventh century it 
is probable that the large settlements of central Italy were governed by states. 
4.1 Traditional Accounts 
 In the early historical period we find sophisticated state mechanisms at work. 
This is true at least of Rome. Due to the nature of the evidence, though, it is 
impossible to know just how developed the communities of Etruria had become. 
This section examines the evidence for how the figures who occupied these political 
roles exercised military power and conducted warfare. This section also discusses the 
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ways in which the state and its magistrates were able to field armies and the 
mechanisms of recruitment. Due to the nature of the evidence, this is a heavily 
Romanocentric discussion. 
4.1.1 Magistrates and War 
Magistrates in the ancient world often had functions in both the political and 
military spheres of power (i.e. Roman consuls, Athenian strategoi). These were the 
officials, whether elected, hereditary, or tyrannical, who raised armies and led them 
into the field. This section looks at the magistrates for whom we have evidence in 
central Italy and examines their functions regarding warfare. It aims to show that 
magistrates were an important part of elite sociality, especially in Rome, and that the 
use of political power helped to expand the use of military power by this group. This 
analysis begins with an analysis of warrior tombs and whether or not they are 
representations of the earliest form of military governance. 
One of the most difficult to interpret tomb types in Tyrrhenian Italy is the 
‘warrior tomb.’542 The phenomenon of burying weapons alongside the dead is well 
represented throughout the period in question. In the Early Iron Age, a low 
percentage of tombs contained actual weapons.
543
 This proportion increased over 
time, and the inclusion of ceramic representations of helmets, the most telling 
symbol of the ‘warrior’ from this period, became more common.544 That the burial 
and identification of the deceased as a warrior had become ritualized even in this 
early period is confirmed by the use of these imitations from the same necropolis.
545
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Offensive arms were also present in these tombs.
546
 Clearly, being identified with 
arms and armour in burial was important for prominent Villanovan males. 
 Commonly discovered alongside this Etruscan weapon burial rite, was the 
image of the hut. Occasionally the urn was shaped like a contemporary dwelling, or 
the dwelling was represented in impasto in another way.
547
 This is normally 
interpreted as a symbol of the deceased’s position as head of house or family. Some 
examples have led scholars to make a direct link between this household leadership 
and martial leadership or prowess.
548
 If this were true, the exercise of military power 
may have been limited to familial networks. 
 Through time, the ritual of the weapon burial becomes more elaborate in 
central Italy. Grave goods rapidly become more abundant, as well as the perceived 
wealth of tombs. More elements are added to the warrior identity, including ritual 
tools such as knives for sacrificing, as well as spits for roasting sacrificed meat. 
These items were not limited to just male burials.
549
 Along with these items, the 
chariot began to be included in a number of tombs, both male and female. The 
inclusion of the chariot has made some scholars postulate that a Homeric form of 
warfare was prevalent in central Italy during this period.
550
 The inclusion in 
relatively high percentages in female graves (approximately 28% of chariots have 
been found in female graves) precludes this.
 551
 Rather, the inclusion of chariots is 
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most probably a sign of an overarching elite identity which was not bounded by 
biological sex. How should we interpret the creation of this identity?
552
 
 The use of arms and armour to create an identity in burials is not unique to 
the central Italian world within the ancient Mediterranean. The Late Bronze Age and 
Early Iron Age in the Aegean saw a number of these types of burials, and their 
existence has influenced the discussion of these societies quite heavily.
553
 In both 
realms, iconographic representation of, perhaps, ‘warriors’ creates ambiguity as to 
the importance of arms and weapons. In Geometric Greece, for instance, armed 
figures are frequently depicted in non-martial settings and weapons appear to be a 
social marker rather than a direct connection to combat.
554
 There is a similar 
iconographic pattern in central Italy. This pattern can be exemplified by a number of 
artefacts, such as scenes which may depict armed dances or hunting scenes (Figs. 4-
5). If arms were relevant to these activities, can we restrict arms found in funerary 
settings to the realm of actual warfare? Because of this evidence we cannot 
definitively describe those buried with weapons to be ‘warriors’. 
Riva has recognized the importance of new, very public, displays of wealth 
and identity as being important to the political elaboration of the urban centres in the 
eighth century.
555
 It is problematic, however, how much she emphasizes the military 
nature of these burials throughout her monograph. While the funerary evidence from 
the Iron Age and Orientalizing periods shows that this identity may have built 
primarily on a direct correlation between the display of arms and military success or 
leadership, evidence from the Archaic period shows that this may not have been the 
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case. This is best shown in the frieze from the archaic building at Poggio Civitate 
(Murlo).
556
  
Of particular interest is the plaque depicting a number of seated figures (Fig. 
6). This frieze most probably depicts scenes of activities associated with elites, 
similar to other terracotta frieze schemes throughout central Italy.
557
 The importance 
of the individuals seated seems clear, but the symbols of their importance are what 
take our interest. Two figures have an identity which seems to be defined by arms, 
incidentally they are the only two readily identifiable male figures on the plaque. The 
third figure from the left is holding an axe in his hand, which is the only element 
which appears to indicate his identity or status.
558
 The most interesting, however, is 
the furthest figure on the right. He is seated and holding what could be a lituus.
559
 
This may identify the figure as a priest-king, but it does not constitute his entire 
identity. Behind this figure stands an attendant holding both a spear and a sword, in a 
demonstrative pose. If we are to read this figure as the local leader, then, his identity 
is multifarious, including both martial and religious items. Whether or not he was 
proficient in either seems to be irrelevant. 
The tombs containing arms must also not be removed from the context of the 
necropoleis. Throughout the period in question, and culminating in the so-called 
princely burials, the tombs of elite Tyrrhenians were becoming more and more 
monumental. Tombs went from simple depositions to stone built dwellings of the 
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dead.
560
 The very public presence of these monumental tombs, alongside the very 
elaborate burial ritual itself, emphasized the position of the elites, and thus of the 
warrior tombs.
561
 But honour and position are not simply expressions, they are the 
results of a dialogue between members of a society and must represent some sort of 
complex organization within that society when the dialogue is as complex as the 
weapon burial rite.
562
 The monumentalization of tombs, and the elaborate burial 
ritual itself, should be seen as the efforts of a weakly, or insecurely, based political 
power attempting to strengthen its position.
563
 Thus, while the ‘warrior tombs’ may 
not contain the remains of actual warriors,
564
 and should not be interpreted solely 
along the lines of their martial content, they do represent communities which may 
have negotiated social power much like states, if they were not actual states. 
The social organization of Rome shows a dialogue between social power and 
warfare, especially in the forms of social units and institutional formalization. State 
armies are further evidenced by an examination of civic leaders and military 
leadership. This is especially important as we have no real institutional framework to 
examine in the Etruscan city-states, thus we must build our understanding of state-
like warfare from the narrative tradition as well as the epigraphic corpus. 
 In the historical period, the earliest civic leaders attested in Tyrrhenian Italy 
are kings. The narrative tradition is full of kings. At Rome, the seven traditional 
reges are all remembered as leading armies in war.
565
 Existence of kings at Rome is 
almost certain, supported not only in the narrative tradition, but also by the 
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attestation of the word rex (most likely) on two artefacts from early Rome.
566
 
Etruscan kings are no less common. Mezentius is remembered as a legendary king of 
Caere in the Aeneid (7.647, 8.482, 10.786-907). Lars Porsenna was rex of Clusium 
at the end of the sixth century and waged a successful campaign against Rome (Livy 
2.9). In the middle of the fifth century Veii was ruled by a king remembered as Lars 
Tolumnius (4.17). Veii was against ruled by a king at the time of its fall to Rome at 
the end of the fifth century (Livy 5.1). All of these leaders appear as the leaders of 
the armies of their respective states. 
 What Etruscan kings were known as in their own language is less clear than 
their Roman counterparts. The Romans had a tradition by which the title of Etruscan 
kings was lucumones (Serv. ad Aen. 2.278). This, however, could be a rather weak 
etymology based on the Etruscan praenomen Lucumo, incidentally the attested first 
name of the first Tarquin in Rome (Livy 1.34). It is possible that zilaθ, which later 
referred to a republican magistracy in Etruscan city-states, could have originally 
meant king. The Pyrgi Tablets, bi-lingual inscriptions in Puno-Phoenician and 
Etruscan have the terms MLK (melek) and zilaθ (TLE 874, 875) describing the same 
figure. Although later attestations equate zilaθ and praetor, MLK quite certainly 
means ‘king.’567 The use of this Phoenician term may indicate that Thefarie Velianas 
was a tyrannical figure, rather than a legitimate magistrate.
568
 
 The place of the king in society was more complex than their seemingly 
supreme leadership of their states’ armies. The Brontoscopic Calendar preserves a 
complex picture of kingship in the eighth or seventh centuries.
569
 Kings could either 
be beneficent (27 December) or cruel (16 January), and their positions were not 
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necessarily secure (19 October, 30 December, 21 January). The picture presented in 
this document shows a dynamic society, led by a king, but in which leading men 
were also important.
570
 According to a tradition preserved in the Roman literature, 
those under the power of the kings were expected to pay homage, possibly every 
nine days, although the historicity of this is not secure (Macrob. Sat. 1.15). If this 
was an historical fact, though, it shows that kings held considerable sway, being able 
to coerce their subjects to perform such a regular and obtrusive task. 
 The transition to republican forms of government in Tyrrhenian Italy brought 
in new leaders of both states and their armies. In Rome this took the form of the two 
consuls (Livy 1.60 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.1).
571
 They were elected by the comitia 
centuriata, those eligible to be asked to serve. Shortly after the introduction of the 
republican magistracy of the consulate, the Romans chose their first dictator (c. 
499).
572
 Around 445 the political situation in Rome had changed and the annual 
consuls were replaced by a board of between four and six tribuni militum consulari 
potestate (consular tribunes) (Livy 4.6; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 11.56).
573
 What is 
interesting, however, is that the nature of warfare does not seem to change 
throughout these changes in supreme office. All three types of leaders could lead 
armies on regular campaigns,
574
 besiege settlements, and lead what appear to be 
raiding parties. 
 The last of these offices, the consular tribunes, are an interesting case. The 
powers given to these officials were very similar to that of consuls.
575
 These 
magistrates were elected in lieu of consuls, irregularly, between 444 and 367. The 
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exceptional nature of this magistracy is that the number of men elected into it varied 
between three and nine.
576
 This political change came at the end of a period of other 
major transformations of Roman civic life: the creation of the Twelve Tables and the 
creation of the quaestorship. How exactly the consular tribunes fit in with this 
reorganization of the socio-political norms is not entirely clear. 
 The reasoning behind the consular tribunate given in the literary sources is 
political; this magistracy was a compromise between patricians and plebeians, the 
latter of whom had been clamouring for access to the consulship (Livy 4.16; Dion. 
Hal. Ant. Rom. 11.53-61).
577
 Livy also records a tradition, however, that the consular 
tribunate was created to meet the growing military needs of Rome (4.7). Both of 
these explanations are problematic. Livy only records three instances of plebeians 
being elected to the office, meaning that if the political explanation is to be accepted 
it clearly did not fulfil its goal (5.12, 13, 6.30).
578
 The military explanation ignores 
the fact that the consular tribunes were elected before the needs of Rome were 
known for the year; as well, in years with consular tribunes, warfare is not often 
noted.
579
 Boddington has argued that there is no correlation between the intensity of 
warfare during a given year and the number of consular tribunes elected.
580
 Neither 
of the ancient explanations are satisfactory. 
 Recently, Armstrong has argued that the consular tribunate, as well as the 
censorship, were created around the middle of the fifth century in response to 
increased plebeian participation in the state and in the army.
581
 This conclusion is 
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based on his underlying assumption that Rome before this period was not organized 
around a strong state system, and that the army was based around the gentes.
582
 As 
we see below, this is problematic. It is possible that the creation of the consular 
tribunate was a means of allowing more members of the elite (both patrician and 
plebeian) the opportunity to command an army, especially in small campaigns. 
Perhaps this was in the form of raiding. The narrative tradition does not record 
raiding type behaviour associated with the consular tribunes, but it is possible that 
small raiding type campaigns did not always make it into the historical record.
583
 As 
we see below, campaigns, even if the commander was unable to celebrate a 
triumph,
584
 could result in considerable gains in social power, economic and 
religious, and by allowing a larger swathe of the elite to campaign in any given years 
would have been a means of offsetting the growing influence and social power of the 
plebeians. 
 Roman magistrates were legally allowed to lead armies only if they were 
imbued the imperium. This is one of the most ‘fundamental’ components of Roman 
war-making.
585
 This was the ‘right of command’ which was voted to magistrates by 
the comitia curiata, and it is this ‘right’ which distinguished the military role of 
certain magistrates from the civil roles of others (Cic. Leg. agr. 2.30).
586
 This body 
would have represented the entire citizen community, not just the army. Sumner 
                                                 
582
 Smith (2006), 317-318, points out that it is difficult to imagine how Rome would have functioned 
in the 6
th
 and 5
th
 centuries if there was such a large divide between patrician interests and those of the 
rest of Rome. 
583
 Raiding is, however, well attested in general. See above, chapter 2. 
584
 It is noted that the consular tribunes could not celebrate triumphs, which is usually ascribed to the 
difference in auspicia which was bestowed upon them. It could be that the campaigns for which they 
were elected, though, were not large enough to receive such communal praise or that they did not 
fulfill other criteria for a triumph. On the auspicia of the consular tribunate, see Smith (2006), 272. 
585
 Drogula (2007), 419. 
586
 Mitchell (1990), 150; Cornell (1995), 115. Whether or not Roman reges were imbued with this 
power, or required to be imbued with it to lead armies, is unknown. Cicero (Rep. 2.25; cf. Livy 1.17) 
says that Numa was brought from Cures to become rex in Rome, although he had already been chosen 
by the people, he had a law passed in the curia regarding his imperium. 
128 
 
suggested that commanders were first chosen by the comitia centuriata and then 
confirmed by the entire population in the comitia curiata (Cic. Leg. agr. 2.26).
587
 
While this is an attractive suggestion, the most important element of it is the 
recognition that military commanders were chosen by a vote of the entire 
community, not just the army.
588
 Thus, these were not necessarily strong men of the 
army being given imperium by their comrades in arms, but they were recognized 
communal leaders.
589
 This double election may have helped to reinforce the Roman 
ideal that states should by ‘its best men’ who excelled in manliness and intelligence 
(Cic. Rep. 1.51).
590
 
Imperium came in different ‘types’ or ‘levels’, with that of the consul being 
the highest of the regular magistrates in the republican period. According to Messala, 
an augur quoted by Aullus Gellius, different types of magistrates had different 
imperium (NA 13.15).
591
 Another example of this is the inferiority of the master of 
horse’s imperium compared to that of the dictator, from whom the master of horse 
received his imperium.
592
 The other principal magistrate elected during the period 
under study, the consular tribune, presents a problem. Though they led armies, we 
are unsure of the precise mode of their election.
593
 We never hear of their 
confirmation by a lex curiata, granting them imperium, but Livy does say that they 
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were given both the insignia and the imperium of the consuls (Livy 4.7).
594
 Not all 
scholars are convinced, with Sealey bluntly stating that ‘it is clear, for example, that 
consular tribunes did not hold imperium.’595 Whether or not they were given power 
through a curiate law, they still commanded armies in the field. 
 The passing of a lex curiata granting imperium to a magistrate allowed them 
to take the auspicia militiae.
596
 By this, it is meant that the magistrate was authorized 
to use a special augury to show that they were divinely favoured to take command. 
The public auspices were traditionally in the realm of the patricians (Gell. NA 13.15; 
Cic. Leg. 3.3.9, ad Brut. 13.4.4, Dom. 38).
597
 This helped to keep military commands 
in the hands of the elites. When a pleb is finally allowed to wage war under their 
auspicia, it ends in disaster (Livy 7.6). In a world without gods, or at least fewer, a 
modern view of this procedure can be viewed as the intersection between political 
and religious social power being monopolized by a single social group. It is 
probably, however, that the Romans themselves took this topic seriously (i.e. Livy 
4.2). By giving a military leader imperium and allowing them to take the auspices, 
the entire Roman population was agreeing that an individual was acceptable as a 
military leader. The need to have these two political/divine elements points to the 
existence of a strong state structure regulating warfare in Rome 
 The situation in Etruria is less well documented.
598
 Whether or not certain 
city-states were headed by kings, a collegiate pair of men styled as zilaθ mexl rasnal, 
or led by a singular eponymous magistrate (Serv.ad  Aen. 2.669), we cannot speak 
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about many specific military expeditions that were not levelled against Rome.
599
 We 
know nothing about the leadership of the Etruscan fleet which participated in the 
Battle of Alalia in the latter sixth century (Hdt. 1.166). We could surmise that it was 
possibly a fleet from Caere, which we know was somewhat well connected to 
Carthage by c. 500 (TLE 874 and 875). If this were the case, said fleet may have 
been led by a tyrannous figure such as Thefarie Velianas as the supreme magistrate 
in charge. It is problematic to assume this, though, as we know that Carthage had 
diverse economic and political interests in Tyrrhenian Italy, evidenced, for instance, 
by the first treaty with Rome dated c. 509 (Polyb. 3.22). It is possible that members 
of the Spurinna family held a number of magistracies in Tarquinia sometime during 
the 5
th
 or 4
th
 centuries which included military leadership, specifically against Caere 
as well as an expedition to Sicily.
600
 If the so-called elogia of Tarquinia are evidence 
for the 5
th
 or 4
th
 centuries, then it shows that magistrates were able to take armies at 
least as far afield as Sicily.
601
 
 The most secure conclusion that we can draw is that political and military 
leadership seems to overlap in the periods for which we have literary or epigraphic 
evidence. We have also seen above that in earlier periods the identity of elites was 
built around a combination of different ideals, including considerable martial 
symbolism, which may indicate their positions as military leaders. 
4.1.2 Recruitment of Armies 
The first armies for which we have details on their recruitment are known 
from regal Rome. This recruitment seems to have been based on the divisions of the 
population. The earliest socio-political division that we hear of in Rome is the 
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division of the people into three tribes (tribus) (Varro LL 5.55). These three tribes 
were known to the Romans as Ramnenses, Titienses, and Luceres (Livy 1.13).
602
 
Although the sources attribute a number of explanations for the names of these 
tribes, such as Livy’s ethnic etymologies of Ramnenses and Titienses (ibid.), the true 
origin of these names is certainly lost to us.
603
 Their importance diminished, or 
disappeared, with the coming of the Servian Constitution in the middle of the sixth 
century, but their names were preserved in the centuries of the cavalry (cf. Livy 
1.36). It was from these earliest tribes that the Romans believed their earliest armies 
were recruited (Varro LL 5.89).
604
 
 Varro’s account holds that the earliest Roman armies consisted of 3,000 
infantry, 1,000 from each of the Romulean tribes, and attributes an etymology of 
miles to this recruitment. Criticisms of this etymology are well known.
605
 This 
number is compatible with the social division that Livy attributes to Romulus 
regarding those who were not knights. Livy holds that Romulus divided the people 
into thirty curiae.
606
 Momigliano authoritatively claimed that ‘the Curiae were the 
pivotal element of archaic Rome.’607 It remains to be seen how to fully interpret the 
curiae, but what does seem certain is that the entire population (quirites) of Rome, at 
one point, belonged to curiae.
608
 A piece of evidence which may support this idea is 
that the feast day of the Quirinalia (17 February) was celebrated by the mass 
gathering of all the curiae (Ovid Fasti 2.531-32). 
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 The most acceptable modern reconstruction of this situation, then, is that the 
earliest Roman armies were recruited from thirty curiae who, together, made up the 
earliest known Roman armies.
609
 An exception to this rule existed in the little 
understood and poorly attested celeres, the 300 supposed swift bodyguards of 
Romulus (Livy 1.15). This body continued to exist throughout the regal period, 
attested even to the last king (Livy 1.59). What the celeres actually were is unclear. 
This is in large part because the ancient tradition itself is somewhat confused. The 
most obvious objection to accepting the celeres at face value, as they appear in Livy, 
comes from Pliny (HN 33.9). Here, Pliny records the evolution of the name given to 
the equites: it began as ‘Celeres’ under Romulus and the other kings, changing to 
‘Flexuntes,’ and, before the members of the ordo equester were known thus, they 
were known as ‘Trossuli.’ 
 This is the strongest evidence to marshal against the otherwise abundant 
annalistic tradition (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.13, 29, 64, 4.71; Plut. Rom. 26, Numa 7; 
Diod. Sic. 8.6).
610
 That the celeres were an authentic element in early Rome, and 
thus a part of early Roman armies, can be found in the Salian ritual associated with 
19 March.
611
 The tribune of the celeres mentioned in this ritual is an office which 
Livy associated with Brutus (1.59). The confused tradition, however, implies that it 
was the name of the celeres and their tribune that was remembered in the late 
Republic, rather than the function of either. 
 Ogilvie verbosely expresses doubt about the authenticity of the celeres as a 
separate body from the early Roman cavalry. He links the earliest interest in reviving 
knowledge of this body to the period of the Gracchi and the rising importance of the 
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equites as a political body.
612
 He goes on to state that the annalistic version of the 
story, represented by Livy, is datable to the period of Sulla, at which point the 
annalists invented the ‘sinister’ idea that the celeres were a bodyguard.613 This 
equation and conclusion are not supported by the evidence as a whole. 
 The naming of Brutus as tribune of the celeres by the annalists would have 
interesting repercussions if Ogilvie’s thesis were true.614 Regardless of the origin of 
this story, its repetition by ‘scheming’ annalists would imply an equation of Brutus 
with the populares of the late Republic. This runs counter to the otherwise positive 
picture of Brutus painted by Livy (cf. 1.57ff; 2.1-6).
615
 The sinister nature of 
bodyguards is also doubtful based on the presence of the bodyguard of Aulus 
Postumius at the Battle of Lake Regillus (Livy 2.20).
616
 Ogilvie’s thesis is also 
problematic because of his following of Pliny’s evolutionary path of the equites. If, 
indeed, the equites were known in early Rome as the celeres then why, after the 
creation of the Republic, is the magister equitum almost immediately attested (Livy 
2.18-21) with the tribune of the celeres still existing as an office?
617
 
 The separation between the normal cavalry and the celeres should not be 
stretched too far. Alföldi famously stated that the former evolved into the patriciate 
of the Republic.
618
 This comment sparked a heated debate between Alföldi and 
Momigliano in the middle of the last century.
619
 While the scholarly community has 
sided with Momigliano’s side of the argument, neither author was correct in seeing 
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the early cavalry and the celeres as the same institution. For this version to be 
accepted we must reconcile our acceptance of a confused antiquarian tradition, 
represented by Pliny, as opposed to a seemingly coherent and culturally accepted 
(from a Roman perspective) version, represented by Livy. Ultimately, in the latter 
half of the sixth century the entire structure of the Roman government and the 
recruitment process of the army was changed with the introduction of the Servian 
Constitution, and the military function of the celeres, as a body of cavalry recruited 
directly from the curiae, ceased. 
Among the many difficult historical issues of the monarchy, the reforms, or 
‘constitution,’ of Servius Tullius is one of the most debated.620 Interest in this topic is 
so intense, in my view, because it represents the interconnection of almost all aspects 
of social organization in one historical event. The centuriate reform of Servius 
Tullius reorganized the Roman people into a new public assembly (comitia 
centuriata), by some accounts brought in a new form of warfare, and is clearly an 
attempt at social control. How much and in what ways this reform affected these 
three characteristics of Roman society is still unclear. No modern synthesis has 
provided an acceptable analysis of the reform.
621
 The importance of understanding 
the centuriate reform for wider research on warfare in archaic Tyrrhenian Italy is 
emphasized by its regular appearance in the existing literature on the topic.
622
 In 
order to better understand this reform it will be analyzed within both its socio-
political context in the literary tradition as well as the archaeological context of 
warfare in the sixth century. 
                                                 
620
 Fraccaro (1931; 1934) has made an extremely strong case that the basis of the Republic army lay 
in the Regal period, and that the structure of the Servian reforms makes sense within this time. This 
study accepts a sixth-century dating for the Servian army. 
621
 The best is in Cornell (1995), 173-97. An alternative, but less well developed, discussion can be 
found in Forsythe (2005), 109-15. 
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 Snodgrass (1965), 119-20; Cels-Saint-Hilaire and Feuvrier-Prevotat (1979), 110-16 ; Saulnier 
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 Before we begin an analysis of the role of the Servian Constitution it is 
important to digress on its historicity for a moment, as the general outline of the 
reform is almost always called into question. Specifically we need to look at the 
historicity of its division into five classes. The two modern syntheses of Early 
Roman history, in English, both dismiss the idea that the five classes given in both 
Livy and Dionysius represent an historical reality (Livy 1.43; Dion. Hal. 4.16-18).
623
 
They both see the original form of the centuriate organization being organized along 
the lines of classis vs. infra classem, the hoplite army vs. those below the level of 
hoplite. This is not an argument unique to their discussion.
624
 The source of this idea 
comes primarily from three sources, now almost clichés: Aulus Gellius, Festus and 
Livy. 
 According to Gellius, the five classes (of the Servian Constitution) were 
further divided between classis and infra classem, and that only the men of the first 
Servian class were classified in the first group (NA 6.13).
625
 Festus echoes this 
sentiment almost identically, although he sets his information in the second century 
BC (100L). A third piece of evidence, even more circumstantial than the first two, 
comes from Livy. When narrating a battle fought at Fidenae in Varronian 425, Livy 
mentions a problem within his earlier sources which claimed that there had been a 
naval engagement here (4.34). These passages, along with a early concept of hoplite 
warfare in Greece, have led to the dismissal of an historical five-class subdivision of 
the population under Servius Tullius.
626
 
                                                 
623
 Cornell (1995), 183-86; Forsythe (2005), 111-13. 
624
 Momigliano (1963), 119-120 (with bibliography). 
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 It is also in Gellius that we find a definition for classis which means the army. The flamen Dialis 
was said to not be able to observe the classis arrayed outside the pomerium (NA 10.15). As well, we 
see classis meaning ‘army’ in Gellius’ discussion of the Spartan use of pipes in battle (NA 1.11). The 
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 On its own, this is not a conclusive body of evidence, to my mind, to dismiss 
the five classes as originating under Servius Tullius, or at least in the sixth century. It 
seems to be overlooked by most that the first Gellius passage (NA 6.13) maintains 
that within the five classes it was only the first class called classis, and not 
necessarily that the entire legio was once called classis. The other Servian classes are 
still present as the infra classem, meaning that this group was not an undifferentiated 
mass! But we also must not remove this passage from its context, which is 169 BC 
and Cato the Elder arguing in favour of the lex Voconia (Cic. Balb. 8, Sen. 5). Thus 
we are left seeing that in the middle of the second century the first class is 
synonymous with classis, but realistically we are forced to stop there. Slightly more 
convincing could be Gellius’ statement that the flamen Dialis could not see the 
‘classis’ outside the pomerium (NA 10.15). This would be quite secure evidence if 
we had a date for the institution of this regulation against the flamen, but we have no 
idea when this came into effect.
627
 If we are to see classis as representing the entirety 
of the Early Roman army of the centuriate organization we would expect that as 
more classes were added to the census rolls that the army would, at some point, be 
called classes instead, representing an army consisting of all of the ‘new’ classes 
combined. The only extant example of this is given in Gellius (NA 1.11) when 
discussing the army of the Spartans. This passage may need to be read as ‘when the 
army was drawn up.’ If we read the plural classes literally, our translation would be 
                                                                                                                                          
precludes the necessity of a hoplite vs. non-hoplite division being the principle organization of the 
Early Roman legio. See below. 
627
 I side here with Rüpke’s (2012) warning that we should not expect religious institutions to be 
unchanging throughout their history and, in my opinion, it is dangerous to read this particular 
institution all the way back into the regal period as we have no mention of it in the narrative histories, 
even though, for instance, Livy would presumably have good reason to mention it at 1.20 when telling 
of Numa’s creation of the priesthood. Rather, Livy simply cites Numa as making this particular 
flamen stay resident in Rome. It is curious that Plutarch, although listing a number of prohibitions of 
the flamen Dialis does not mention this particular one (QR 40, 44, 50, 109). Plutarch was, however, 
following a different tradition from Livy, as he assigns the creation of the flamen Dialis to Romulus 
rather than to Numa (cf. Numa 7). 
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‘when the classes were drawn up’ and it would make less sense within the text.628 
Thus we cannot say securely, based on the evidence from Gellius, that classis in the 
singular was vernacular for army proper, only that it represented the first class of the 
Roman army at some point in the city’s history.629 
 The passage in which Livy supposedly uses classis to represent the army is a 
very difficult passage to interpret. Based on the less than clear understanding of the 
word in Gellius, this passage could either mean that the first class of the Roman 
army was the only one to take the field on this occasion, or perhaps it was 
exceptional that it had taken the field, (per NA 6.13) or that the army made up of 
every available soldier was present (per NA 10.15). The first meaning from Gellius 
can be dismissed as we know that the cavalry was present, and the passage at 6.13 is 
too vague for us to safely include the cavalry in its reference.
630
 Certainly, the second 
example from Gellius fits the situation, as it would imply that the entire army was 
present, which the narrative seems to support (cf. Livy 4.32-34). Even Ogilvie, who 
seemingly supported the idea that the classis represented the entire Servian army in 
one class, concedes that ‘classis and classici could equally well stand collectively for 
the five classes, while infra classem would be all those who did not have the 
minimum property qualification.’631 
A more critical look at Livy is revealing in this light. The passage at 4.34 has 
had a considerable impact on the attitude of modern scholars to the Servian classes. 
In some ways it is seen as confirmation of the information provided by Gellius. This 
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absolute plural, as following on from ‘cum procinctae igitur classes erant’ Gellius brings the number 
back to the singular with ‘et instructa acies.’ The perfect passive participle of instructa forces us to 
read this entire passage in the figurative plural. 
629
 The evidence of Festus fits in with the same argument and thus does not need to be discussed 
independently. 
630
 A. Momigliano (1963) in fact believed that ‘the knights remained of course above the centuries of 
the classis,’ (120). 
631
 Ogilvie (1965), 589. 
138 
 
is not what this aside of Livy’s provides. Recent commentators, such as Forsythe, 
have claimed that this passage represents an ‘annalistic misunderstanding of the 
word [classis].’632 The problem with this idea is how it has come down to us and 
how it was most probably introduced into the annalistic tradition. Commentators 
have continually left out an essential element of the sentence, quoque.
633
 Livy is not 
telling us simply that ‘certain historians record that there was a naval battle’ at 
Fidenae in 425, but that certain historians have also recorded that the fleet was 
present.
634
 
 It seems quite certain that the classi here is not the fleet, regardless of how 
we interpret it. If, in fact, this passage is representative of a misunderstanding of an 
inscription, as postulated by Forsythe, there is another probable solution to the 
problem of Livy’s text.635 Whatever the source used by the earlier annalists was, the 
text must have read something like ‘legio classisque adfuerunt’636 if Livy is 
accurately representing his source. The ambiguity does not rest with the presence of 
the army, only the presence of the classis. If we accept a reading of Livy as reflective 
of the structure of his sources then we are forced to see the classis not as the single, 
undifferentiated, Servian army but as something that stands separate from it. It is 
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 The sentence reading: classi quoque ad Fidenas pugnatum cum Veientibus quidam in annales 
rettulere (1898 Teubner text). 
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 Quoque having to be read together with classi. The quoted translation is that of Luce (1998) in the 
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traceable back to Ennius (ap. Macr. Sat. 6.4.6) and Plautus (Amph. Prologue 102). It seems very 
unlikely to me that classis ever meant ‘the army’ yet did not make its way into the vocabulary of the 
annalists. With that said, early Latin was certainly different to that of the latter centuries BC. 
Polybius’ difficulty in reading the first of the Romano-Punic treaties (3.22) illustrates the differences 
between the Latin of the late sixth century and the mid to late second century. We would be on more 
secure footing if we had access to the texts of the early annalists, but even then the point would be 
impossible to prove conclusively. 
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problematic that we do not possess Dionysius at this point, who could offer a 
comparative understanding. 
These discrepancies do not give us enough ground to dismiss the five classes 
of the Servian constitution. It must be asked why the annalists would create these 
anachronistic classes in their description of Servius Tullius and then assign them a 
haphazard assortment of weaponry if all of their evidence pointed to a single class 
which made up the army. It seems far more probable that the early annalists 
preserved some sort of memory which originated in the sixth century. There is some 
ground to claim that a document known as the descriptio classium existed which 
could have been the source for the five classes, but perhaps not for the arms assigned 
to each, as they differ between our two surviving sources, Livy and Dionysius.
637
 If 
this document recorded the state of the army under Servius Tullius as consisting of 
five classes, but did not list their arms, then it would make sense for mid-Republican 
annalists to try to fill in this gap.
638
 If this document, however, only contained a 
single Servian class it makes no sense for the annalists to have created the five 
classes out of nowhere. 
 There is also evidence within the descriptions of the classes themselves 
which may indicate a genuine historical value for the five separate classes. It is well 
known that the accounts of Livy and Dionysius are almost identical, in terms of what 
each class was to be armed with, but they do differ slightly.
639
 This has been 
recognized as being indicative of our two sources having followed different 
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 Digesta (2) records a Sextus Papirius, supposedly a contemporary of Tarquinius Superbus, as 
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traditions when composing their respective works.
640
 There is evidence from 
Bologna that armies of mixed arms existed in a quasi-contemporaneous period.
641
 
The Arnoaldi Situla shows a group of armed figures, perhaps an army, with mixed 
arms: on figure on foot carrying a round shield and wearing a crested helmet, six 
figures on foot carrying oblong shields and wearing (possibly) Negau type helmets, 
one figure carrying an oblong shield and wearing a crested helmet, a horseman with 
round shield, a horseman without visible defensive arms, and a figure carrying an 
oblong shield and appearing to blow into a horn (Fig. 7).
642
 The Certosa Situla 
contains similar imagery, four figures carrying round shields with crested helmets, 
four figures carrying square shields with rounded corners, five figures carrying 
oblong shields, two horsemen, and four figures with basket shaped headwear 
possibly carrying axes (Fig. 8).
643
 These depictions seem to show a strikingly similar 
set of arms to those found in the classes of the Servian Constitution.
644
 
 Besides the distance from Rome at which these were found, there are a 
number of problems with taking these as evidence for the classes of the Servian army 
without some comment. Firstly, although oblong shields are evidenced at Veii and 
Bisenzio in the eighth century, there is no archaeological evidence in Rome or 
Latium during the sixth century for this type of shield, this evidence only comes 
from regions further north.
645
 We can overcome this obstacle, however, by realizing 
that the representational evidence that we have from this period in central Italy were 
commissioned by elites, much of which was meant to promulgate their image. If this 
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 On the Arnoaldi situla, see Cherici (2008), 195-198. 
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(1985). 
644
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 Stary (1979), 200, and infra 6.1. 
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is accepted, it can be reasoned that the production of art displaying the arms and 
armour of the second class and below would not have been a priority. Secondly, it is 
also possible that the armies depicted on these situlae, if that is what they are, may 
show a multi ‘ethnic’ character, the figures with the round shields being Etruscans 
and those with oblong shields being from the Hallstatt cultures to the north of the Po 
Plain.
646
 The similarities between the situlae, especially that of the Arnoaldi situla, 
and the recorded arms of the Servian constitution cannot be ignored. It would be 
unwise to claim that these images confirm the authenticity of the historical record, 
but they do give the literary evidence considerable support. 
There has also been a linguistic argument against classis being an archaic 
term meaning the army. Classis must be reconciled with the well attested term legio. 
The later is clearly the remembered name of the army raised from the Servian 
Constitution as is well attested throughout the narrative history of the Republic. That 
the original Servian army was known as legio is quite certain, as well, if we accept a 
connection between the legion and leges, laws enacted by the comitia centuriata, or 
populus. These laws stand in opposition to those enacted by the plebs, outside of the 
army levy, which were known as plebiscita.
647
 This connection is tenuous, however, 
as there is an Indo-European precedent for lex/legis, and the point may be moot.
648
 
 The argument against an archaic Roman hoplite phalanx is also an important 
counter point to the single class theory.
649
 Circumstantial support for the single class 
theory has often been to cite the nature of hoplite phalanx warfare, in which two 
‘egalitarian’ groups of citizen-soldiers faced off in an almost agonal martial 
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contest.
650
 There was little to no differentiation in these armies that relied on 
extremely tight formations and steadfastness to hold the line.
651
 The new 
interpretation of Greek warfare, which is considerably more plausible and evidence-
heavy, postulates that the emergence of the classical Greek phalanx occurred only 
sometime in the fifth century.
652
 This new dating precludes its introduction in sixth-
century Rome.
653
 This renders much of the discussion of the nature of the Servian 
army moot.
654
 
 The problems raised against the Servian Constitution are not limited to 
discussions of the infantry. The cavalry centuries have also caused considerable 
misunderstandings in modern interpretations. Servius Tullius is said to have 
maintained the original six equestrian centuries that originated with Romulus and 
were expanded by Tarquinius Priscus, and then added twelve additional centuries to 
their number (Livy 1.43; cf. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.18). While the number of 
centuries is securely settled at a total of eighteen, the order in which these centuries 
voted is not consistent in the evidence. The annalistic tradition, as maintained by 
Livy (1.43) and Dionysius (4.20), records that the cavalry centuries voted first (Livy) 
or concurrently with the first class of the infantry (Dionysius). This is contradicted 
by a small body of non-narrative evidence (Cicero Phil. 2.82; Rep. 2.22; Festus 
452L). Rawlings has emphasized the mistaken precedence given to this body of 
evidence by earlier commentators.
655
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 Argumentation to support the hypothesis that the cavalry centuries voted after 
the first class is problematic. Momigliano based part of his theory on his perception 
that cavalry would have played little to no role in the hoplite warfare of the time, 
emphasizing their lack of stirrups and inability to perform shock tactics.
656
 There is 
no evidence for this inability in any ancient society, and it is a modern 
anachronism.
657
 Cornell’s rationalization of this otherwise counterintuitive aspect of 
the comitia centuriata is bound up in accepting his belief that the Servian 
Constitution was meant as a check on the power of the aristocracy.
658
 This 
reconstruction, however, is based almost wholly on an earlier understanding of 
hoplite warfare and a presumption that the cavalry, being made up of the wealthiest 
members of Roman society, voted last. 
 The importance of cavalry for archaic Rome could be confirmed (or at least 
supported) by a series of terracotta revetment plaques found which date close to the 
reign of Servius Tullius (Fig. 9-10). The motif of armed riders is quite common in 
the so-called Veii-Rome-Velletri decorative system.
659
 It would be overly optimistic 
to try to equate these images directly to the Servian equites, but their presence at a 
number of prominent sites throughout Rome, and their very public display, must 
have some significance.
660
 These images typically appear alongside other friezes 
which depict images which are often associated with aristocratic activity and seem to 
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fit into a visual dialogue as such. Their presence as a decorative element on small 
temples could represent the aristocratic origin of the original temple dedication.
661
 
 Some of the scholarly doubt towards the prominence of the archaic Roman 
cavalry could be based in a famous, yet absurd, passage in Polybius. The historian 
states that, before adopting Greek kit, Roman horsemen fought almost naked, with 
an ineffective hide shield, and carried lances which broke apart before coming to 
grips with the enemy (6.25).
662
 Accepting this attitude easily enables one to believe 
that the cavalry must have taken a backseat to the infantry under the Servian 
Constitution.
663
 Besides the pragmatic problems presented by Polybius’ statement, 
his concept of early Roman cavalry does not match up with the iconographic 
evidence of archaic armament.
664
 
 Lastly, the difference in conceptions of the Servian Constitution could also be 
down to the different goals of the preserved authors. There are three different 
historical traditions which can be seen to affect our knowledge of this topic. Cicero 
represents a tradition of institutional history which has a clear and distinct goal, 
which is to prove that the Roman constitution was the best in the Mediterranean 
world (Rep. 1.34, 70).
665
 Livy and Dionysius together represent the other two 
historical traditions. The first is a tradition of institutional history which seemingly 
aims to understand the workings of archaic Rome. The second is the narrative 
tradition which preserves at least some narrative knowledge of the workings of early 
Rome. These three traditions all give different pictures of what the Servian 
Constitution actually accomplished. 
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 Under the moralizing institutional history created by Cicero, the Roman 
Constitution can be seen to be superior to others even of the ‘mixed’ variety. The 
voting of the equites after the first class could have been an element of this 
moralizing agenda. This would show that in Rome, unlike other states, voting was 
primarily the concern of a middling group of well to do citizens. The institutional 
history preserved by the annalists is not of much more help except to give evidence 
of the importance of the equites under the original organization. The narrative 
history, however, provides a line of analysis that has not been mustered in the 
discussion of the Servian Constitution. 
 Although the narrative histories do preserve a version of the Servian 
Constitution, the reconstruction of Roman warfare based on their actual narratives 
does not fit well at first sight with a military view of the Constitution. Roman 
warfare throughout the fifth century, and probably in the sixth century as well, often 
consisted of raids and counter raids against hill tribes such as the Aequi and Volsci, 
as well as against Veii.
666
 The importance of cavalry in raids is obvious. More than 
that, the entire Roman levy does not seem to be being raised to go on these raiding 
expeditions. 
 In the years immediately following the fall of the monarchy we get a glimpse 
of how the Servian Constitution and the Roman army were probably functioning. 
Cavalry, not the infantry levy, is the most notable contributor to the first battle to 
repulse the return of Tarquinius Superbus, the Battle of ‘Silva Arsia’ (Livy 2.6). The 
two consuls, Publius Valerius and Lucius Iunius Brutus, each led a different 
component of the army, Valerius the infantry and Brutus the cavalry.
667
 The most 
notable event of the battle was of Brutus and Arruns Tarquinius killing one another 
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in the cavalry engagement. Eventually the infantries join the fight, but clearly the 
important illustration in the narrative is that of the cavalry engagement. 
 The next great battle in the fifth century poses a further problem. In either 
499 (Livy 2.19) or 496 (Livy 2.21; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.1-16) the first dictator is 
appointed, Aulus Postumius, and Titus Aebutius is appointed as the master of the 
horse. What is problematic from a constitutional point is that Livy specifies that they 
marched against the Latins ‘with a great force of infantry and cavalry’ (Livy 2.19). 
Further examples of the need to specify the quality of numbers raised are relatively 
common. The narrative histories show that the constitution was not remembered as 
playing a memorable role in the wars of the fifth century. 
 This evidence is very diverse and indicates that there was not a standard sized 
army in the archaic period. The Roman army which fought at Lake Regillus is 
described by Livy as ‘a great force’ (2.19).668 This seems to imply that this army was 
irregularly large. Proportionally great preparations for war were made in 434 in the 
face of an Etruscan threat (Livy 4.23).
669
 We also hear of Roman armies which 
included volunteers (Livy 3.69, 4.60, 5.16). An additional abnormality in recruitment 
in 418, when the decision was made to only levy troops from ten tribes, rather than 
the entire population (Livy 4.46). Although not widely attested, there is evidence 
which points to the Roman army being enrolled irregularly throughout the fifth 
century. The last example provided, as well, may be evidence that the Servian 
recruitment system was, perhaps amongst other things, a coercive tool. Thus, despite 
having two institutional traditions which describe the Servian Constitution as being 
the basic recruiting structure of the Roman army of the archaic period, the narrative 
histories do not support a simple recruitment structure. This is problematic for 
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historians who argue for a standardized Roman army based on the number of 
centuries in the comitia centuriata.
670
 The reform is almost always seen as a 
primarily military reform which introduced this kind of standardization.
671
 
Based on the above discussion I propose a new reading of the Servian 
Constitution and the centuriate organization, at least as it existed in archaic Rome. 
Rather than being a military reform along the lines of the ‘hoplite reform’ of the 
Hellenic world, the Servian Constitution represents a negotiation of power between 
the elites, who probably voted first, followed by the well to do, who typically voted 
along the lines of the elites (Livy 1.43). It also established who in the city-state’s 
hegemony was obliged to go to war when called into service.
672
 This was a measure 
of coercion to force those who were outside of the wealthiest social group to go to 
war. 
Recruitment of Etruscan armies may have been raised in a similar fashion to 
those of Early Rome, though we have no evidence for this type of state mechanism. 
Civic armies certainly existed, but from the evidence available it appears that these 
were often augmented by auxiliaries from the region or by units raised by individual 
families. This was the case for the army of Veii in 480 (Livy 2.44; Dion. Hal. Ant. 
Rom. 9.5.4).
673
 If recruitment along the lines of kin or client relationships was 
common throughout Etruria, the development of coercive state mechanisms may not 
have been necessary, but the existence of Etruscan magistrates suggests that this was 
not the case. 
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4.2 Condottieri 
 Besides states waging war during the period under investigation, extra-state 
figures are seen as playing a prominent role in conflict making. These figures are 
often referred to as condottieri, a term more commonly found in Renaissance history. 
The use of this term in the history of central Italy can be traced back to the early 
twentieth century.
674
 Deiss has summed up the nature of these men, as the term 
applies to the Renaissance: ‘they fought, intrigued, betrayed, killed – to get what 
they wanted.’675 This general sketch fits well with the activities of those historical 
individuals.
676
 This basic description makes them a very tempting comparison to the 
aristocrats, elites, or whomever else we see acting outside of the state system of 
Tyrrhenian Italy. We should take care, though, to remember that the idea of waging a 
‘private war’ is not unique to an Italian context. There is considerable evidence for 
private wars having been waged in the Hellenic world from the age of Homer 
through to the Classical period.
677
 But how prominent and how important was this 
warfare? Was there a strict dichotomy between state and private war, as some have 
suggested?
678
 
 One of the characteristics of the armies of Renaissance condottieri was the 
preponderance of mercenaries within their ranks. This may have also been the case 
in Tyrrhenian Italy. There is evidence that mercenaries circulated throughout the 
region, and may have participated in both the wars of Etruria and Latium and as far 
afield as Sicily. The actions of mercenaries are by definition outside of the traditional 
                                                 
674
 Cf. Rawlings (1999), 116 n. 4. 
675
 Deiss (1966), 13. 
676
 Cf. Caferro (2006). 
677
 A number of examples from the Homeric corpus present themselves. Two of the best examples are 
the first two examples of the ‘Cretan Lie’ (Od. 13.256-286, 14.191-359). If we give any credence to 
the reality of a Homeric world, then Odysseus gives us two fairly strong examples of a Cretan 
condottiero. Further examples can be found in more historical times (e.g. Hdt. 6.42; Thuc. 1.5-6; Plato 
Laws 12.955b-c). These instances are all discussed in Rawlings (2007), 11-14; cf. van Wees (2004), 
95-97. 
678
 Armstrong (2009). 
149 
 
image of the state as dominating the use of force; these men go to war for personal 
gain, whether that was wealth, glory, or subsistence. This section examines the 
behaviour of condottieri and mercenaries, breaking them into two general categories. 
The first looks at how non-state armies centred on kin groups operated. The second 
examines the phenomenon of non-kin and non-state based armies or war-bands. The 
important differentiation is that kin based groups have a pre-existing bond, while 
armies of mercenaries and strangers do not. 
4.2.1 Gentilicial/Kin Groups 
 The rise of large settlements over the period of the Early Iron Age, as we 
have seen above, may be an indicator of the rise of proto-states or states. In the 
archaeological remains, however, there may be evidence of a resistance to 
centralized power.
679
 Developments in Tarquinia are important for our understanding 
of how families and states may have been opposed during this period. At the end of 
the Early Iron Age, four burials stand out from the usual trend of burials clustered in 
family groups, sitting alone.
680
 These are relatively wealthy burials in terms of their 
grave goods which included bronze crested helmets and other arms.
681
 Opposed to 
these four burials is a general burial pattern which centres on the family group.
682
 At 
the centre of a number of these familial groups are a number of extremely wealthy 
burials. The most spectacular of these included an impasto hut urn. Burials with kind 
of urn have been argued to represent the figure of the pater familias, the head of the 
family unit.
683
 Patterns within these familial groups, as well, may indicate that 
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military power, or at least the practise of burial with arms, was restricted to certain 
families within the community.
684
 
 The widespread use of the hut urn in Etruria and Latium may be evidence of 
strong familial bonds and groups which could exercise military power during the 
period in which states appear to be forming.
685
 If this is true, warfare may have been 
organized along both state and non-state lines in the Early Iron Age throughout the 
region. This supposition, however, is predicated on those persons buried with arms 
actually practised warfare, and that the bonds within these familial groups were 
strong enough to coerce its members into performing martial deeds. The continued 
importance of familial burial groups into the Orientalizing and Archaic Periods show 
that kin ties were still important into the period in which the central Italian city-states 
were very developed. This may be further evidence that the kin groups were 
extremely powerful in the earlier period; the assumption would be that their power 
slowly declined as the power of the state increased. Political power could be 
consolidated within certain families for multiple generations, although the evidence 
does not allow for much elaboration.
 686
 This concentration of political power may 
have translated into monopolization of military power through the mechanisms of 
the state, although there is no direct evidence for this happening before the historical 
period. 
The famously problematic scene depicted on the Tragliatella oinochoe has 
often been used as further evidence of gentilicial armies (Fig 11).
687
 The most 
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controversial scene depicted on this vessel shows seven armed figures, with large 
round shields emblazoned with boars, and holding three spears. The other scenes on 
this vase, however, point to this being part of either a ritual or an elaborate myth 
about which we know very little. Two further oinochoe show similar scenes, armed 
figures with shields similarly emblazoned (Figs. 12-13). This evidence may very 
well point to the existence of forces centred around the gens, as has been forcefully 
argued by Jannot.
688
 The repetition of shield emblems is pointed to as the key piece 
of evidence for this. The problem with this assertion regarding the Tragliatella 
oinochoe is that the boar was a civic symbol of Tarquinia.
689
 Tragliatella lies within 
what is generally considered the territory of Caere, which may make us question an 
association to Tarquinia, but there is no reason to presume that it was always within 
the sphere of control of this city. In general, though, there is no reason to rule out 
that these shield devices could have had civic symbolism rather than familial. 
Another body of controversial evidence relating to the existence of gentilicial 
armies was excavated at Vetulonia, in 1905.
690
 One hundred and twenty five Negau 
type helmets were found during this excavation near the Mura dell’Arce, dating to 
the fifth century. On the lower edge of approximately fifty of these helmets is 
inscribed the word haspnas. This has been identified as a family of elites from the 
area.
691
 The inscribed name has led some scholars to conclude that this provides 
definitive proof of gentilicial armies in Etruria.
692
 This inscription, however, could 
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mean many different things.
693
 It could be the name of the smith who made the 
helmets. Alternatively, the helmets could be the ritual deposition of captured 
helmets, with those inscribed with haspnas having been those killed or taken 
prisoner by members of this one family. The definitive association of these helmets, 
as well as the above discussed evidence, with private, family based, warfare has 
rested heavily on two pieces of literary evidence. 
The first piece of literary evidence is Dionysius’ description of an Etruscan 
army drawn up at Veii, around 480. The observations of the Romans are supposedly 
preserved, telling us that influential men (δυνατοί) from around Etruria had brought 
their dependents (πενέσται) to join with the army from Veii (Ant. Rom. 9.5.4).694 
Although this scene does establish the possibility of leading Etruscan figures 
recruiting armed groups of men, ultimately it was in the service of a civic army, and 
there is no evidence that the armed groups raised for this confrontation were used to 
wage a private campaign.
695
 
The most significant historical source for gentilicial warfare, however, is the 
fifth-century expedition of the gens Fabia against Veii.
696
 This episode is frequently 
used to support arguments in favour of seeing gentilicial armies in early Rome.
697
 
The Roman state was occupied by conflicts against raiding tribes from the east in 
479, when war was provoked by Veii. The gens Fabia volunteered to wage a 
‘private’ war against Veii, with whom hostilities seem to have been about to ignite 
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(Livy 2.48-50). Livy claims that the Fabii went to war ‘velut familiar bellum private 
sumptu’ (Livy 2.49). According to the tradition handed down by Livy and Dionysius, 
the clan marched out en masse against the Veientines, with 306 patrician members of 
the clan being engaged (Livy 2.49; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 9.15-22). Besides family 
members, Livy tells us that the cognati and sodales of the clan also marched with the 
Fabii. The prolonged hostilities against Veii culminated in the utter destruction of the 
clan at the battle of the River Cremera, in 476/477 (Livy 2.50). That this was actually 
an example of a family waging private warfare, though, is a complicated conclusion 
and is questioned below. 
 The account of this war in Diodorus Siculus does not follow the same 
narrative as Livy and Dionysius, and this divergence must be reconciled. According 
to Diodorus, this conflict between Rome and Veii was a war in the traditional sense, 
and that it was exceptional for the fact that 300 members of a single family, the 
Fabii, were killed in the fighting (11.53.6).
698
 The reception of this version of events 
is mixed in the modern scholarship, with some commentators such as Momigliano 
suggesting that it was created as a ‘normalization’ of archaic events, which would 
have been more faithfully recorded in Diodorus’ sources.699 Tim Cornell has 
connected the conflict with the Fabian lands which bordered the ager Veientanus and 
believes that the story’s ‘basic historicity should not be questioned.’700 Oldfather, in 
a note to his Loeb translation of Diodorus, believed that Diodorus provides a 
‘sensible’ account of the event and ‘that this was a battle between the Romans and 
the Etruscans for the control of the right bank of the Tiber… [which] the Fabian gens 
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dressed up.’701 Although this is simply a passing statement made by a translator, it is 
a point which deserves further, more rigorous, examination. 
 Of our three narrative sources of the events at the Cremera, Diodorus 
provides the most brief account. Livy’s version spans three chapters in book two 
(2.48-50), and Dionysius’ account was written over eight chapters (9.15-22). 
Diodorus’ account amounts to two sentences. But those two sentences contain a very 
important notice, ‘according to some historians there were also three hundred of the 
Fabii,’702 amongst those killed. We know from Dionysius that there were a number 
of versions of the story known to him, as well, but they all include the Fabii (Ant. 
Rom. 9.19, 20).
703
 Although he does not explicitly say he followed multiple sources, 
Livy’s narrative has been accused of this.704 It is obvious, then, that by the Late 
Republic there were a number of different versions of the Battle of the Cremera 
within the historical tradition.
705
 Two of these were preserved by Dionysius, one of 
which was probably the basis for Livy’s narrative, but we must remember that there 
were also authors which did not even include the Fabii in the story, as cited by 
Diodorus. 
Diodorus’ chronology of early Rome is significantly different from that of 
Livy and Dionysius. This difference has generally been considered an important 
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cache of otherwise unpreserved traditions.
706
 It is important to note that Diodorus did 
not record every event of early Rome, only those which seemed important, notably 
the Decemvirate and the Gallic Sack. The Battle of the Cremera, then, was important 
enough to receive mention by Diodorus, even if he did not provide a complete 
narrative. This shows that his sources made the event out to be of historical value, 
with or without the participation of the Fabii.
707
 If every version of the story had 
been simply an annihilation of the gens by the army of Veii, would it really have 
ranked as important enough for Diodorus to include in his compilation? 
 Arguments in favour of this expedition having been a proper military affair of 
the Fabii claim that because the lands of this gens bordered the Veientine land which 
was being attacked it would have been a prerogative of the Fabii to undertake this 
endeavour.
708
 This does lend credence to the war having been carried out primarily 
by the gens and its retainers, but a number of inconsistencies further complicate the 
matter. Dionysius tells us that the Fabii took along with them 4,000 of their clients 
(πελάται) and friends (ἑταῖροι) (9.15.3), while Livy tells us that their family (cognati) 
and friends (sodales) followed after them but does not give a number (2.49). We do 
not hear of these others taking part in the fighting in either account, both using very 
general language to describe the combat. Dionysius’ second narrative of the events 
which led to the Fabian massacre could be construed as including the clients and 
friends, as he speaks of a Fabian army, but there is no specific mention of them (Ant. 
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Rom. 9.20-21). Livy completely omits them, saying that 306 perished, these being 
the Fabii (2.50). 
 We also have to contend with the Livian narrative naming Caeso Fabius, the 
leader of the expedition, as consul (2.48). When the army marched out of Rome, in 
this version of the story, they would have technically been under the auspices of an 
active consul (2.49). Rawlings believes that this was a normalizing addition to the 
historical tradition.
709
 Dionysius, though, also names Caeso Fabius as the consul 
when the clan first marches out of the city (Ant. Rom. 9.15.3). Caeso Fabius did not 
lead his clan as consul, only a normal Roman army. Having returned to Rome with 
his army in the year that the Fabii marched out on their own, Caeso resigned his 
position of consul, but he joined his clansmen later and led with proconsular power 
(Ant. Rom. 9.16.3). The appointment of Caeso as a supposed ‘proconsul’ is an absurd 
claim, and is typically regarded as a normalizing element of the tradition, as the 
Livian narrative above.
710
 The supposed normalizing element in both narratives, 
either making Caeso consul (Livy) or proconsul (Dionysius), is problematic from an 
historical point of view, and the effort of Livy (or his source) is in vain, because 
although the clan sets out under his auspices, the actual combat comes a year later, 
after Lucius Aemilius and Gaius Servilius were elected consuls (Livy 2.50). In 
Dionysius Caeso marched out before he left office, but not with the clan, with the 
Roman army (9.15.3). 
 Noting these complications, it is easy to understand Richard’s exhausted 
conclusion that the version of events handed down to us is probably not the true 
version of events.
711
 The circumstances of the year prior to the departure of the Fabii 
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may give an important clue to the historical circumstances surrounding this event. In 
480, an army was raised in Rome to march against Veii, perhaps as a reprisal for a 
plundering raid the year before (Livy 2.43-44).
712
 This army was commanded by 
both consuls, Marcus Fabius and Gnaeus Manlius. They are said to have defeated 
Veii in a battle which Dionysius describes as greater than any others fought by Rome 
before it (Ant. Rom. 9.13.1).
713
 Manlius the consul was killed, but the Fabian consul 
survived, although Quintus Fabius, consul three years earlier, was killed (Livy 
2.46).
714
 This battle was described as if was a resounding success for the Fabii as it 
supposedly won them the favour of the plebs and the senate (Livy 2.47-48). 
It is possible that after this victory the Fabii were able to establish themselves 
in a fortified position on Veii’s side of the Tiber, which is reflected in the first action 
taken in the narratives of their private war.
715
 The gens is strongly associated with 
this victory over Veii and Livy makes it seem quite clear that the family benefited 
greatly from it. The benefit which Livy highlights is popularity with the people, but 
there is no reason to think that the Fabian consul, the only surviving consul, did not 
use his victory to secure gains for his family.
716
 It is possible, if not probable, that the 
Fabii used this opportunity to exert control over the lands recently forced from Veii’s 
hands, perhaps it was an opportunity to expand their original lands which shared a 
border with the new acquisition. If this is the case, though, it is unlikely that the clan 
marched out against Veii in a familial show of patriotism, but rather was entrenched 
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for almost three years in newly conquered lands before they were later forced off by 
the Veientes.
717
 
If this line of thinking is accepted, then the account of Diodorus can be lined 
up with the accounts of Livy and Dionysius. In the two narrative accounts, after the 
Fabii were destroyed at the Cremera an army from Rome comes to battle with the 
army from Veii, and is defeated (Livy 2.51; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 9.23-24). This is 
the defeat which is mentioned in Diodorus (11.53.6). To make the version given by 
Diodorus compatible with the Livian and Dionysian accounts, though, the Fabii 
would have to have been destroyed during the battle, rather than in a separate 
engagement, or series of engagements, before the arrival of the Roman army. This 
version of events may help to make sense of one last element of the story, that the 
Fabii were wiped out down to a single, young, male (Livy 2.50). Dionysius finds this 
detail to be ludicrously fictional and a fabrication of later authors, pointing out that 
there had to have been young male members of the family who had not been part of 
the slaughter (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 9.22).
718
 Presumably there would have been male 
members of the family not old enough to participate in warfare. Because the Fabii 
disappear from the consular lists until 467, some modern commentators have 
accepted the historicity of a single male survivor of this intense slaughter.
719
 
The evidence of the Fabii disappearing from the magistrate lists is telling, but 
of what? The election of Quintus Fabius Vibulanus consul in 467 only allows for a 
gap of twelve years since the last Fabian consul, and eleven or ten years since the 
supposed slaughter of the family. Quintus is noted as being the lone survivor of the 
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disaster (Livy 3.1), but Dionysius’ description is very interesting, he calls Quintus 
‘the son of one of the three brothers who had commanded the garrison that was sent 
out to the Cremera and had perished there together with their clients’ (Ant. Rom. 
9.59.1). If we are to accept Livy’s version, we must question how young Quintus 
could have been at the Cremera if he is elected consul only about a decade after the 
supposed destruction of the rest of the family. Dionysius’ version provides another 
issue, though; we have seen above that he rejected the idea that a single youth 
survived the slaughter and now shows that he is following a different tradition than 
Livy, which is probably the romantic tradition recording only one survivor. In this 
version it is not the entire family which was destroyed, but only three brothers and 
their retainers. This version of events works well with the above suggestion, that the 
supposed Fabian expedition was actually a movement to newly conquered lands by a 
number of members of the family. 
If the entire gens was not destroyed, as has just been suggested, a new 
explanation for their absence from the consular lists is needed. There is no reason 
that we have to preclude the unpopularity of members of the gens during this decade, 
as it seems fairly certain that the popular consuls of the years leading up to the 
Cremera were killed in the conflict with Veii. It is also possible, however, that the 
gens was blamed for the disaster that befell the Roman army. The narrative indicates 
that the Roman army was sent against Veii after the Fabii were destroyed, and even 
though a Fabius was not in command of this army, the fact that it was levied and 
marching to deal with a problem caused by the clan may have caused a backlash 
amongst the Roman people (Livy 2.51). 
So what then does this leave of the Fabian expedition? None of this 
argumentation is meant to claim that the Fabii were not engaged in raiding against 
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Veii. This they were doing, being based in a fortified position in newly conquered 
territories. Two parts of the story, however, are proposed to be later additions to the 
story. The first part that was a later elaboration is that the Fabii marched against Veii 
in a zeal of patriotism and in defence of Rome; as has been suggested in this section, 
they were simply occupying land won in the previous year’s campaigning. The 
second part of the story that is probably a later creation is the absolute destruction of 
the clan. The Fabii do disappear from the consular fasti, but this was not because 
they were wiped out, it was because they were blamed for the greatest Roman 
disaster to date. 
We have seen in this section, then, that the evidence traditionally mustered to 
argue that there were private armed bands regularly roaming around Etruria and 
Latium is problematic. Much of the archaeological evidence is difficult to interpret, 
and the association of much of it with ‘condottiero’ or gentilicial warfare rests on a 
linked interpretation with a body of problematic literary evidence. As has been 
argued here, much of the evidence for gentilicial armies must be either questioned, 
or altogether rejected. 
4.2.2 Strangers/Mercenaries 
In addition to the problematic evidence of familial groups, and others, whom 
we may label condottieri, we find evidence of individuals who went to war for 
personal gain, without their family group, or went to war on behalf of polities that 
were not their home; these men were mercenaries.
720
 Mercenaries are well known 
from the ancient world. They occupied a prominent place in the warfare of the 
eastern Mediterranean empires and later city-states.
721
 Mercenaries from pre-Roman 
Italy were known to fight for Greek cities in Sicily and for the Carthaginians on a 
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number of occasions.
722
 Although Etruscan mercenaries are mentioned by 
Thucydides in relation to Sicilian affairs, the level of participation of Etruscans and 
Romans is unclear.
723
 Recently, it has been argued that there is no evidence to 
reliably see central Italian mercenaries before the fourth century.
724
 While 
mercenaries from Etruria and Rome may not have played much of, or any, role in the 
wider Mediterranean before the fourth century, textual evidence suggests that 
mercenaries did exist on a local level. 
During the reign of Tullus Hostilius, the Sabines recruited mercenaries and 
volunteers from the local area, especially Veii, for a way against Rome (Livy 
1.30).
725
 As we have seen in the historical methodology above, evidence from the 
regal period is extremely tenuous. Our sources probably did not have access to a 
genuine memory of this levy. This example shows, however, that the Roman 
historians accepted the idea of mercenaries existing that early in central Italian 
history.
726
 In later times, an Etruscan army marching against Rome attracted a 
number of Sabines, by their own accord, because of the liberal pay being offered by 
the Etruscans (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.59.1-2).
727
 When Tarquinius Superbus was 
assembling an army with which to march on Rome, he was sent help by Tarquinia 
and Veii, some soldiers were sent by their friends (φίλοι), while others served for pay 
(μισθοφόροι) (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.14.1). The army of Lars Porsenna which 
marched on Rome contained a large contingent of foreigners and mercenaries 
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(μισθοφόροι) (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.22.4).728 We should not discount off hand that 
there were men willing to go to war for some sort of remuneration in central Italy 
during the archaic period. 
There are more speculative instances which may be construed as the 
inclusion of mercenaries in armies. In 464, when preparing to raid the lands of the 
Hernici, the Aequi sought an armed force from the Volscian town of Ecetra (Livy 
3.4). Although the Aequi and the Volsci are said to have raided lands together, this is 
an exceptional instance where we are told a contingent from a specific town is on the 
move. In the same year, when the consul Spurius Furius is trapped within his camp 
by this army of the Aequi, a relieving force which included subitarios milites from 
allied peoples, including the town of Antium, comes to the rescue (Livy 3.5). 
Although these very well could be soldiers provided under treaty agreements with 
Rome, the fact that 1,000 men from Antium only showed up after the battle could be 
indicative of a less formal arrangement, perhaps one for pay. When the plebs of 
Ardea seceded from the nobles, they gathered a group of artisans to fight against the 
nobles ‘ad spem praedae’ (Livy 4.9). If not actually mercenaries, these men came to 
violence for the same reasons that mercenaries do. In 410 when the Aequi were 
again marshalling an army, some Volsci joined their warband as ‘voluntariis 
mercede’ (Livy 4.53). 
 Some scholars have argued that there is archaeological evidence for 
professional soldiers, or warchiefs, present in the record.
729
 The evidence of these 
men is in their contextually isolated burials. Examples of these follow: the ‘Tomb of 
the Warrior’ (Vulci), Tomb 180 at Certosa (Bologna), and the Tomb of the Warrior 
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at Lanuvium (Lazio). All three of these examples have been labelled as tombs of 
foreigners and characterized by burial with arms and armour.
730
 In Vulci, the late 
sixth-century ‘Tomb of the Warrior’ stands out not necessarily for its inclusion of 
war-related items, but because of its containing the full kit of a warrior: spear, large 
round shield, and greaves.
731
 In the Certosa necropolis in Bologna, foreign 
mercenary or soldier tombs have been identified and postulated to have been 
Umbrians, based on the ‘national’ character of the arms found therein.732 It must be 
conceded that the contents of the tomb also betray an Etruscan nature and the 
inclusion of a ‘full hoplite panoply’ must make us question how useful the ‘national’ 
identification of the deceased is. In the case of the Lanuvium burial, its isolation and 
contents led the most thorough commentator to believe that it was almost certainly 
the burial of a socius or a mercenary.
733
 
 A quick conclusion cannot be drawn on the men buried in these graves. It is 
apparent that they were meant to be associated with warfare, whether it was a 
practical relation or a ritual one is not entirely obvious. The inclusion of what some 
have seen as more ‘realistic’ martial implements should make us consider these 
burials to be of individuals who did indeed go to war during their lives. But even if 
we believe this conclusion, the interpretation that these men were mercenaries is 
problematic. The burials do stand out from the others in their respective centres, and 
in the case of the Lanuvium burial stand out topographically from the rest of the 
burials. The spread of gentilicial names related to polities throughout the region is 
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corroborating evidence that these burials may indeed represent strangers or 
newcomers to the community.
734
 
 These burials and names, though, may not necessarily represent mercenaries. 
Migration of entire clans following a leader is attested in central Italy. The most 
well-known such figure is Attus Clausus (Livy 2.16). These figures could also be 
much less romanticized than even a migrant strong man. The irregular burials that 
we have been discussing could be those of exiles from nearby communities, who 
came to the polities in which they were buried through necessity. An excellent 
example of this type of figure is provided by Coriolanus.
735
 After having encouraged 
enough anger against his person at Rome, through his hostilities towards the plebs, 
he went into exile among the Volsci. Presumably if he had died in peace in the 
Volscian lands, and was respected by the people, Coriolanus would have been 
afforded a comparatively nice funeral and burial, and if he had had any input it is 
possible that to the modern archaeologist it would appear as a ‘foreigner’ burial. This 
is, of course, speculative, but it should serve as an example that a straightforward 
interpretation of these burials is not possible. 
 It must be pointed out that this period of central Italian history was before 
monetization. Mercenaries active in this world could not have been paid by coin, as, 
for example, were those in the service of Carthaginian during the wars against 
Syracuse.
736
 But the lack of a monetary economy does not preclude soldiers for hire. 
Alternative methods of remuneration are possible. The Persian Empire, for example, 
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used to pay for services in livestock, grain, and wine.
737
 It could be that central 
Italian states would have compensated mercenaries with similar goods. The 
possibility of plunder and booty cannot be ruled out as reason enough to serve as a 
mercenary. As we see in chapter five, below, plunder was a regular part of war in 
central Italy, and a share of this could have been used as remuneration.
738
 Trundle 
has shown, for the Greek world, that there many different ways to pay 
mercenaries.
739
 If Runciman’s analysis of the Roman state is applicable to our 
period, it is possible that inclusion in the citizen body, or at least the community, of 
Rome may have been used as payment for service.
740
 Although there was no coin 
circulating in central Italy, there were other ways of ‘paying’ mercenaries. 
 Besides mercenaries, another type of figure may have joined around 
prominent men to wage war. Sodales, as the Romans called them, were friends or 
companions, with the word term carrying a martial connotation.
741
 Livy calls the 
followers of the Fabii, who perhaps followed the clan to their fortress on the 
Cremera, sodales (2.49). He also uses the term to describe the remaining friends of 
the Tarquins in Rome, after the expulsion of the rex (2.3), as well as the followers of 
Caeso Fabius (3.14) and Caeso Quinctius (3.14). Besides other ties, these 
companions may have had a religious connotation, although the evidence is not 
extensive.
742
 
 The most remarkable evidence that figures of the archaic period had sodales 
around themselves was found in Satricum. The so-called lapis Satricanus preserves a 
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dedication made by the sodales of one popliosio valesiosio.
743
 This dedication may 
provide evidence for early Roman colonization, or perhaps a campaign in which 
Satricum was captured or sacked by Publius Valerius and his sodales.
744
 Warrior 
brotherhoods of this kind may have been common in archaic central Italy, and the 
example of the lapis Satricanus may be evidence that they operated outside of any 
type of state structure.
745
 
 Groups such as sodales may have accompanied a number of figures who we 
know waged war as strangers on behalf of adopted communities. Coriolanus is said 
to have gathered a band of followers around him for warlike gain, eventually going 
on to wage war on Rome on behalf of the Volsci who welcomed him into their 
community (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7.21). The term used to denote his war-band, 
ἑταιρία, is equated to sodales (Digest 47.22.4).746 Like Coriolanus, the son of 
Tarquinius Superbus left Rome and took up residence in a neighbouring settlement, 
Gabii, and waged war on Rome (Livy 1.53-54). Although this is a tactic used by the 
Roman rex in order to bring Gabii under his control, it is a further example that 
strangers, these so-called condottieri, were able to wage war on behalf of adoptive 
communities. The most well known figures of this kind, though, were the brothers 
Vibenna. 
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The Lyon Tablet, or at least part of it preserves evidence for the most famous 
archaic condottiero. The Tablet is a bronze plaque inscribed with a speech made by 
the emperor Claudius in AD 48. Claudius was trying to persuade the Senate to allow 
men from Gaul into its ranks. In order to do this he attempted to bring up historical 
analogues to the current situation. In the course of this speech he betrayed an 
element of the Etruscan mytho-history surrounding the figure of Servius Tullius.  
 
If we follow Etruscan sources, he [Servius Tullius] was once the most faithful 
companion (sodalis) of Caelius Vivenna and took part in all his adventures. 
Subsequently, driven out by a change of fortune, he left Etruria with all the 
remnants of Caelius’ army and occupied the Caelian hill, naming it thus after 
his former leader. Servius changed his name (for in Etruscan his name was 
Mastarna), and was called by the name I have used, and he obtained the throne 
to the greatest advantage of the state.
747
 
 
The existence of Caelius Vivenna (Caeles Vibenna) is known from outside of this 
speech.
748
 The most important part of this story for the current discussion is that 
Rome was captured by the army of a condottiero, subsequently followed by the 
usurpation of the throne by Servius Tullius.
749
 Elements of the story of Vibenna may 
be preserved on a wall painting from the François Tomb, from Vulci. 
Among the heroic paintings of the François Tomb is one series which has 
been called ‘the one Etruscan painting that has any truly historical content.’750 It 
could depict a conflict between two groups, the first, apparently victorious group, 
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consists of Caile Vipinas, Avle Vipinas (Caelus and Aulus Vibenna), Ma(c)starna,
751
 
Larth Ulthes, Rasce, and Marce Camitlnas. The second group includes Laris 
Papathnas Velznach, Pesna Arcmsnas Sveamach, Venthical […]plsachs, and Gneve 
Tarchunies Rumach.
752
 The interpretation of this painting has been consistent since 
the middle of the twentieth century.
753
 Larth Ulthes has come to the rescue of his 
otherwise naked companions, who appear to be being freed from bondage. Among 
those being slaughtered by the recently escaped men are the only figures given a 
locative title. Laris Papathnas is from Volsinii, Pesna Arcmsnas from Sovana, 
Venthical’s home has not been identified, and Gneve (Gnaeus) is a Tarquin of 
Rome.
754
 Aside from this painting, none of these figures are known from the 
historical record. 
 It may be that the group doing the killing represents some sort of independent 
warband, but what about the group being killed?
755
 That the defeated all have 
‘national’ identities affixed to them muddles the view that this is an example of a 
single war-band led by Gneve (the only bearded figure among the defeated). The 
paintings do not form one continuous scene within the tomb, and are spatially 
separated from one another. It is possible that rather than being meant to be read as a 
single scene, these paints represent a series of mythical events involving different 
heroes from Vulci defeating a series of enemies. 
 It is evident that strangers were welcome into the practise of warfare in alien 
communities. Mercenaries probably operated in central Italy throughout the period 
under investigation. Alongside these soldiers for hire existed a group of condottieri, 
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such as Coriolanus, who brought with them groups of armed companions into new 
communities. The ability of these figures to wage war independent of official state 
systems is unclear. The son of Tarquinius Priscus was waging a legal war through 
his newly acquired position in Gabii, and Coriolanus was waging a war on behalf of 
his adopted home amongst the Volsci. The supposed capture of Rome by Caelius 
Vibenna, though, is the only strong evidence we possess which shows a condottiero 
actually undertaking a major military campaign. Ultimately, though, most of the 
traditionally cited examples of condottieri are more reflective of an open social 
system in which horizontal mobility was common.
 756
 
4.3 Conclusions 
 A considerable amount has been argued in this chapter. The first half has 
tried to argue in favour of seeing states in central Italy from around the eighth 
century onward. The implications in terms of this for warfare are not entirely clear-
cut; under the assumptions of anthropological and sociological theories this would 
have led to a centralized and organized practise of warfare. That this kind of threat 
existed is shown in the fortification of frontier zones and in the large scale 
campaigning at the end of the sixth century by Lars Porsenna. In the latter half of the 
sixth century we have seen that a complex and strongly coercive military system was 
established in Rome, which obligated members of the community to serve in her 
armies. 
 Powerful figures were not absent from this picture of warfare. Caelius 
Vibenna provides the most convincing evidence for the existence of roaming 
warlords in central Italy. Many of the examples cited by other scholars, though, such 
as Appius Claudius or Coriolanus, are not examples of condottieri, but of persons 
                                                 
756
 Cf. Ampolo (1976-77; 1981) and Bourdin (2012), 519-589. 
170 
 
who have become a member of a community that was not their original home. When 
these figures move to a new polity, they are shown to wage war within the official 
confines of those centres. The supposed expedition of the Fabian gens has been 
shown to not be the smoking gun evidence of central Italian condottieri as some 
believe it to be. This type of warfare may have been more common in the Early Iron 
Age and down to the Regal Period, but at that point the sources are unanimous that 
the Romans instituted the fetial priesthood.
757
 If we accept a regal dating for the 
fetiales, as is argued below, then it was only in the earliest periods of central Italian 
urban settlement that private warfare could have been common. It is in this period, I 
believe, that the end of widespread private warfare ended, and from the sixth century 
onward states were the only major agents of war. 
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5. Warfare and the Economy 
 Warfare and economics can be closely related. In some schools of 
anthropological thought, economic causes were the leading causes of primitive 
warfare.
758
 This idea is based on the assumption that growing population need to 
expand their resource pool. In a synthesis of studies, Keely has showed that 46.4% of 
Western North American Indian raids/wars were for economic purposes.
759
 He has 
also demonstrated that 86% of non-state societies went to war for economic reasons, 
while 90% of state societies did the same.
760
 In the Middle Republic, Roman society 
was spurred towards war by economic motivation.
761
 This is not to say that economic 
causes are the only causes of warfare, but that they are almost an omnipresent cause 
of war in the human experience. The exploitation of military power by the social 
elite could serve as a means to an end, but at the same time economic power could be 
used to help them achieve military power. This chapter looks at the economy of 
central Italy and then moves on to analyzing the effects of raiding and the history of 
piracy in the period under investigation. The aim of this chapter is to discuss and 
understand the interplay between military power and economic power, quite 
specifically the acquisition of economic power through the exercise of military 
power. 
5.1 The Economy of Central Italy 
 The ancient Mediterranean economy was very complex. From an early period 
in the Iron Age international trade resumed after a break from the Mycenaean 
period.
762
 Italy again became part of the wider Mediterranean world and economy 
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when the Phoenicians and Greeks began to look west for trade.
763
 The most visible 
early evidence of this is the Greek settlement of Pithecussae.
764
 It is often cited that a 
desire for metals drove this westward move.
765
 This gradually increasing foreign 
trade may have helped to spur on the development of socio-political classes, or at 
least the visible division of social groups in the archaeological record.
766
 The major 
impact of this trade was to bring central Italy, especially the Etruscans, into a large 
network of traders and pirates, states and tribes, which would continue to impact the 
history of Italy indefinitely.
767
 It was through this contact with the Phoenicians and 
the Greeks that certain elements of arms and armour made their way into central 
Italy from the eighth century onward.
768
 It is probable that this trade spurred on the 
development of piracy in the central Mediterranean.
769
 
 Although central Italy participated in this wider network of trade, on a local 
level the economy was based on agriculture.
770
 A number of different cereals were 
grown throughout the region.
771
 Husbandry was widespread, as far as we can tell. 
The slaughter of animals became ritualized at some point, and precise butcher marks 
may be physical evidence of this.
772
 That the harvest of stock was important for 
ritual is confirmed in other ways. We know that animal sacrifice was used in certain 
elements of worship in both Etruria and in Rome, and amongst raised animals were 
                                                 
763
 Aubet (1993), 194-211. 
764
 Ridgway (1992). 
765
 Treister (1996); Osborne (2009), 106-110. 
766
 Torelli (1986); Naso (2000); Riva (2010). Contrast modern views, such as those of Riva (2006) 
and van Dommelen (2006) with those of the previous generation, such as Drews (1981). 
767
 Malkin (2011). 
768
 Cherici (2007) and below, chapter 6. 
769
 Below, 4.3. Trade with the eastern Mediterranean was also, probably, responsible for the 
development of piracy in the Adriatic, which is outside of the scope of this study. See Sassatelli 
(2004b). 
770
 Spivey and Stoddart (1990), 62-91; Barker and Rasmussen (1998), 177-215; Becker (2006). 
771
 Barker and Rasmussen (1998), 183-185; Motta (2011). 
772
 Barker and Rasmussen (1998), 185-189. 
173 
 
pigs and cows.
773
 This agriculture was easily exploited in warfare, with raids being 
made to carry off cattle and even during large campaigns it is probable that crops 
were also ravaged.
774
 
 Networks of trade within central Italy also existed. These networks were built 
up around a number of different trades. One of the most visible was the trade in 
architectural decorations. These decorations were made in a number of centres and 
then distributed through a network of trade.
775
 One location that we know produced 
this kind of work was Murlo.
776
 Many of these decorative plaques displayed military 
scenes. The so-called Rome-Veii-Veletri system is very intriguing (Fig. 9-10). These 
pieces have been shown to come from a common mould, although the centre of 
production is not known. This system displays militaristic themes, especially that of 
the mounted warrior in an attacking stance. It is important that we recognize that the 
popularity and widespread implementation of these scenes reflects a regional 
recognition of this type of warfare.
777
 These particular plaques decorated important 
structures in the towns in which they have been found, in Rome perhaps even the 
Regia.
778
 Choice of decoration for a building such as this would not have been 
haphazard but deliberate; there is meaning to be found in these images, and from 
their content that meaning is very probably militaristic.
779
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 It was not just the buyers and the viewers of these scenes who were engaged 
in the meaning of the images. The producers of these products must have also 
recognized and understood what the cultural value of these depictions was. If this is 
to be accepted it implies that there was an understanding of the imagery of warfare, 
and perhaps practise, throughout the network of trade. The role of these artisans and 
craftsmen in transmitting a particular image of warfare should not be underestimated. 
Although they were probably not from the highest classes, their position in society 
was important. There has been considerable research done on the topic of craftsmen 
in central Italy recently which have shown how internally connected the region 
was.
780
 
 A certain Corinthian has had a considerable impact on the discussion of 
production in central Italy, Demaratus.
781
 Demaratus is said to have fled to Tarquinia 
after civil strife drove him from his home (Livy 1.34).
782
 He came with a number of 
artisans and set up a workshop. He gained enough influenced to have sired and 
offspring who would eventually become a Roman king. The importance of a figure 
like this in the realm of warfare should not be underestimated. Demaratus fled to 
Rome during the period in which the old orthodoxy believed hoplite warfare was in 
its prime in Greece.
783
 The newer perspective, though, places his migration at a time 
of development.
784
 Regardless of whether or not hoplite warfare was in full stride yet 
or not, the immigration of an important figure, and his integration into the 
community, could have led to his influencing Tarquinia’s way of making war. As 
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Demaratus supposedly founded a workshop, this would have allowed him to produce 
products which depicted warfare as he knew it from his homeland which would then 
be distributed throughout Etruria and probably Latium, as well. The impact of visual 
culture on warfare may not have been overwhelming, but it could have helped to 
spread trends in arms and armour.
785
 The story surrounding Demaratus’ ‘setting up 
shop’ is dubious, though, and much of it is probably a later creation. 
 Transmission of this visual culture also occurred through the trade in 
statuary. Bronze workshops appear to have existed as centres of production in central 
Italy.
786
 One of the most well attested and widespread pieces of production were 
statues of warriors and depictions of Laran/Mars.
787
 One of the workshops identified 
by scholars is that of the so-called Todi workshop.
788
 Etruscan appreciation for 
statuary is reflected in the story that when the Romans took Volsinii in 265 they 
found and removed two thousand bronzes from the city (Pliny NH 34.33).
789
 The 
desire for cult statuary extended to looking outside of central Italy, with the 
possibility that the cult statue of Diana in Rome may have been produced in 
Massilia, or in the least it was influenced by a statue of Artemis made in that city 
(Strabo 4.1.5). Rome is also supposed to have imported the sculptor Vulca, from 
Veii, to construct the statue of Jupiter Optimus Maximus and the adorning sculpture 
of his temple (Pliny NH 35.157; cf. Plut. Pub. 13).
790
 Through these trade 
connections, central Italy would have seen imports of statuary, and then its 
circulation, which represented pan-Mediterranean deities outfitted in the Greek style 
of arms and armour. These representations must have had some sort of impact on the 
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choice of arms in central Italy as elites and commoners alike worked to emulate their 
gods. The militaristic nature of at least some of this sculpture may have also served a 
political function in justifying the warfare of the elite.
791
 
 We have seen that the economy of central Italy was diverse in the period 
under study. There were ways in which economic forces, particularly trade, may 
have impacted warfare. This economy was vulnerable, as all agrarian economies are, 
to the ravages of war. In the following two sections we look at how raiding by land 
armies and piracy affected the economy of central Italy. 
5.2 The Profits and Consequences of Raiding 
 Raiding is both an act of war and an economic action. Taking movable 
wealth, whatever the medium, had two purposes: to harm the victim and to benefit 
the doer. This was not done without risk, as we have discussed above, but the 
consequences for the victim could be quite devastating. In some cultures raids did 
not necessarily target tangible wealth, but rather a cultural wealth.
792
 Raids for 
honour or reprisal were common among the North American Indians.
793
 We hear of a 
number of instances in the ancient sources, as well, where raids were executed in 
central Italy as reprisals for earlier injuries. This is common behaviour in the 
ethnographic record. What we hear of more often than not, however, is raiding for 
the purpose of seizing movable wealth. This wealth could be in the form of livestock, 
captives, or valuable objects. Our sources often mention, as well, the agricultural 
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devastation that raids and campaigning would have, which directly impacted the 
economy of the targeted city or settlement.
794
 
Livestock was a prime target for raiding armies. Cows, pigs, goats, and sheep 
together were an important aspect of the central Italian economy. We have 
iconographic depictions as far back as the Orientalizing period which show captive 
animals being led by armed figures (Fig. 14).
795
 Although it is impossible to show 
definitively that these images are meant to represent a successful raiding party, this is 
probably the situation. Raiding for cattle is present in our literary sources in a 
number of occasions (Livy 2.51, 64, 3.66, 6.31). If any of the narrative around Lars 
Porsenna’s siege of Rome can be believed, we have an excellent example of how 
valuable cattle were to marauding armies. The Romans used cattle in this instance as 
a way to bait the Etruscan army into a trap, which, according to Livy was successful, 
and helped to lead to an end of the siege (Livy 2.11).
796
 Besides the value of these 
beasts as a food source and potentially as breeding stock, they had a religious value 
as well.
797
 We know that animal sacrifice was practised throughout the region. The 
ability to abscond with an important part of your enemy’s cattle, which may have 
been intended for ritual purposes, must have led to a ‘cultural victory’ over them.798 
This could have helped to further social problems in the affected country’s 
population. In the case of cattle used in ritual slaughter, capturing these animals 
would also lead to increased prestige at home. 
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 On this point, see Hanson (1998), 131-173, who discusses the effectiveness of agricultural 
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Crops would be destroyed and fields laid waste. The impact of warfare on 
certain types of crops, such as vines and olives, may not have been as devastating as 
might be assumed.
799
 We should not underestimate the problems that raiding could 
bring on a settlement.
800
 When an army of Veii defeated the Roman army and 
occupied the Janiculum, it raided Roman territory to the point that there was a 
scarcity of food in the city (Livy 2.51). On at least one occasion we hear that the 
agricultural fields were the target of a particular incursion (Livy 6.4).
801
 Food 
shortages were not unheard of in central Italy and could lead to internal problems 
within cities. This may have been one of the plebian grievances in the fifth 
century.
802
 In times of peace corn could be brought in from Etruria (i.e. Livy 4.12-
13) or further afield, such as Sicily (Livy 2.34). It is safe to assume, though, that in 
times of war this supply may have been harder to receive. 
Land based raiding also led to the capture of movable wealth, generally of an 
unknown variety. We usually hear of the raiding army being laden with plunder or 
carrying off booty (i.e. Livy 2.42, 3.3, 10, 4.34, 51, 59, 5.20, 27, 28, 32, 6.12-13). It 
is impossible to tell exactly what type of booty was being taken away. Perhaps 
statuary that had a religious meaning, as happened when the Romans sacked Veii in 
396 (Livy 5.22).
803
 It may be possible to assume that at least some of the movable 
wealth was in the form of precious metals, or metal in general, in this pre-monetary 
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 Unfortunately we do not often hear of the results of this agricultural raiding. For instance, when the 
Romans raided Volsci territory in 494 we simply hear of them ravaging the lands (Livy 2.30). 
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conquered people, see Young (1988). 
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world.
804
 The Etruscans, in particular, were known for producing high quality gold 
jewellery which would have been taken if it was available.
805
 That personal items 
were taken is attested by Livy (3.10). Possibly the most valuable, and the only non-
agricultural booty mentioned in the sources, things to be taken away from a raid 
were slaves. We hear of captives being taken during a number of raids, which we 
should presume were made into slaves (Livy 4.29, 34, 6.31). It is possible that 
depictions of blond slaves in Etruscan tomb paintings represent slaves taken in this 
manner from Gallic peoples.
806
 The taking of slaves by Roman pirates is also 
probable and is alluded to in the second treaty with Carthage (Polyb. 3.24). The 
economic impact of these slaves is impossible to tell.
807
 
Although it is impossible to tell the economic impact of raiding and warfare 
in general, it does seem to have caused some problems. When booty was not 
distributed to the soldiers they would cause a stir (Livy 2.42, 4.34).
808
 It is 
understandable why the people would want a share in some of the hoards captured, 
as they could be large enough to feed the treasuries of the city (Livy 2.42, 3.10, 
5.27). In the wake of the sack of Veii this problem became very acute, with the 
populus of Rome becoming discontent with their erstwhile hero, Camillus (5.32). 
The dictator was simply trying to make the soldiers fulfil the tithe which the gods 
had a right to (Livy 5.20, 25). The Roman people may have been wise to be 
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suspicious of a general who kept too much of the plunder from raiding and sacking 
cities, as this type of thinking may have led to the Spartans sparing Athens in 
404/403.
809
 The amount of wealth that could be extracted from a settlement during a 
raid, whatever type of wealth that may have been, could add up to huge amounts. 
Dionysius I of Syracuse is supposed to have looted 1,500 talents from the small port 
town of Pyrgi in a piratical raid (Diod. Sic. 15.14.4). 
5.3 Piracy in the Tyrrhenian and Beyond 
 Piracy is a common topic in the dialogue on archaic Tyrrhenian Italy. 
Etruscan piracy, in particular, is often discussed. Any discussion of piracy during 
this period, though, is fraught with a number of problems, as always these problems 
are the usefulness and availability of sources. We also have to define what we are 
speaking about when we approach piracy, as it is a topic that has received a 
considerable amount of scholarly attention over the past two decades. Piracy, like 
land based raiding, is characterized as the seizure of property or capital by force, in 
which we generally assume that this is violent force, or at least the threat of 
violence.
810
  
At its most basic level, piracy is an economic activity that is affected by 
patterns of trade and forces of markets, even in the ancient world. These economic 
actors, though, are variably described in different cultural settings; in more modern 
contexts, the pirate is a figure which can either be a felonious parasite or a libertarian 
hero.
811
 This problematic reception of the concept of the pirate is evident in the 
ancient world, as it is often noted that one man’s pirate is another man’s trader.812 A 
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recent, and helpful definition, has been put forward by two anthropologists based on 
a survey of the history of piracy in the early period of modern history: ‘a form of 
morally ambiguous property seizure committed by an organized group which can 
include thievery, hijacking, smuggling, counterfeiting, or kidnapping.’813 Smuggling 
and counterfeiting were probably not activities undertaken by pirates in the central 
Mediterranean, but the rest of this description fits the activities that we see in our 
sources. 
 Associations of peoples of the central Mediterranean with piracy may go 
considerably further back in history than the Iron Age. Some scholars believe that 
some of the so-called Sea Peoples which harassed Egypt and the Levant from the 
thirteenth century originated from Western parts of the Mediterranean, particularly 
Sardinia and Sicily.
814
 It is also possible that some of these seaborne raiders were 
Etruscan, possibly those identified in Egyptian reliefs as Trš (Teresh).815 Although it 
is impossible to conclusively connect these early instances of raiding to the central 
Mediterranean, from the period in which we do begin to read historical notices we do 
hear of piracy being prominent in this region. 
 The Etruscans are traditionally thought of as practicing piracy quite 
readily.
816
 We are told that some of the earliest Greek settlers in the central 
Mediterranean were discouraged from the attempt by the tenacious Etruscan pirates 
                                                                                                                                          
disambiguation between the two. They are the same activity occasionally practiced by different levels 
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(Strabo 6.2.2).
817
 In the fifth century, Anaxilaos of Rhegion built fortifications in 
order to check the activities of Etruscan pirates (Strabo 6.1.5). One of the most often 
cited examples of Etruscan piracy and its impact is the Homeric Hymn to Dionysus 
and the later traditions of this myth. In this story, the god Dionysus is abducted by 
Etruscan pirates, eventually freeing himself through his divine powers. Versions of 
the story are found in Euripides (Cyc. 10-22), Apollodorus (Bibl. 3.5.3), Ovid (Met. 
3.564-691), Hyginus (Poet. astr. 2.17; Fab. 134), and Nonnus (Dion. 31.86-91, 
44.231-252, 45.105-168).
818
 Some scholars have read this myth as being set in the 
central Mediterranean,
819
 but this has recently been questioned.
820
 
 Evidence from Greek sources betray a possible non-Italian origin for the 
Tyrrhenians who abducted Dionysus. We consistently hear about Tyrrhenians who 
inhabited the Aegean. From Herodotus we hear that the Pelasgians, who are the same 
people as the Tyrrhenians, used to inhabit Attica and founded a number of towns in 
the Eastern Mediterranean (1.57). Thucydides records that there were 
Pelasgians/Tyrrhenians living on the Akte peninsula and that these peoples had once 
inhabited Lemnos and Athens (4.109). Dionysius of Halicarnassus repeats a tradition 
from Hellanicus that the Tyrrhenians were once called Pelasgians but only took their 
name after emigrating to Italy (1.28.3-4). These peoples had been driven out of 
Greece by the coming of the Hellenes.
821
 It may also be these Aegean Tyrrhenians 
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that we hear of as raiding Samos (Athen. 15.12). Raiding attributed to the Pelasgians, 
as opposed to Tyrrhenians proper, is also attested in the Aegean.
822
 The dichotomy 
between the Tyrrhenians and Pelasgians, and the apparent confusion on the part of 
the Greeks as to who these peoples actually were, has led to a strong argument 
against seeing these notices of piracy as relating to the Etruscans of Italy.
823
 Whether 
or not it was the piratical behaviour of the Aegean Tyrrhenians/Pelasgians or the 
Italian Etruscans taking part in the Aegean adventures, we cannot prove. 
There are a number of other indications that the indigenous inhabitants of 
Italy did practise piracy, as well, although some of these fall later than the scope of 
this study. Sometime in the early sixth century, Etruscans are said to have been 
practicing piracy, which helped to bring certain Greek colonists together (Diod. Sic. 
5.9.4).
824
 In the first half of the fifth century, the Syracusans sent a fleet led by 
Phayllus to suppress Etruscan piracy, eventually sacking Elba (Diod. Sic. 11.88.4). 
This force apparently did not succeed, the leader was exiled, and the Syracusans sent 
another fleet, eventually attacking the Etruscans who were settled on Corsica (Diod. 
Sic. 11.88.5). We hear that when Dionysius I of Syracuse pillaged the Caeretan port 
of Pyrgi it was in order to put down piracy (Diod. Sic. 15.14.3).
825
 That so many of 
these notices come from Diodorus may be indicative of the strength of the topos of 
Etruscan piracy in the Western Greek historians. This topos may have spread to the 
east, perhaps influencing the position of the Tyrrhenoi in the Homeric Hymns, 
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through the myth of Scylla as we hear in the rationalization of the myth by 
Palaephatus (De incr. 20). 
We also hear of a number of later instances of Tyrrhenian piracy. In 339, an 
Etruscan pirate by the name of Postumius sailed into the harbour at Syracuse and 
offered his services to Timoleon who had recently ‘liberated’ the city (Diod. Sic. 
16.82.3).
826
 Postumius is not a common Etruscan name, and it is problematic to 
directly accept that this man was a pirate from Etruria.
827
 If Postumius did in fact 
lead an Etruscan pirate fleet, it may be that he originated from the Latin town of 
Antium. According to Strabo (5.3.5) the inhabitants of this city used to take part in 
piracy alongside the Etruscans. He says that Antium was already a subject of Rome 
when this was going on.
828
 Because of Rome’s supposedly close ties to Caere in the 
early years of the Republic this could indicate that the allied piratical fleet was based 
there, perhaps in Pyrgi.
829
 It is possible, as well, that the association of piracy with 
Antium as a possession of Rome may imply that the Romans themselves practised 
piracy, although there is no hard evidence for this outside of the treaties with 
Carthage.
830
 
 That the Etruscans of the central Mediterranean did practise piracy may also 
be reasoned by examining the historical situation as we know it. Piracy in the seas 
around Italy was not limited in practise to Etruscans. Greeks were particularly guilty 
of this. Some of the earliest Hellenic migrants to the region, Phocaeans, settled on 
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Corsica and began to operate as pirates (Hdt. 1.166).
831
 When the Ionian Greeks 
were driven from the coast of Anatolia, their leader, Dionysius, a Phocaean, ended 
up establishing himself as a pirate in Sicily, preying on Etruscan and Carthaginian 
ships (Hdt. 6.17).
832
 Chalcidian pirates from Opician Cumae were remembered as 
founding Zankle on the straights between Italy and Sicily (Thuc. 6.4). Perhaps the 
most famous Greek pirates in the central Mediterranean were the inhabitants of 
Lipari (Diod. Sic. 5.9; Paus. 10.11). Something of a piratical rivalry may have 
developed between a group of Etruscans and the Liparians, who had dedicated a 
portion of their population to naval defense (Strabo 6.2.10).
833
 The most famous 
episode of Liparian piracy occurred at the beginning of the fourth century when they 
seized a Roman ship sailing for Delphi; eventually the Liparians released the 
Romans and escorted them to the sanctuary (Livy 5.28; Diod. Sic. 14.93.3; Plut. 
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Cam. 8.8).
834
 By 349 we hear of Greek fleets preying on the Tyrrhenian Sea as well 
as the coast near Antium (Livy 7.25).
835
 
 While we cannot comment on the actions of these pirates, those pirates who 
raided the coast are attested in a number of ways. The first two treaties struck 
between Rome and Carthage concern the issue of coastal raiding. Polybius’ text of 
the first treaty includes four clauses which refer to seaborne raiding:
836
  
4. a list of Latin communities subject to Rome which shall not be harmed by 
Carthaginians  
5. other Latin communities seized by Carthaginians shall be handed over to 
the Romans
837
  
6. no Punic fortress shall be constructed in Latium  
7. when Carthaginians do come to Latium to execute hostilities they shall not 
spend the night (Polyb. 3.22).
838
  
The second treaty described by Polybius includes four clauses directly related to 
piracy:  
1. Romans shall not sail beyond Cape Fair to practise piracy,
839
 trading, or 
colonization
840
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of Robin Waterfield (Oxford World Classics). The first clause of this treaty may also refer to limiting 
piratical behaviour, although this time on the part of the Romans. Any Roman or their ally who is 
forced to sail beyond Cape Fair, wherever that may have been, shall not take anything away unless it 
is necessary for repairing their vessel or for sacrifice. 
839
 ‘λῄζεσθαι,’ the term used by Polybius, is commonly associated with piracy. 
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2. the Carthaginians may capture towns in Latium and keep the booty and 
captives but must hand the towns over to Rome  
3. Romans and Carthaginians may capture allies of one another but not bring 
them into one another’s ports841  
4. If a ship takes water from the other’s territory they shall not then harm 
those belonging to that state (Polyb. 3.24).
842
  
While most modern commentators describe these treaties as primarily economic in 
nature, that is a deceptive conclusion.
843
 Others have pointed to Rome seeking a 
treaty with a power like Carthage at the beginning of the Republic to establish itself 
as a new state, although this view seems to be influenced, in part, from more modern 
practise and expectations.
844
 A considerable proportion of these treaties dealt with 
the regulation of piracy between Rome and Carthage, which itself implies that piracy 
was a pervasive enough problem to warrant ‘international’ regulation.845 Although 
there is no evidence for other similar treaties, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
treaties between other parties to regulate piracy may have existed. 
                                                                                                                                          
840
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 Walbank (1957), 337-349, provides discussion of the early bibliography. The literature on the topic 
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 Serrati (2006), 117-118, suggests that the Romans may have approached the Carthaginians for this 
purpose. 
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 I do not believe, however, that Rome was a major naval power during this time, or had much, if 
any, of a navy proper, as has been argued by Steinby (2007). 
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 Archaeologically, it is difficult to try to discuss evidence of piracy.
846
 There 
is no evidence to suggest that the plethora of Oriental and Hellenic objects found in 
Etruscan and Latial tombs were seized through piracy. There is, however, a 
relatively large corpus of imagery depicting armed ships from Etruria.
847
 Armed 
ships are also known from archaeology recovery.
848
 The most well known 
representation of an armed combat at sea comes from the Aristonothos Krater (Fig. 
15). This vase dates from the early seventh century, and along with what appears to 
be a depiction of an armed combat between two ships includes the earliest depiction 
of a scene from Homer.
849
 The naval scene has been proposed to represent a Greek 
ship, that with oars, fighting an Etruscan ship.
850
 Mario Torelli is forceful in his 
argument that the painter of this krater, in working for an aristocrat of Caere, painted 
this scene to represent his battles against Sicilian Greeks, with Polyphemus as a 
symbol of Sicily.
851
 This analysis is partially based on a perceived analogy between 
Polyphemus’ eye and the fact that one of the ships, the ‘Greek’ ship, has an open eye 
on its prow. As Vedia Izzet has pointed out, however, this is perhaps overstepping 
the bounds of analysis and there is no way to develop the understanding further.
852
 
Of Etruscan production, a black figure Hydria from Vulci depicts an armed ship with 
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ramming prow and banks of oars (Fig. 16).
853
 There is no way of knowing, however, 
if these represent pirate vessels.
854
 
 How exactly we should understand this piracy, though, is not straightforward. 
From an Hellenic perspective, piracy was a widespread and generally respected 
activity. In the Homeric poems we find that piracy was a common practise. It was 
widespread enough that a successful lie could be built on the premise that the one 
telling it had been on a raid (Od. 14.245-72).
855
 It may have been common place to 
ask newly come guests from the sea whether they were traders or whether they were 
pirates (Od. 3.71-73).
856
 This was not necessarily a universally accept view towards 
piracy, and there has been some suggestion that non-aristocrats may have 
disapproved of the practise (Od. 14.83-87).
857
 Even if this type of activity was not 
frowned upon, it did not always end well, as we hear about in two stories about ill 
fated raids against Egypt (Od. 14.245-272, 17.417-444). As time went on, the view 
on piracy did change in the Greek world. Thucydides provides a rather lengthy and 
important discussion of piracy: 
 
οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες τὸ πάλαι καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων οἵ τε ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ παραθαλάσσιοι καὶ 
ὅσοι νήσους εἶχον, ἐπειδὴ ἤρξαντο μᾶλλον περαιοῦσθαι ναυσὶν ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους, 
ἐτράποντο πρὸς λῃστείαν, ἡγουμένων ἀνδρῶν οὐ τῶν ἀδυνατωτάτων κέρδους τοῦ 
σφετέρου αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενέσι τροφῆς, καὶ προσπίπτοντες πόλεσιν 
ἀτειχίστοις καὶ κατὰ κώμας οἰκουμέναις ἥρπαζον καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον τοῦ βίου ἐντεῦθεν 
ἐποιοῦντο, οὐκ ἔχοντός πω αἰσχύνην τούτου τοῦ ἔργου, φέροντος δέ τι καὶ δόξης 
μᾶλλον: δηλοῦσι δὲ τῶν τε ἠπειρωτῶν τινὲς ἔτι καὶ νῦν, οἷς κόσμος καλῶς τοῦτο δρᾶν, 
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καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τὰς πύστεις τῶν καταπλεόντων πανταχοῦ ὁμοίως 
ἐρωτῶντες εἰ λῃσταί εἰσιν, ὡς οὔτε ὧν πυνθάνονται ἀπαξιούντων τὸ ἔργον, οἷς τε 
ἐπιμελὲς εἴη εἰδέναι οὐκ ὀνειδιζόντων. (1.5)858 
 
For in these early times, as communication by sea became easier, so piracy became a 
common profession both among the Hellenes and among the barbarians who lived on 
the coast and in the islands. The leading pirates were powerful men, acting both out 
of self interest and in order to support the weak among their own people. They would 
descend upon cities which were unprotected by walls and indeed consisted only of 
scattered settlements; and by plundering such places they would gain most of their 
livelihood. At this time such a profession, so far from being regarded as disgraceful, 
was considered quite honourable. It is an attitude that can be illustrated even today 
by some of the inhabitants of the mainland among whom successful piracy is 
regarded as something to be proud of; and in the old poets, too, we find that the 
regular question always asked of those who arrive by sea is ‘Are you pirates?’ It is 
never assumed either that those who were so questioned would shrink from 
admitting the fact, or that those who were interested in finding out the fact would 
reproach them with it. (1.5)
859
 
 
A number of observations can be made from this passage. The first is that by the 
time of Thucydides in the fifth century piracy was not as highly regarded as it once 
had been. 
It may be over simplifying to say that piracy had lost its honour by this time. 
Xenophon seems to admire them for their hard work in earning their living (Eq. mag. 
8.8). Aristotle lists pirates amongst a number of other ways of earning a living; 
considering that farming and hunting are listed immediately after piracy we may be 
able to draw the conclusion that it was considered as honourable as the others (Pol. 
1256a = 1.8.7). In another instance, however, Aristotle points to the use of metaphor 
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allowing even pirates to call themselves providers (ποριστὰς) through metaphorical 
speech (Rh. 3.2.10). Plato gives an interesting picture of the effects of greed on 
people and his Athenian believed that greed can turn people from a quiet nature into: 
traders, ship-owners, and servants, while of the bold it makes pirates, burglars, 
temple-robbers, fighters, and despots (Leg. 8.831d-8.832a). Interestingly, we are told 
that these people are not necessarily ill-natured rather unlucky; this adds a level of 
fatalism to those who have become pirates. Isocrates did not believe that pirates 
deserved any praise (12.226). The culmination of these opinions is that the position 
of pirates between the 5
th
 and 4
th
 centuries was not universal, which could be 
symptomatic of this being a period of change.
860
 This can be contrasted with a sixth-
century law, in which we hear that groups of pirates had the same legal rights as 
other fraternities under Solon so long as their agreements and behaviours did not 
violate the laws of the state (Dig. 47.22.4).
861
 
The second observation that we can make from the passage of Thucydides 
quoted above is that the main income of piracy was not made on assaulting other 
ships, necessarily, but by sacking cities. This type of behaviour explains why many 
of the coastal settlements in the central Mediterranean were either set back off of the 
coast by some distance or highly defensible.
862
 In Etruria, this settlement pattern can 
be seen in the development of the great coastal cities. Vulci, Tarquinia, Caere, and 
Rome were all set considerably far inland and were thus not easy targets for piratical 
raids. The construction and use of ports, such as Pyrgi, shows that although these 
were the centres of trade for their respective mother cities the populations never 
shifted towards these satellite towns. 
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Why, if piracy had been an accepted practise amongst the Greeks for so long, 
was Etruscan piracy viewed in a different light? The answer could be that it was part 
of the construction of Etruscan otherness, which was hard for some Greeks and 
Romans to otherwise see.
863
 Cruelty could also have added to this vilification of 
Etruscan pirates compared to their Hellenic cousins. Etruscan pirates were 
supposedly known to tie prisoners face to face with dead bodies as a form of torture 
(Arist. Protrepticus 60 R; Virg. Aen. 8.478-488). These pirates were also guilty of 
cannibalism, at least according to our sources (Hyg. Fab. 274.20). This cruelty of 
eventually became proverbial in the ancient world (Hsch. Tyrrhenoi desmoi). 
Modern scholars have tended to accept this view of Etruscan pirates.
864
 In the face of 
this evidence it is hard to argue that these were not exceptionally cruel men, that 
perhaps the Greeks and later Romans were influenced to think this way because the 
Etruscans were the enemy but unfortunately we cannot prove this conclusively, 
although it is probable that this played a part in the construction of Etruscan cruelty. 
We have seen that piracy was pervasive in the central Mediterranean. Not just 
Etruscan piracy, but Greek, Punic, and possibly even Roman piracy was ever 
present. We should not overestimate the impact of this behaviour. Although these 
forces were certainly at work trade was not completely impeded.
865
 Eastern goods 
and Greek goods still made their way into central Italy, and goods from central Italy 
made their way out. Piracy in the region must not have been too pervasive to 
discourage traders from plying their trade. There is also little to no evidence that 
piracy led to animosity between different εθνή as the sources portray. We know that 
ports such as Pyrgi, Gravisca, and Punicum were multi-ethnic centres of 
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commerce.
866
 The larger cities, as well, such as Rome also had a multi-ethnic 
character.
867
 This evidence should make us doubt some of the severe ways in which 
the ancient sources talk about naval matters in general in the central Mediterranean, 
and question if the concept of thalassocracies, even piratical thalassocracies, are still 
valid.
868
 
It is possible that the pirates we hear of were individual actors, probably 
members of the elite who could mobilize the resources to keep ships and maintain 
crews. Postumius is the best example of this. This is similar behaviour to the 
gentilicial raiding which we have discussed, and argued against, above.
869
 Some of 
our sources have led scholars to believe that there may have been state sponsored 
piracy, such as Pindar’s praise of Hieron after the Battle of Cumae (Pyth. 1.73-81). 
This could be the case when we hear of Etruscan fleets preying on the central 
Mediterranean (i.e. Diod. Sic. 5.9.4). But we must keep in mind that there was a 
confusion in the Greek world about the political nature of the Etruscans, as they were 
usually clumped together as one single political unit, rather than a group of 
independent city-states. 
If Tyrrhenian city-states were in control of piratical fleets directly, this would 
have been a major undertaking. The construction and maintenance of large fleets is 
costly and would have relied on a strong and effective managerial system. The 
requirements of maintaining a fleet of triremes, in particular, has been shown to be 
extreme and encouraged the development of sophisticated financial systems in 
Athens.
870
 As is argued above in chapter 4, the existence of strong state systems was 
probable in central Italy from a rather early time, and these could have had the power 
                                                 
866
 Boitani (2008); Fiorini (2008); Demetriou (2013), 64-104. 
867
 Ampolo (1976-1977). 
868
 Cherici (2006). On thalassocracies in the Greek world, see Rawlings (2007), 111-112. 
869
 Chapter 2. 
870
 van Wees (2013). 
194 
 
and structure to maintain fleets, including piratical fleets. The treaties between Rome 
and Carthage imply that piracy practised by Roman citizens was something that 
could be controlled by the state, which may imply state involvement in the practise 
as well. 
Even if states were in control of piracy, rather restricted groups of elites 
controlled those states. The domination of Roman politics from the end of the sixth 
century through the end of the period under investigation by elites is hard to 
question. If the state controlled piracy, it would have been these elites in government 
who oversaw it. This does not necessarily mean that they themselves practised 
piracy, but it is possible. Even if they did engage in piratical behaviour, the treaties 
between Rome and Carthage imply that they would have been able to influence the 
practise. Whether elites themselves were pirates, outside of civic control, or they 
were those in control, piracy was probably restricted to the higher echelons of 
society.
871
 If we accept that elites controlled this piracy, either independently or 
collectively in each city, then it is evidence of how warfare was used to control 
economic power.
872
 
A brief note on naval tactics is necessary. The practise of naval warfare 
throughout the archaic period is not well attested in the literary evidence. When we 
do find references to naval battles, few, if any, details are given. We can reconstruct 
how this combat worked to some degree from the archaeology. Early depictions of 
ships from Etruria do not show any observable armament or armed passengers (Fig. 
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17). The imported Aristonothos krater is generally thought to depict a Greek and an 
Etruscan ship in combat (Fig. 15). There is no scholarly consensus on which ship 
would represent which of these εθνή; the ship on the left is armed with a ram and the 
ship on the right has a high bow, perhaps designed to prevent it from being rammed 
or taken bow to bow.
873
 Both ships were complimented by a crew of armed men, 
with round shields, spears, and crested helmets. This implies close combat, hand to 
hand, which would have involved boarding an enemy ship. The spears, as well, 
could be representations of javelins, which would imply ranged combat. Ships with 
rams are common in later depictions of armed ships and naval combats.
874
 Ranged 
combat was still important, however, as archers are depicted aboard ship, and the 
Giglio wreck carried with it a compliment of Ionian spearheads.
875
 Although many 
shipboard warriors are depicted wearing crested helmets, a Negau type helmet was 
dedicated by Hieron after the naval battle of Cumae, and must have come from an 
Etruscan warrior present. Naval combat began as an open fashion using ranged 
weapons, which escalated to ramming and close combat between shipboard warriors. 
5.4 Conclusions 
 We have seen above that warfare in its loosest sense, meaning armed conflict 
between two groups, was used as an economic policy in central Italy. Small groups 
were probably responsible for early raiding, and as the horse became more and more 
common in warfare it is possible that this raiding intensified.
876
 Raiding by 
individual kin groups may have been practised before the rise of states, but we have 
seen above that the existence of gentilicial or condotterio armies was not 
widespread, if they existed at all. For Rome, the raiding practises of state armies 
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were used as retribution against similar acts by enemy forces, but Rome also 
practised raiding as a regular form of warfare. This raiding allowed for the 
accumulation of booty in the form of removable wealth and agricultural products. 
The raiding of cattle is well attested and must have represented the most valuable 
type of agricultural raiding. Piracy, as well, was widely practised by the inhabitants 
of central Italy. The exact nature of those people who practised piracy, though, is not 
entirely clear. What is clear from the Carthage-Rome treaties is that states could 
exercise some level of control over pirates originating from their harbours. 
 Raiding and piracy reflect the impact of military power on changes in 
economic power. For individuals already in possession of military power, such as 
magistrates, kings, or clan leaders, this meant that they could readily further their 
position in society by drawing off of the economic power of their targets. Economic 
competition between elites, then, would have helped to fuel wars and the practise of 
piracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
197 
 
6. Warfare and Religion 
Religion held a deep sway over the peoples of the ancient world. Ideological 
power, it seems, is deeply rooted in human nature.
877
 The commonality of religion in 
human societies, especially in ‘early’ societies, is so prominent and easily visible that 
some modern scholars believe that it has a root in evolutionary biology. This trait 
evolved to ‘account for the origin and nature of the cosmos and the forces that 
animated it, the origin and nature of human beings, the fate of individual humans 
after death, and the way in which humans might regulate relations with the 
supernatural to their advantage.’878 The same author believes that religious 
knowledge, specifically the knowledge of how to improve ‘relations with the 
supernatural,’ was the basis of most, if not all, early elites.879 In some branches of 
anthropological thought it was through the ‘smoke and mirrors’ of religious ideology 
that early socio-political systems began to centralize.
880
 This brief image of religion 
plays out in the analysis of Etruscan and Roman culture. This chapter examines how 
religion, particularly the religion of the elite, interacted with, governed, and was 
affected by warfare. 
The Etruscans are occasionally described as a notoriously superstitious 
people when it came to religion. Livy describes the Etruscans as ‘more devoted to 
religion’ than all other peoples (5.1.6), while Arnobius, at the beginning of the fourth 
century AD, could still recall the Etruscans as the source of all superstition 
(7.26.4).
881
 This picture is often repeated by modern authors, but at least as far back 
as Pallottino, we have been reminded that perhaps it was the differences between 
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Greco-Roman religion and that of the Etruscans which resulted in this ancient 
consensus.
882
 While considerable work has been done on the religion of the 
Etruscans in the last century and first decades of this century, its relationship with 
warfare has been almost entirely ignored.
883
 While Etruscan religion shares some 
common ground with the Greco-Roman religions which dominated the 
Mediterranean for centuries there were many differences. Etruscans were especially 
known for their interpretation of prodigies.
884
 
The Romans, as well, were notoriously religious, though historically in a 
different way than the Etruscans.
885
 Religion was woven into the historical narrative 
of Early Rome as an essential element of the formation of the city.
886
 Elements of 
Roman religion were remembered as having been founded throughout the history of 
the city, from the mythical presence of Evander in Rome onward (cf. Virg. Aen. 
8.51-54; Plut. Rom. 13, 21).
887
 The development of many of the elements of Roman 
religion supposedly occurred during the regal period. Romulus and Numa are 
variously accorded the development of much of the ritual practice.
888
 The calendar, 
an essential element of Roman life and religion, was supposedly developed by 
Romulus (Mac. Sat. 1.12.3); importantly for the current study, this calendar began 
with the month of Martius, that dedicated to Mars, the god of war.
889
 Much of this 
historical development was probably speculative when recorded by the earliest 
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Roman historians, but they had ample evidence at hand in the form of temples, 
dedications, and obviously archaic rituals to create a somewhat accurate 
reconstruction. 
This chapter looks at the connections between religion and warfare in Etruria 
and Rome. It begins by examining the connections between priests and non-
ideological social power which overlapped with the political and military social 
power.
890
 The connection between war, religion, and social power is most obviously 
manifest in the temples of central Italy, which is the topic of the second section of 
this chapter. The final section of this chapter examines the connections between the 
gods and war. The gods and other religious figures of central Italy were affected by 
war and other violent conflict in their existence. They also interacted directly in the 
warfare of mortal men, influencing the tide of battle as at Lake Regillus or by 
advising men on the course and approach of wars. 
We can see the intertwining of ideological and military power as far back as 
the Terramare culture, for which we now have evidence of ritual destruction of 
bronze swords/daggers being incorporated into a burial ritual.
891
 Although these 
practices were not common in Etruria during much of the Bronze Age, as the Iron 
Age culture developed, the institutionalizing of the warrior identity in burial began to 
be elaborated.
892
 The ritualized warrior burial reached its zenith around the turn of 
the eighth century, a predominance which lasted until the middle of the seventh 
century.
893
 These “ritualized warriors” should not, however, be confused with actual 
warriors/soldiers; we cannot say for sure whether the individuals we have recovered 
from tombs actually fought in wars, but what is important for us to acknowledge is 
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the inclusion of this warrior ideal as an element of elite identity.
894
 It is only after 
this period that we may speak in detail about the connections between ideological 
and military power.
895
 
6.1 Priests and War 
 Between the worlds of gods and men stand representatives. In many 
societies, including early Rome, the mediating individuals were kings.
896
 Through 
the evolution of societies, however, more and more individuals were inserted 
between the mortal and godly realms, often creating a priestly bureaucracy. In 
Etruria and Rome we have evidence that this began happening rather early in the 
period under examination. Although from the earliest periods of the Iron Age we do 
not have the necessary evidence to distinguish between kings, princes, priests, and 
warriors, on a sophisticated level, as literary evidence becomes more prominent it is 
a much easier topic to discuss. This chapter examines the connections between these 
priestly bureaucracies which developed in central Italy and the practise of warfare. 
Evidence in the mortuary record for the overlap between priest and warrior, 
in their abstract forms, begins in the eighth century.
897
 Although the militaristic 
aspects of these burials is often emphasized, they provide evidence that power was 
expressed in a more complicated way, and often included religious, or cultic, aspects. 
As Riva points out, tools relating to ritual sacrifice and cooking were present in a 
number of these tombs.
898
 Connections between military and religious power exist, 
also, outside of the tomb. For example, the frieze from Poggio Civitate (Murlo) (inv. 
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 Riva (2010), 74-95. For a comparative view on Greek “warrior burials” see Whitley (2002), 217-
32. 
895
 ‘Strategies of ritual’ have been identified as significant social forces in a number of societies in the 
Central Mediterranean, most recently for the Sicilian Greeks (Martín [2013]) and Nuragic Sardinia 
(Ialongo [2013]). 
896
 Because the kings before him were the chief priests, for instance, Numa created the flamen dialis 
to look after priestly duties whilst the king was out of the city (Livy 1.20). 
897
 By ‘priest’ and ‘warrior’ I mean the inclusion of ‘ritual’ and ‘martial’ items in the same burial. 
898
 Riva (2010), 90-3. Cf. Murray (2011), 205-206. 
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68-265) depicts a seated figure, most probably a figure of authority, holding a lituus 
while his attendant, immediately to the figure’s rear, holds a spear and sword at the 
ready.
899
 An actual example of a lituus was found in a sixth-century tomb at 
Caere.
900
 This priestly “wand” is described by the Roman sources as a “curved staff 
without knots.”901 The evidence of religious ties to elite burials and to facilities 
which were dominated by the elite (Murlo) indicates an overlap between those in 
political power and those who held religious power. 
 We know that certain, presumably elite, families were closely connected to 
certain deities and certain rituals. When the Romans sacked Veii (c. 396), the young 
men who were responsible for moving Juno’s statue back to Rome were 
apprehensive about touching the statue as only members of a certain Etruscan gens 
were accustomed to touching it.
902
 It is also known that some Etruscan families had 
familial cults associated with important deities, such as the cult of Uni Ursmnei, or 
Uni of the Ursmnei family.
903
 We also know, from the Capua Tablet (TLE 2), that 
certain families were responsible for conducting rituals prescribed by a formal 
religious calendar.
904
 Private religion and ritual ran deeper than a monopoly of 
priesthoods in Etruria and was certainly an extremely important aspect of elite family 
life.
905
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 Illustrated in Sinos (1994), 102 (Figure 11.3). Connections between religious and political 
iconographies of power at Poggio Civitate have been proposed by Tuck (2006), 130-35. 
900
 Pfiffig (1975), 99. 
901
 Livy 1.18. It was purported to have been brought to Rome, as a religious or regal symbol by the 
early kings, cf. Cicero, Div., 2.80; Verg., Aen., 7.187. 
902
 Livy 5.22. 
903
 Jannot (2005), 81-82. 
904
 Ibidem, 81. For a full analysis of the Capua Tablet, see M. Cristofani (1995). Although the Capua 
tablet was found in Campania, it is an Etruscan text and could be representative of wider Etruscan 
practice. 
905
 See, with some caution, Torelli (1986), 222-234. Importantly, Torelli’s first paragraph must be 
read in tandem with Simon (1984). 
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 Priesthoods and priestly behaviour in Rome were somewhat different from 
those and that of Etruria.
906
 In the beginning of the state, the kings held considerable 
religious power, perhaps in the guise of a high priest.
907
 It was through their power 
that many of the religious aspects of Roman culture were supposedly implemented, 
although the reconstructions we possess in our sources may be pure speculation, 
much of the Roman religious world seems to have been in place before the fall of the 
monarchy. Some of these ancient practices were upheld by certain families, like in 
the Etruscan world. The Potitii and Pinarii families were remembered as being 
responsible for the ara maximus and the cult of Hercules in Rome.
908
 In a similar 
vein, the Nautii were responsible for the cult of Minerva (Pallas/Athena);
909
 in 
legend the father of the house, Nautes, was made the student of Pallas (Verg. Aen. 
5.703-705). More generally, religious rites were divided between public and private 
(Festus 284L).
910
 The Fabii were known to have a set of gentilicial religious rites 
which they executed even in times of war.
911
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 Some public priesthoods may have been hereditary, cf. Forsythe (2005), 169. 
907
 Festus (198-200L) preserved what may be a hierarchical list of Roman priests, at the head of which 
was the rex sacrorum, the Republican priesthood which inherited the religious responsibilities of the 
ancient reges. Cf. Forsythe (2005), 136. Varro, though, claimed that the flamen dialis may have been 
the highest of priests (Gell. NA 10.15.32) but it is not certain, the problem hinged on his wearing of a 
white cap, the only of the flamines to wear one. The alternative explanation given is that the white cap 
may relate to his sacrifice of a white victim, although we must concede that neither of these may be 
correct, and without the entire discussion of Varro it is hard to argue either way. Livy (1.20) claims 
that Numa created the flamen dialis because of the foreseen long-term and frequent absences of the 
king from Rome, which could imply that he was the highest priest except for the rex himself, thus it 
would make sense that after the fall of the regency the rex sacrorum would have become the highest 
priest in Rome. 
908
 Verg. Aen. 8.270; Serv. ad Aen. 8.270; Livy 1.7; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1.40.4. Diodorus (4.21) 
gives a slightly different version of the story than Livy, and associates only the Pinarii with the cult of 
Hercules. 
909
 On the Nautii and Minerva’s cult, see Serv. ad Aen. 2.166, 3.407, and 5.704. 
910
 Public rites related to the hills, pagi, curiae, and shrines, while private rites related to individuals, 
families, and gentes. 
911
 One of the possible reasons given for the destruction of the gens at the Cremera was that they were 
leaving their fortress to return to Rome to perform a sacrifice (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 9.19). During the 
Gallic Sack, a Fabian sacra was to be conducted on the Quirinal and only executed through the brave 
maneuver of Caius Fabius Dorsuo (Livy 5.46), although, this story could be a Fabian fiction. The 
Claudii were also associated with gentilicial rites (Festus 274L). At some point, a temple of Diana on 
the Caelian was the focus of gentilicial sacrifices (Cic. Har. 32), the antiquity of this temple may be 
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 Public rites and general religious activities were executed by the numerous 
colleges of priests. There were so many colleges of priests that public religious 
power was quite diffuse.
912
 However diffuse this religious power was, it is unclear 
how much overlap there was between it and political power in the archaic period.
913
 
The college of the pontifices was the principal college of Roman priests during the 
Republic.
914
 The head of this college was the pontifex maximus, who was chosen by 
his colleagues to head the college in the early Republic.
915
 The three principle single 
deity priests were the flamines Dialis, Martialis, and Quirinalis. The flamen Dialis, 
the chief priest of Jupiter, had an odd relationship with war. He was forbidden to ride 
a horse and was forbidden to observe the army arrayed for battle (Gell. NA 10.15.3-
4).
916
 It is quite probable that the origin of these prohibitions is quite ancient, and the 
explanation for the creation of this priesthood given by Livy (1.20), that Numa 
created the priesthood so that the rites of Jupiter could be performed during the 
king’s absence due to war, helps to explain why this priest was forbidden to 
associate himself with warfare.
917
 Although we do not have as detailed knowledge of 
                                                                                                                                          
indicated by its function amongst the gentes but there is no definite dating for its construction, though 
Coarelli (2007), 215, describes it as ‘a very ancient shrine.’ 
912
 Beard (1990). 
913
 Mitchell (2005), 142, postulated the existence of a ‘hidden religious aristocracy’ which only came 
into public office in later Republican times. This is based on a number of families from prominent 
gentes which may have had religious duties in the past but emerged as novi homines in the politics of 
the middle and late Republic. This idea is not extremely convincing, perhaps based on the scarcity of 
evidence, although it must be consigned that there is a possible grain of truth in this idea. 
914
 Beard et al. (1998), 19. 
915
 Perhaps the rex was at the head of the college during the Regal Period. 
916
 That these particular restrictions were of great antiquity is indicated by their presence in the first 
book of Fabius Pictor (Gell. NA 10.15.1). This priesthood is generally considered incompatible with 
political and military office (cf. Cornell [1995], 233, and Forsythe [2005], 138), though Aulus Gellius 
only says that this flamen was rarely (rarenter) made consul (NA 10.15.4). The loosening of 
restrictions on flamines may have occurred later in the Republic, cf. Beard et al. (1998), 28. 
917
 These prohibitions could also have resulted from a conscious (on some level) effort of the elites of 
early Rome to prevent further accumulation of social power by those who attained the priesthood of 
Jupiter. Manipulation of priesthoods, their practices, and the pool of people whence they may be 
drawn was used in other city-state societies to change the balance of social power; recently this has 
been shown with considerable evidence for Athens and the Periclean citizenship reforms, with some 
of this power in the form of priesthoods being monopolized by certain families, see: Blok (2009) and 
Lambert (2010); Rasmussen (2011) doubts the hereditary nature of some of these priesthoods. 
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the other chief flamines, the flamen of Mars may have been prevented from going to 
war because he was not allowed to leave the city.
918
 
 The college of priests most closely associated with the actual practise of 
warfare was the fetiales. This group was charged with the regulation of ‘just war,’ 
the conclusions of treaties, and making demands for reparations after wars. 
Supposedly, these priests had their origin early in the Regal Period, although the 
exact origin of their regulatory ability towards warfare is disputed in the sources. 
Dinoysius (Ant. Rom. 2.72) and Plutarch (Num. 12.4-8) both attribute their creation 
to Numa. Cicero, though, says that Tullus Hostilius instituted their regulation of 
warfare (Rep. 2.31).
919
 Not all scholars are convinced by the antiquity of the whole 
fetial rite, but suspicion cannot be substantiated in the ancient evidence.
920
 It is also 
not clear exactly who the fetiales were. The earliest name associated with them is 
Marcus Valerius, who Livy (1.24) names as the fetial priest at the time of Tullus 
Hostilius.
921
 If Valerius is an authentic early fetial, then it is probable that this 
college, like the pontifices, consisted of patrician members.
922
 One of the most 
extreme postulations of who the fetiales were has been put forward by Richard 
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 Liv. per. 19. This particular instance is set during the First Punic War (242) when the pontifex 
maximus, Caecilius Metellus, forbade the flamen Martialis, Aulus Postumius, to fulfill his duty as 
consul to wage war. 
919
 Livy does not tell us about the origin of the fetiales, but we do see them early on in his narrative 
concluding a treaty with the Albans during the reign of Tullus Hostilius (1.24). He also records a 
tradition which claims Ancus Marcius originated the fetiales’ procedures for initiating a ‘just war’ 
(1.32; cf. De vir. ill. 5.4 and Serv. ad Aen. 10.14). A post regal introduction is suggested by Servius 
(ad Aen. 7.695) but this is unlikely. The procedure of the fetiales was considered to have been 
imported to Rome by many sources, from Ardea (Dion. Hal .Ant. Rom. 2.72.2), the Falisci (Serv. ad 
Aen. 7.695), or the Aequiculi (Livy 1.32; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.72.2; cf. ILLRP 447). On the 
introduction of the fetiales and their rites regarding warfare, see in general Penella (1987). 
920
 Cf. Wiedemann (1986). Rawlings (1999), 113, believes that the important element in the 
chronology is the memory that the fetiales were a regal institution. 
921
 Marcus Valerius may be a name added to the tradition by a later member of that gens. 
922
 Dionysius (Ant. Rom. 2.72.1) records that they were chosen from the best of families. 
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Mitchell, who believes that they were senators performing the function of 
‘international relations.’923 
 While it is not entirely clearly exactly who the fetiales were, their practises 
are slightly better known. The procedure for declaring war, as recorded by Livy, is as 
follows: the fetial goes to the border of those from whom restitution is sought,
924
 
declares himself to Jupiter and the borders, and then makes his demands. If 
restitution is not made within three days, the priest declares war, invoking both 
Jupiter and Janus Quirinus,
925
 seeking the consent of king and senate (later probably 
just the senate), and finally launches a spear over the border of the country on which 
the Romans are declaring war (Livy 1.32). Livy also recorded the procedure for 
making a treaty. Like in the declaration of war, the king is consulted if this is the 
path which he wishes to take, after which the fetial harvests a piece of sacred turf 
from the Capitol and using a ceremonial branch designates another person (perhaps a 
fetial) as the pater patratus. Jupiter is then invoked as the binder of the treaty, and a 
pig is sacrificed using a flint knife as a symbol of the fate of those who broke the 
oath of the treaty (Livy 1.24).
926
 
 The reasons for the creation of the fetiales are generally assumed to be 
somewhat straightforward by modern scholars. They have typically been seen as a 
necessary element in regulating the warfare of marauding kings, warlords, and 
gentilicial groups, but as we have seen above these are not as important as once 
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 Mitchell (2005), 142-144, cf. Idem., (1990), 109-113. In both of these works he describes the 
fetiales as ‘shadowy’ in nature. His argument partially rests on the translation of pater patratus, the 
title given to the principal fetial during missions, as ‘the father of the fatherhood,’ with the fatherhood 
being the senate (1990, 109-110; 2005, 143). This is an enticing possibility, which carries along with 
it the implication that rather than being a dedicated college of priests the fetiales were more of an 
extension of the senate, which provides continuity with the later practice of senatorial legates, who 
eventually took over many functions of the fetiales. 
924
 Just war required that the Romans were not the aggressors, rather that they were making war in 
search of restitution for previous wrongs. 
925
 It is interesting to note that the Romans are the only Latin people among whom we see Jupiter as a 
deity associated with warfare. 
926
 The knife was kept in the temple of Jupiter Feretrius, on which see below. 
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thought.
927
 The exact nature of this regulation is, like all things about the fetiales, 
somewhat hard to understand. Much of this rests on the interpretation of the group 
itself, whether it was an extension of the senate or a separate group of priests. Quite 
interestingly, Alan Watson has argued that their practise fits in with general Roman 
legal practise, almost acting as judges representing Jupiter.
928
 
 If the fetiales were responsible for commencing a just war and concluding 
‘fair’ treaties, the salii were responsible for the Roman people before and afterward. 
The Salian priesthood was supposedly instituted by Numa (Livy 1.20; Dion. Hal. 
Ant. Rom. 2.70; Plut. Numa 13) and enlarged by Tullus Hostilius (Livy 1.27; Dion. 
Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.32.4). Like the other priesthoods that we know of from early Rome, 
the salii were patricians (Livy 4.54). The two groups of priests were devoted to Mars 
and Quirinus, respectively.
929
 On the 19
th
 of March, the Salii performed a ceremony 
by which the arms of the Romans were cleansed and readied for the coming 
campaigning season. Conversely, on the 19
th
 of October they cleanse the Roman 
people of the campaigning season.
930
 The antiquity of this priesthood and these 
cleansings is indicated by two points. The first is that the salii were associated with 
single hills, those of Mars to the Palatine, probably in connection to the period before 
a unified city of Rome existed, but hilltop villages did. The second point is that to 
later Romans, the songs of salii were incomprehensible because of the antiquity of 
their language (Varro Ling. 7.2; Quint. 1.6). 
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 The bibliography which links the fetial priests to this type of warfare is quite large, see in 
particular Rawlings (1999), 112-115, Rich (2011), 216. 
928
 Watson (1993). 
929
 Gerschel (1950). 
930
 Ibid.; Dumézil (1970), 276; Scullard (1981), 92-94, 195-196. I follow the interpretation of Dumézil 
regarding the functioning of the Salian ceremonies being related to war, rather than to agriculture as 
some have suggested. The ceremonies involved the sacred shields, ancila, which were kept in the 
Regia. 
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 It has been proposed by some scholars that the Roman triumph represented 
another act of cleansing after a season of campaigning. The procession of the ritual 
dedicated spolia as offerings to three different gods: the first outside the pomerium 
(Mars), the next were dedicated at the entrance to the city (Janus Quirinus), and the 
final was dedicated on the Capitoline (Jupiter Feretrius).
931
 Although much of the 
emphasis in later literature is on the triumph as a ritual of victory,
932
 Festus 
preserved the purificatory nature in a single passage, saying that the soldiers which 
followed the triumphant general’s chariot into town were cleansed of the bloodshed 
they had perpetuated (104L).
933
 Bonfante has proposed similarities to rituals in 
Umbria and Etruria whose communities may have practised similar rites.
934
 While 
the triumph included purificatory elements, the ability to show off the spoils of war, 
especially in a religiously sanctioned ritual, would have been beneficial to the 
triumphant general.
935
 Armstrong has proposed that the triumph as an element of 
elite competition which allowed generals to publicly display their success in the 
previous campaign.
936
 This religious ritual, then, served both as a cleansing ritual as 
well as a way for leaders to show off their success throughout the community. 
6.2 Temples 
 Temples were central places in which Romans and Etruscans could conduct 
dealings with the gods.
937
 For the Romans, temples provided places in which rituals 
could be performed, many of the earliest temples of Rome were probably preceded 
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 Charles-Picard (1957), 130; Magdelin (1984); McDonnell (2005). 
932
 Rich (2014). 
933
 This is not a literal translation, but an extrapolation based on the passage: aureati milites 
sequebantur currum triumphantis, ut quasi purgati a caede humana intrarent urbem. 
934
 Bonfante-Warren (1970), 55-64. 
935
 The existing literature on the triumph is extensive and too much to deal with as a whole here. For 
up-to-date bibliographies, see Armstrong (2013b) and Erskine (2013), 53 n. 54, and the collected 
essays of Lange and Vervaet (2014). 
936
 Armstrong (2013b). 
937
 On Etruscan temples in general, see Colonna (1985), on Roman temples of the Republic, see 
Ziolkowski (1992). 
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by earlier open air sanctuaries.
938
 The rituals which focused on these sanctuaries 
consisted of both public and private rites, as we have seen above. Etruscan temples, 
likewise, were centres of ritual activity, although it does not seem that Etruscan ritual 
required such elaborate buildings.
939
 The connection between sanctuaries, rather than 
temples proper, and warfare dates back to the earliest periods of civilization in 
central Italy, although this connection is rarely detectable in the archaeological 
record. In early Greece, sanctuaries had considerable connections to taboos and 
norms in war.
940
 In later times, a number of Greek sanctuaries and temples were used 
to deposit victory commemorations.
941
 
 Unlike in the Greek world, there was not a strong tradition of dedicating 
captured arms or spoils in Etruscan and Roman temples. Early in the history of 
Rome martial dedications may have been made to Vulcan, but we know little about 
this.
942
 The spolia opima, however, deserves some comment. In the historical 
tradition, the dedication of captured arms to a god is limited in Rome to the spolia 
opima. This tradition is first attributed to Romulus (Livy 1.10; Plut. Rom. 16; Serv. 
ad Aen. 6.859).
943
 Only two other generals were to make this dedication in Roman 
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 Cornell (1995), 108-112. 
939
 Barker and Rasmussen (1998), 219-227. There was considerable variance in size of buildings used 
for cultic purposes, ranging from simple altars and small shrines up to large temples, discussed as a 
survey in Colonna (2006a). An important element, if not the important element, of Etruscan temples, 
regarding ritual, was the sacred area established around the central altar or shrine, with or without a 
building, Izzet (2007), 126-30. 
940
 Whitley (2001), 134-40. 
941
 Famously, two Etruscan helmets, captured by Hieron I of Syracuse and dedicated at Olympia. 
942
 Carafa (1998), 105-110, details the finds in the archaic Volcanal, including a number of 
spearheads. Spoils taken from defeated enemies were occaisionally burned in honor of Vulcan, with 
one instance of this occurring in the archaic period (Livy 1.37), but the practice is better attested in 
later Roman history (cf. Livy 30.6, 41.12). 
943
 The versions given by Livy and Plutarch are rather similar but show that there was not a unified 
tradition down to the time of the latter’s writing. Livy’s narrative is much simpler and plainer than 
that of Plutarch, who gives an elaborate version of events: Romulus and Acron (king of Caenina) 
challenge one another to single combat, Romulus vows a dedication to Jupiter if he is allowed to win, 
he carefully considers how to make this dedication, he then cuts down a gigantic oak tree to construct 
the trophy. The most elaborate element of Livy’s narrative is Romulus’ dedication of the temple of 
Jupiter Feretrius. The construction of the trophy by Romulus in the eighth century has been doubted, 
especially as the narrative traditions describe it in terms of a Greek tropaion (Ogilvie [1965], 71). 
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history, Aulus Cornelius Cossus (Livy 4.19-20; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 12.5; Prop. 
4.10; Val. Max. 3.2.4; Festus 204L; Front. Strat. 2.8.9; Plut. Rom. 16, Marc. 8)
944
 
and Marcus Claudius Marcellus (Livy Per. 20; Verg. Aen. 6.855-859; Prop. 4.10; 
Val. Max. 3.2.5; Festus 204L; Front. Strat. 4.5.4; Plut. Marc. 7-8). The origin of this 
ceremony is a debated issue in modern scholarship. Some scholars believe that the 
rite did indeed date to the regal period, while others contend that it was a later 
innovation.
945
 
 Adding further to the controversy of the antiquity of the spolia opima is the 
nature of the ceremony itself. There seems to have been a rather confused tradition 
which reached the Late Republic and Early Principate. According to Livy, the spolia 
opima could only be dedicated by a Roman commander who had killed an enemy 
commander in battle (4.20.6).
946
 Another tradition remembered that there were three 
different kinds the spolia opima, the first to be dedicated to Jupiter Feretrius, the 
second to Mars, and the third to Quirinus (Festus 204L; Plut. Marc. 8; Serv. ad Aen. 
6.589).
947
 Scholars have offered a number of suggestions as to how these three types 
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 Cossus’ dedication is famously complicated, as Augustus supposedly found the linen corselet 
which was part of this dedication during his restoration of the temple of Jupiter Feretrius (Livy 4.20). 
This ‘discovery’ was possibly a tactic used by Augustus to deny Marcus Licinius Crassus the ability 
to dedicate the spolia opima after his defeat of the Bastarnae in 29 B.C., this is because Augustus 
claimed evidence that Cossus was consul, rather than military tribune, under the dictator Mamercus 
Aemilius. See Rich (1999) and Sailor (2006) for a detailed discussion of the interplay of historical 
authority and political authority in the early Principate and earlier bibliography on the discussion. It is 
notable, that the name of the king of Veii, Lars Tolumnius, was preserved in the Roman tradition. In 
the later siege and capture of Veii the name of the king was unknown to the annalists, even though the 
latter event was of considerably more importance in their narratives (cf. Livy 5.1, where we hear 
stories about this king but are given no name). This leads me to believe that there was some type of 
epigraphic evidence for the defeat of Tolumnius surviving during the time of the early Roman 
historians; this evidence had clearly disappeared by the time of Livy, with him only able to cite the 
linen books and the earlier historians, especially that information cited by Licinius Macer (Livy 4.20). 
945
 Stewart (1998), 80-89, believes that the process dated to the regal period. Flower (2000) argues 
that the version of the ceremony that is preserved in our evidence was the invention of Marcus 
Claudius Marcellus. 
946
 This is supported further by statements in Propertius (4.10) and Festus (206L). On the Propertius 
passage, see Garani (2007). 
947
 This second tradition was supposedly based on the books of Numa, themselves a matter of 
controversy and undoubtedly not genuine to the time of Numa, if they existed at all. Livy (40.29) tells 
the story of the discovery of the books of Numa which were buried along with the king (cf. Plut. 
Numa 22). 
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of dedications related to one another. One suggestion is that they each corresponded 
to a different dedicatory location, to the shrine of Mars in the Campus Martius went 
the third, the second to the temple of Janus Quirinus, and the first to Jupiter 
Feretrius.
948
 John Rich has argued against this idea.
949
 It has also been suggested that 
the three types of spolia represented a hierarchical system of dedications, donated in 
descending order by a commander who slew an opposing commander, by a leader 
fighting under the auspices of another, and then by a normal Roman soldier.
950
 
There is evidence that certain Etruscan cites or individual elites did dedicate 
offerings of some kind after a military victory, although this does not seem to be 
common.
951
 Rather than practicing this ritualized dedication, it is probable that 
Roman and Etruscan elites dedicated entire temples after military victories.
952
 This 
behaviour was common in the Roman Republic, with Becker counting 37 instances 
of new temple dedication during the Republican period for this purpose.
953
 The only 
certain instance of an Etruscan temple being dedicated by an individual is that of 
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 Picard (1957), 131-33 and Bonfante Warren (1970), 49-66. 
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 Rich (1996), 124-25. 
950
 Rüpke (1990), 219-20. 
951
 There is some evidence of Etruscan dedications at Delphi after a military victory. Though the 
source of the dedications in question is unknown, Strabo (5.2.3) does record that Caere kept a 
sanctuary at Delphi and it is possible the dedications originated from that city. The Etruscan 
dedications may have been part of a play for ‘spatial dominance’ at the sanctuary, possibly competing 
with Lipara; see Scott (2010), 91-93 and Colonna (1984), 557-78. Evidence of individuals dedicating 
offerings after a victory is provided by the Elogia from Tarquinia, which may claim that Velthur 
Spurinna dedicated a number of metal items to a deity following a successful military campaign, 
Torelli (1975), 30-38. Interpretation of these inscriptions, however, is difficult and should be made 
with caution; although it is possible that the events they commemorate relate to the time period under 
question in this work, it is not entirely clear, see the review of Cornell (1978), 167-73. Rome is said to 
have dedicated a golden bowl to the Apollo of Delphi (Livy 5.25, 28) after the defeat of Veii. This 
occurrence has generally been accepted, with Ogilvie (1965), 689, giving evidence in favour of 
believing the story about the Liparian pirates. 
952
 Becker (2009). Lulof (2014) argues that there was a considerable expansion in temple construction 
in Central Italy during the late sixth century that was spurred on by elites. 
953
 Ibidem, 92 n. 20. In all 48 temples were known to have been constructed based on a vow, out of 
about 80 which were built. During the early Republic, we only hear of six temples vowed because of 
war. Two may be argued for the regal period, being two temples dedicated to Jupiter. The practice is 
then better attested in the middle Republic, for which the historical evidence is richer and possibly 
more accurate. We should not, however, read back the circumstances of the later dedications into the 
early period, as it is dangerous to assume such a static nature was involved in Roman religious and 
political dialogue. 
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Pyrgi, dedicated by Thefarie Velianas.
954
 In Rome, however, we know of a number 
of temples dedicated because of military campaigns. For instance, in 396 Camillus 
vowed to rededicate the temple of Mater Matuta, which had originally been 
dedicated by Servius Tullius, before marching against Veii (Livy 5.19). 
Temple Date Adversary Vowing 
Party 
Role Sources
955
 
Jupiter Feretrius
956
 Regal Caenina Romulus Rex L 1.10 
D 2.34.4 
Jupiter Optimus Maximus Regal Sabines Lucius 
Tarquinius 
Priscus 
Rex L 1.38;  
D 3.69.1 
Castor (and Pollux) 499/496 Latins Aulus 
Postumius 
Dictator L 2.20 
(D) 6.13 
Liber, Libera, Ceres
957
 496(?) Volsci Aulus 
Postumius 
Dictator D 6.17 
Mater Matuta 396 Veii Marcus 
Furius 
Camillus 
Dictator L 5.19 
Juno Regina 396 Veii Marcus 
Furius 
Dictator L 5.21 
D 13.3.1 
                                                 
954
 Colonna (1965). 
955
 L = Livy; D = Dionysius of Halicarnassus Ant. Rom. 
956
 We do not hear that this temple was vowed before or during the war, but its dedication was the 
direct result of the conflict. Although the stories surrounding the foundation of this temple are almost 
certainly anachronistic, the association of this temple with an early rex named Romulus or something 
similar, is not impossible, and the association of this temple with warfare is quite explicit throughout 
the sources. 
957
 The reasons given for this dedication are not limited to warfare, perhaps the most important reason 
for this dedication was the drought which had ravaged Roman crops. Dionysius does note, however, 
that the war with the Volsci prevented the import of grain from abroad, thus contributing to the 
vowing of the temple. 
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Camillus 
Mars c. 390 Gauls Titus 
Quinctius 
Duumvir 
sacris 
faciundis 
L 6.5 
Juno Moneta 344 Aurunci Lucius 
Furius 
Dictator L 7.28 
 
 
Perhaps the most spectacular story of a dedication, however, comes from the Battle 
of Lake Regillus (499 or 496). The Dioscuri were said to have helped the Romans to 
win the battle (Cic. Nat. D. 2.6, 3.11-13; Tusc. 1.28; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.13; Val. 
Max. 1.8.1A, c; Front. Str. 1.11.8; Plut. Aem. 25.2-4; Cor. 3.4; Flor. 1.5.4; Lact. Inst. 
2.7.9; De vir. Ill. 16.3). As the tide of the battle was turning towards the Romans, 
Aulus Postumius Albinus, the dictator, vowed a temple to Castor (Livy 2.20). There 
is evidence that this temple indeed dates to a very early period of the city’s 
history.
958
 The historicity of the vow, and the story of the Dioscuri at Lake Regillus, 
has been doubted and a fourth-century terminus post quem has been suggested.
959
 
Other scholars point out that certain elements of the story likely came into the 
tradition in the second century.
960
 The temple, however, could represent, in part, the 
Roman praise for the cavalry in the Battle, which is carried over in the traditions of 
the vow and the battle which we possess. A similar line of thought allowed 
                                                 
958
 The existence of an archaic structure beneath the late Republican temple to Castor and Pollux may 
validate the historicity of an early Republican foundation, Holloway (1994), 7-8, which has been 
accepted and repeated by other authors, such as Cornell (1995), 68. That worship of these twin deities 
had reached Latium by the traditional foundation date of the temple is suggested by a dedication to 
them found at Lavinium in 1958, castorei podlouqueique qurois (ILLRP 1271a). 
959
 Richardson (2013), 903-905. 
960
 Wiseman (1994), 137, Idem. (2004), 188, believes that the part of the story regarding the bronze 
beard of Domitius was likely added to the story with the first consulship of a member of that family. 
The first of their line to be elected to this office was Gn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who was consul in 
192. This seems like a probable conclusion, but does not merit regarding the entire story as fiction. If 
the story of the Battle of Lake Regillus was already a famous event, then it makes sense why the 
family would have tried to write themselves into it. 
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Tagliamonte to propose a connection between the spread of elite ‘horsemanship 
ideology’ and the worship of the Dioscuri.961 This possible element in the 
construction of this temple is only part of the complex identity of these gods. 
It is worth noting, that during the early Republic, we see most temples being 
vowed in war by dictators. The one exception was the temple of Mars, vowed during 
the Gallic War, by Titus Quinctius, a duumvir sacris faciundis.
962
 This could be 
symptomatic of the vower needing to possess imperium. Whilst the consuls typically 
held the highest type of imperium in the Republic, during times of crisis this power 
was invested in the dictator alone. With sole possession of the highest power in the 
land, dictators were able to bind the state, through solemn vows, to build these 
temples.
963
 
If, indeed, temples were commonly dedicated by victorious generals, or other 
private citizens, after a military victory, their importance should not be 
underestimated. These structures add a religious element to the dialogue of 
monumentality already at play with elite constructions, such as those at Poggio 
Civitate and Acquarossa.
964
 Temples dedicated after a military victory would keep 
that success in the forefront of socio-political discussions in those communities. 
Keeping these memories in the minds of their contemporaries enhanced the status 
                                                 
961
 Tagliamonte (2004). On the importance of sanctuaries for defining communities in Samnium, see 
Scopacasa (2015), 188-209. 
962
 Later known as the decemviri sacris faciundis, this was a college of priests founded during the 
reign of Tarquinius Superbus (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.62). They were primarily responsible for the 
maintenance and consultation of the Sibylline Books (cf. Livy 7.27, 21.62, 31.12). Originally a 
collegiate position, their numbers were increased to ten in 367, with half being patrician and half 
plebian (Livy 6.37, 42). Their numbers were increased again, twice, in the later republic, once by 
Julius Caesar (Dio Cass. 42.51). They were responsible for the games dedicated to Apollo (Livy 10.8) 
as well as the secular games (Tac. Ann. 11.11). Servius implies that they were priests of Apollo (ad 
Aen. 3.332). 
963
 Orlin (2002), 45-66. See, though Ziolkowski (1992), 195-198. 
964
 Meyers (2012). 
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and power of those who dedicated the temples.
965
 Religious power, exercised 
through temple construction, then, actively affected the maintenance of military 
power, in a theoretical sense. This would have been extremely important in a socio-
political environment which saw elite families competing for power so fiercely 
within their communities, as was the case in central Italy. 
 Temples and other monumental structures also provided ample space for 
elites to display, advertise, and encourage their way of life, including warfare.
966
 
This is best shown by the terracotta plaques which were used to decorate many of 
these structures.
 967
 These frieze plaques showed a number of military scenes, such as 
the departure of warriors, victory,
968
 and cavalry charges/manoeuvres.
969
 Beyond the 
basic association of some of these plaques with temples, there is a possible linkage 
of religion and warfare in the images themselves. The best example of this is from 
Tuscania, but currently in Munich;
970
 the plaque shows the departure of two warriors 
on foot, and a third mounting a chariot, but the lead figure, who is not armed, is 
holding what is most probably a lituus.
971
 Whether this is an image of warriors being 
escorted to the next life or departing for actual war, the presence of a priest confirms 
a connection between warfare and religion.
972
 
 
 
                                                 
965
 Marcus (2003). Orlin (2002), 66-73, though, has pointed out that dedications in the middle 
Republican period often involved consultation of the Senate, and if this practice can be read back into 
the archaic period, we may have to question the effectiveness of this practice of display. 
966
 This display would have been important within the immediate community, as well as on a regional 
level if it is true that foreigners would have frequented these temples, Glinister (2003). 
967
 Roth-Murray (2007). 
968
 Chateigner (1989). 
969
 For instance, the cavalry frieze of the so-called Veii-Velletri-Rome system shows a number of 
charging horsemen. See Winter (2009) 311-94. 
970
 Museum antiker Kleinkunst 5033. 
971
 Chateigner (1989), 124-25. 
972
 Note the analysis of the iconography of power at Chiusi by Jannot (1993), which shows that the 
lituus could also function as a political symbol. 
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6.3 The Gods and War 
 The gods of Etruria and Rome were portrayed, in some instances, as warriors. 
This is not uncommon in the Ancient Mediterranean. In the Hellenic world, a 
number of gods were associated with war or were thought to actively participate in 
mortal warfare.
973
 Ares was the god of war par excellence. He is portrayed in some 
sources as representing “the mindless carnage of combat” and all of the awful things 
that that entailed.
974
 Alternatively, Ares, the embodiment of war, could also be seen 
in a more positive light, even being described as πολισόος (protector of cities),975 
which is more often associated with Athena. Sharing primacy in war along with Ares 
was Athena, who is often represented as the cool and cunning side of warfare: 
tactical and orderly. The personalities of these two deities of war, however, are 
considerably more complicated than we have time to explore.
976
 Within the Greek 
pantheon, as well, we find a number of other deities associated with war, which may 
have varied from polis to polis.
977
 
 The Etruscan pantheon is no less diverse and interesting than that of the 
Greeks, in some ways it is even more interesting. What sets it apart, however, is our 
comparative lack of knowledge, thanks to the usual combination of lack of Etruscan 
literature and questionably useful Greco-Roman sources. We do know, however, that 
this pantheon was complex and seemed to have been influenced, in some ways, by 
contact with Hellenic and Latin culture, although, we cannot underestimate the 
differences between the Etruscan deities and their supposed Greek and Roman 
                                                 
973
 Rawlings (2007), 177-79. 
974
 Ibidem, 177. See Burkert (1985), 169-70. 
975
 Hymn. Hom. Mart. (HH 8). 
976
 See Deacy (2000). 
977
 Cf. Villing (1997). 
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counterparts.
978
 This being said, the pantheon of the Etruscans had parallels for both 
Ares/Mars and Athena/Minerva. 
 Laran has come to be identified with Ares/Mars within the Etruscan 
pantheon.
979
 It has been suggested that this deity was added into the Etruscan 
pantheon relatively late in their cultural history.
980
 We do not hear of him until the 
fourth century BC, and he is not found among the gods of the Piacenza liver. His 
equivalence with Ares/Mars is confirmed by a number of depictions along canonical 
lines, such as his participation in a gigantomachy on a mirror from Populonia
981
 or 
his placement with Turan, Aphrodite.
982
 Athena/Minerva is represented in the 
Etruscan pantheon by Menerva. Many images exist of Menerva as an armed deity, 
often using similar iconography to that of the Hellenic variety of the deity.
983
 The 
origin of Menerva is controversial, with some scholars believing her to be an 
indigenous Etruscan deity, while others believe that she was an externally influenced 
creation.
984
 
 Other deities appear as armed figures in Etruscan iconography. Mariś, once 
thought to be the Etruscan equivalent of Mars, appears armed in many depictions.
985
 
The nature of this deity, though, is controversial, and his place within Etruscan 
religion is not well understood. De Grummond has proposed that Mariś is best 
understood as an equivalent to the Latin Genius, although a consensus has yet to be 
reached.
986
 Sethlans, the Etruscan interpretation of Hephaistos/Vulcan, is depicted on 
                                                 
978
 de Grummond (2006a), 12-15. 
979
 de Grummond (2006a), 138-40; Jannot (2005), 164-65; Simon (1984), 498-505. 
980
 Jannot (2005), 164. 
981
 Simon (1984), 501 (with bibliography). 
982
 Ibidem, 502-503. 
983
 de Grummond (2006), 71-78. 
984
 Cf. Torelli (2009), 120-21; Simon (2006), 59; Jannot (2005), 147-49. 
985
 For example CSE 2.16a, which shows Mariś, armed with a spear, seated in the presence of Tinia 
and Lasa. 
986
 de Grummond (2006), 140-44. 
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a fourth-century mirror from Arezzo wielding a two headed axe.
987
 Although there is 
no strong connection between Sethlans and warfare, as a god of crafts he may have 
been associated with the production of arms and armour,
988
 although his cult is 
almost unknown from the archaeology of Etruria. 
 Many Roman gods were associated with warfare. The most readily to mind is 
Mars, who is remembered primarily as the god of war. Mars may have also been 
associated with the agricultural cycle of archaic Rome, although his primary function 
as a war god is probable.
989
 His function and place in the regal period is indicated by 
his presence in the calendar at the beginning and end of the campaign cycle.
990
 
During these festivals the population of Rome is cleansed and readied for war and 
then cleansed of the filth of the actual practise of war.
991
 These festivals are very old, 
although we have no secure dating.
992
 The presence of the Salii in the lustrations, and 
the storage of their sacred shields in the Regia, implies that these rights date to the 
regal period. It is also here that we find one of the only associations of Mars with the 
kings, besides his siring of Romulus and Remus (Livy 1.4). It could be that Mars 
was a deity especially identified with Romans besides the reges, as the Campus 
Martius was either dedicated (Livy 2.5) or rededicated after the expulsion of the 
Tarqruins (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.13.2).
993
 
                                                 
987
 CSE 1.1.13a. 
988
 Cf. Burkert (1985), 167-68. 
989
 Dumézil (1970), 205-272. Dumézil’s arguments were built up over a period of decades, and are 
convincing to me in his rejection of Mars as a primarily agricultural deity. I do not, however, agree 
with his conception of an ‘archaic triad’ of Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus, as representing the ‘three 
functions’ of Indo-European society, the theory of which does predate his studies by almost a century. 
990
 Scullard (1981), 85-87, 89, 193-195. In many ways, this overlaps with the agricultural cycle as 
well. The militaristic aspects of the ceremonies during these times, such as the parades of the Salii, 
however, belie the relation of these rites to warfare. See the brief comments by Balsdon (1966). 
991
 Rosivach (1983), Gagé (1970), Gerschel (1950). Cf. Scullard (1981), 195, on the ‘armilustrium.’ 
992
 Coarelli (2010) advocates an archaic date, finding evidence that the development of the city and of 
the calendar make a logical pair. 
993
 In the version preserved by Dionysius, the reason that the Campus Martius had to be rededicated 
was that the Tarquins had usurped its divine use for their own. 
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 Two other gods are directly associated with the practise of warfare in early 
Rome, Quirinus and Jupiter. Quirinus was associated with the opening and closing 
rituals of the new campaigning season. The Salian priests dedicated to this god 
participated in these rituals alongside their counterparts devoted to Mars, and 
represented the transition from peace to war and from war to peace.
994
 His 
relationship to Mars is often complicated by the combined name Mars-Quirinus 
appearing a number of times, especially in reference to agricultural issues.
995
 This 
connection could be due to the necessity of military protection to the safety of 
agriculture in the archaic period; as we have seen above, raiding often threatened 
agriculture.
996
 Quirinus is also invoked, in the guise of Janus Quirinus, in the 
procedure of the fetiales when making peace (Livy 1.32).
997
 The role of Quirinus 
was in the conclusion of war and the maintenance of the Roman community between 
campaigning seasons.
998
 The role of Jupiter in warfare is perhaps more subtle than 
Mars and Quirinus, but the association is definite. That the spolia opima was 
dedicated to Jupiter Feretrius indicates that he was seen as being directly responsible 
for victories of this kind. And like Quirinus, his invocation in the conclusion of 
treaties (Livy 1.32) demonstrates that he played a role in the ending of wars.
999
 
 A number of Etruscan heroic figures, whose story is as much mythology as 
history, are also characterized by their military character. Important for our 
discussion are the figures of Caele and Avle Vipinas. The exploit most closely 
                                                 
994
 Rosivach (1983). 
995
 Cf. Dumézil (1970), 273-280. 
996
 Magdelain (1984). 
997
 Dumézil (1970), 589-590; cf. Rich (2011). In a later attestation, Polybius attests that whilst the first 
treaty with Carthage was made invoking Jupiter, later treaties invoked Mars and Quirinus (3.25). This 
is a point on which we know very little. 
998
 Magdelain (1984). According to Festus, Quirinus was not defenseless as he was armed with a 
lance (238L). Polybius calls him ‘warlike’ at one point (3.25.6) which is hard to deny. His role as a 
military deity may be further argued for if we trust Festus (204L) that the spolia tertia were dedicated 
to him. 
999
 The silex used by the fetial priests to sacrifice the pig, necessary in treaty signings, was kept in the 
temple of Jupiter Feretrius (Paul. Fest. 81L). 
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associated with the Vipinas is the etymological association of Caele and the Caelian 
Hill in Rome. The often cited speech of the emperor Claudius also describes Caele as 
the companion of Macstarna, who was to become the Roman king, Servius 
Tullius.
1000
 Importantly for Etruscan religion, however, the brothers Vipinas 
famously ambushed and probably captured the prophet Cacu. In various images, the 
brothers are depicted as armed and threatening towards the prophet and his assistant, 
Artile.
1001
 This story may illustrate the importance of the revealed divine knowledge 
of Etruscan religious belief, it was important enough to be taken by the sword. 
 The gods of Etruria and Rome were not just figures to be etched on mirrors 
or sculpted in bronze, they played an active part in the lives of these peoples. The 
gods communicated through a variety of signs which could be interpreted by those 
with sacred knowledge.
1002
 Knowledge of divination was passed down through 
families, and was probably a guarded secret.
1003
 Of these practices, the divinatory 
examination of livers and entrails (haruspicy) is possibly the most well known. This 
examination could tell the haruspex the will of the gods through observation of the 
blood, anatomical defects, or disease.
1004
 Undoubtedly the gods were consulted in 
this manner regarding warfare.
1005
 Although typically associated with Roman 
practices, divination by watching the flight of birds, “taking the auspices,” was 
practised in Etruria. We might have an example of this practice being used to seek 
the gods’ will regarding warfare in a painting from the François Tomb, Vulci. An 
Etruscan augur named Vel Saties is watching the flight of what has been identified 
as a woodpecker, a bird sacred to Laran. If this interpretation of the painting is 
                                                 
1000
 ILS 212.1.8-27. See, Cornell (1995), 133-38. 
1001
 de Grummond (2006a), 28 (fig. II.5), 174-75 (figs. VIII.1-2). 
1002
 de Grummond (2006a), 53-54. 
1003
 Cic., Fam., 6.6; Tac., Ann., 11.14. Cf. de Grummond (2006b), 34-35; Jannot (2006), 5-8, 23. 
1004
 Jannot (2006), 21-24. 
1005
 Etruscan harupices were consulted, but ignored, by the emperor Julian on whether or not he 
should execute a certain campaign (Amm. Marc. 23.5.10). 
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correct, it shows the importance of avian divination to warfare.
1006
 This type of 
divination is very public and served as a means of legitimating a military campaign 
or action, this is an exploitative crossover between religious and military social 
power. 
 The form of Etruscan divination for which we have the most knowledge of, 
however, is the art of the fulgurator, brontoscopia, the examination of thunder and 
lightning. Understanding the will of the gods through lightening was extremely 
important for the Etruscans. The exact nature of how this worked is not quite clear, 
however. Some sources believed that only nine gods of the Etruscan pantheon could 
wield the lightning-bolts which communicated with mortal men.
1007
 To further 
elaborate the tradition, Seneca describes three different types of lightning which have 
different meanings.
1008
 This tradition is controversial among modern historians, 
however, and influences ranging from the Near East to the Greek world have been 
proposed as the source of this Roman tradition about the Etruscans.
1009
 What is 
important for the current study, though, is a divinatory calendar based on 
brontoscopy preserved in an early Byzantine text. 
 John the Lydian (fl. sixth century AD) compiled a work on omens (de 
ostentis) which included a section (27-38) on brontoscopia. For some time, this text 
has been neglected because it drew strong opinions on its antiquity.
1010
 Recently, 
though, a strong argument has been made by J. M. Turfa as to its usefulness in 
analyzing Etruscan society.
1011
 In brief, although the calendar owes some of its 
structure and contents to a Near Eastern or Mesopotamian origin, the bulk of the 
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 Ibidem, 27-28. 
1007
 Pliny, NH, 2.138-40. Tinia is also credited with possessing three types of lightning. 
1008
 Sen., Q Nat, 2.39, 49; see however 2.47. 
1009
 For the most up-to-date discussion with full bibliography, see Turfa (2012), 51-9. 
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 Dumézil (1970), 637-49. 
1011
 Turfa (2012), 3-18. 
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information it contains can be included in the discussion of Etruscan history. The 
contents of the calendar reveal the importance of divining war to the Etruscans. 
While thunder being heard on four days throughout the year may indicate the coming 
of peace, approximately thirty-one days of the year signal war if thunder is heard.
1012
 
The details of these predicted wars are diverse. For example, if thunder is heard on 
“25 November” the coming war will be “very dangerous,” while thunder on the next 
day, “26 November,” will signal civil war and much death.1013 The varying degrees 
of severity and threat could indicate a mechanism by which the diviner could 
manipulate those listening to his advice. The abundant appearances of warfare in the 
Brontoscopic Calendar are a further link between religion and warfare in Etruria. 
Because the interpretation of these omens was restricted to certain elite families, this 
ritual helped to further the dominance of the elite classes of military power; they 
knew when war was coming, or when to wage war. 
 The taking of the auspices is the Roman practise of divination for which we 
have the most evidence and is most connected to the sphere of warfare.
1014
 
Traditionally this was the practise of divination through watching the flight and 
actions of birds. The term later became synonymous with many other types of 
divination in Roman religion. It is well attested in the annalists for the archaic 
period, and might have had its origins quite early in the history of the city.
1015
 It was 
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 We could, possibly, include two more instances. For “27 June” thunder would indicate “danger 
from the army for the men in power,” while thunder on “3 January” indicates “loss after victory for 
those in war.” Although these do not directly predict war, they do pertain to war. Translations adapted 
from Turfa (2012), 88, 96. 
1013
 Turfa (2012), 95. 
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 On the asupices and imperium, see above chapter 4. 
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 Livy (1.6-7) relates that Romulus and Remus used augury to decide who would rule the city that 
they had just founded. Whilst this story is almost certainly fictional, it shows that the Romans 
associated augury with the earliest phases of their city. Reference to augury can be found on the Lapis 
Niger. Cf. ter Beek (2012). 
222 
 
a divinatory art that was connected to Jupiter.
1016
 The practice was executed by both 
magistrates and a special college of priests whose job it was to interpret these 
portents.
1017
 The power to read the auspices was central to the authority of 
magistrates (Gell. NA 13.15.4).
1018
 Before a military commander went on campaign 
he was required to take the auspices to make sure that the future campaign was 
satisfactory to the gods. This was a very public act which legitimated the 
magistrate’s ability to wage war in the eyes of the people. By performing these 
ceremonies, Roman magistrates were able to combine religious and military power 
to further affect their goals. 
6.4 Conclusions 
 This chapter has examined the role of the gods in warfare. Certain deities 
were closely associated with warfare, and show close parallels to Greek gods. The 
association between these gods and warfare, however, ran deeper than Hellenization, 
as they were associations deeply rooted in Etruscan and Roman culture. These gods 
directly impacted the warfare of mortals, typically through the practise of divination, 
although some are said to have fought alongside mortals, such as the Dioscuri at 
Lake Regillus. Likewise, martial pressure in the form of an ambush or raid allowed 
certain Etruscan heroes to seize and exploit the religious knowledge of prophets, 
knowledge that no doubt helped them later in their stories. Between the actual deities 
of the Etruscan and Roman pantheons, and the revealed knowledge of the prophets, 
enlightened Etruscans and Romans were able to see the will of the gods through 
certain portents, the best known to us being through thunder and birds. All of this 
shows that religion and warfare were deeply connected in central Italy. 
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 For instance, Jupiter is invoked when Numa took the auspices as he was deliberating becoming 
rex in Rome (Livy 1.18). Cicero says that Jupiter is the god who controls the portents (Leg. 2.20). 
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 Dumézil (1970), 594-601. 
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 It was even essential to the power of the kings, see Scullard (1980), 66-69, Cornell (1995), 143. 
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 The evidence of ceremonies and divinatory practices are examples of the 
religious elite of central Italy also possessing the power to influence the realm of 
warfare. This was an important tool that allowed the religiously dominant groups to 
affect behaviours beneficial to them, whether that was waging war or coming up 
with an excuse to avoid it. Through military victories, elites were able to fund and 
justify the construction of temples throughout the region. This construction allowed 
these figures to perpetuate ideals which benefited their social group, in many cases 
this a promulgation of warfare, either through post victory dedications or through the 
commissioning of militaristic decoration. Through this art, as well, elites developed 
their identity, associated with both war and religion, by having their deities portrayed 
in the same image as the elites. This interplay between warfare and religion aided in 
the social dominance of elite groups. 
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7. General Conclusions 
  Our understanding of central Italy is constantly changing. The progress of 
archaeological research over the past century has increased our knowledge of the 
region considerably. One of the most visible results of this archaeological work has 
been to show that the primary settlements of central Italy, the great city-states of the 
historical period, emerged at the beginning of the Early Iron Age and began a 
centuries-long period of extensive growth. The inhabitants of these places gathered 
around themselves a vast wealth over the course of almost a thousand years, before 
Rome conquered the peninsula. Throughout this growth and accumulation, these 
cities became more and more centralized. Burial patterns begin to hint at the 
existence of state structures from at least the eighth century, at which point these 
centres begin to build monumental defensive structures. It is probably not a 
coincidence that these two turning points almost coincide; it is at this point that we 
see non-kin, non-familiar, states coming into being. At the centre of this 
development was the practise of warfare. 
 The rich and powerful were buried with arms, perhaps in an attempt to 
identify as ‘warriors’ in death, perhaps a reality in life. This identity was created in 
an environment where warfare was rampant, so rampant that settlements had to be 
specially protected against it. In order to create these personas, though, central Italian 
elites did not rely solely on local traditions and customs. They enhanced their 
position through the import of exotic metal armours from northern Europe, perhaps 
even using their positions of power to import craftsmen. These imports allowed the 
quasi-political military figures of the Iron Age to create an ideology accessible only 
to those like them, with a restricted repertoire of imagery, primarily martial in nature. 
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All aspects of social power were tied up within this group and it was through 
the actions of these powerful persons that the early states developed. During this 
great period of urbanization and social formation kings ruled, at least in Rome. The 
evidence for rulers in Etruria is unclear, although there is mythologized literary 
evidence that kings also ruled in the Etruscan polities. These figures, whether reges 
or something else, used their monopoly on social power (ideological, economic, 
military, political) to control the settlements in which they lived. According to the 
problematic, and much elaborated historical narratives, there were state mechanisms 
in place to coerce individuals into military service under these figures. This is the 
time of the supposed Romulean army, which is probably a reconstruction of 
Republican historians, but there is probably a kernel of truth to the existence of a 
state army. 
 By the sixth century, the Roman state had become strong and centralized. 
The major army reform of this period, the so-called Servian Constitution, marked a 
new era in Roman warfare. In the absence of the shadow of the oppressive hoplite 
narrative, we have shown that this reform looked a lot more like the version 
preserved in the literary sources than has been believed for some time. The theory 
that the Servian army was made up of a single class, forming a Roman phalanx, has 
been shown to be weak and grounded in few pieces of substantial evidence. Instead, 
it has been demonstrated that in the literature of the late Republic and early 
Principate there was a continuing confusion over what the term classis meant before 
the Middle Republic and that confusion is not enough to dismiss the received 
memory of a complex Servian army. This complex system continued to be used into 
the Republican period because it allowed for the ruling group to coerce citizens into 
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military service. This system survived the fifth century and was probably a core 
component of Rome’s strength for much of its rise to power. 
 Contrary to the recent trend of emphasizing the role of private warfare, this 
study has argued that this played a very limited role, if any at all, in the warfare of 
central Italy from the sixth century onward. The so-called expedition of the Fabii 
was not a patriotic private war, but an elaborated story about a powerful family. The 
other actors typically described as condottieri may have been violent individuals, but 
their practise of warfare was not private. Sextus Tarquin, Appius Claudius, and 
Coriolanus all went to war on behalf of states. Within this social milieu, though, 
existed men who were willing to go to war for pay, in whatever form that may have 
taken. All of this is evidence for horizontal social mobility in central Italy, but not 
for extensive private warfare. 
 This is not to say that competitive behaviour was unknown, but this 
competition was centred on the community. Competitive display and acquisition of 
religious and economic power drove warfare. Waging war gave elites the 
opportunity to dedicate temples, thus creating a monumental legacy for themselves 
and their family. This same warfare allowed for the accumulation of material wealth 
through the capture of booty, which we know was a common behaviour. 
 The same religious concepts which encouraged elites to go to war 
encouraged their communities to accept this warfare. The image of deities and 
mythical heroes overlapped with the successful political figure. Through the 
development of artistic styles and norms, elites could visually equate themselves to 
these figures. Sacred knowledge allowed this same group of elites to claim 
knowledge of the will of the gods, allowing them to manipulate when or if war was 
made. The involvement of the gods, as well, could allow individuals with sacred 
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knowledge to exculpate themselves from military failure by manipulating the 
interpretations of certain signs. In these ways, warfare and religion were deeply 
connected in Tyrrhenian Italy. 
 The accumulation of material wealth was an almost unavoidable outcome of 
successful warfare. Slaves and cattle were seized at will during successful wars, two 
extremely valuable resources. The trade with the eastern Mediterranean which was 
fuelled by the elite’s lust for exotic objects opened up the opportunity for material 
gain through piracy, a form of low-intensity warfare. Piracy was practised from an 
early period and eventually became endemic in the central Mediterranean. 
Considerable wealth could be collected through this activity. 
 Throughout all of these discussions one thing remains clear, that warfare was 
deeply connected to political, economic, and ideological power in central Italy. The 
overlapping of these sources of social power created a matrix of social dominance, 
this matrix being controlled by the elites. As the execution of these powers was 
focused on settlements, we come once more to the key point of this work. Private 
warfare was an unnecessary and unproductive activity; competitive elites could 
achieve the same ends that have been argued as the motivation for private warfare, 
through the execution of state-based warfare. In any case, states had considerable 
control over warfare and piracy and thus we may conclude that the Tyrrhenian way 
of war was one of states. 
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Appendix 1 – Figures 
Most figures carry two citations. The first being the source of the image and the 
second being the original publication of the artefact or one of the principal studies of 
the artefact, where further bibliography may be found. 
 
Fig. 1 – Bossen (2006), 100 (Fig. 4) 
Fig. 2 – Runciman (2000), 70 (Figure 1) 
Fig. 3 – Broodbank (2013), 492 (9.34) 
Distribution of traded items in the Western Mediterranean 
Fig. 4 – Stary (1981), Tafel 20 
Masner (1892), 19 
Vienna Pithos 
 
Fig. 5 – Stary (1981), Tafel 16 
Martelli (1973), fig. 34-35 
Seventh-century Situla di Pikaśna, from Chiusi 
 
Fig. 6 – Sinos (1994), 102 Figure 11.3 
Gantz (1974), 6 
600-590 BC, Seated figures frieze, Murlo inv. 68-265 (Fi. 112728) 
 
Fig. 7 – Cherici (2008), 231 (Fig. 2) 
Lucke and Frey (1962), 14 
Situla Arnoaldi 
 
Fig. 8 – Cherici (2008), 231 (Fig. 1) 
Ducati (1923) 
Certosa Situla 
 
Fig. 9 – Stary (1981), Tafel 46 
van Buren (1921), 61 
Frieze Plaque, Velletri 
 
Fig. 10 – Winter (2009), 356 
Frieze Plaques, Velletri and Caprifico 
 
Fig. 11 – Spivey and Stoddart (1990), 137 (89) 
Giglioli (1929) 
Seventh-century Tragliatella oinochoe, armed (dance?) scene 
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Fig. 12 – Stary (1981), Tafel 10.5 
Montelius (1904), fig. 382.6 
Oinochoe from Central Italy 
 
Fig. 13 – Stary (1981), Tafel 10.3 
Robinson and Harcum (1930), 32 
Oinochoe, Royal Ontario Museum, Toronto 
 
Fig. 14 – Jannot (1985), Planche 1 (Fig. 5) 
Vermiglioli (1844), 143 
Sperandio Sarcophagus, Perugia 
 
Fig. 15 – Stary (1981), Tafel 14.1 
Förster (1869) 
Frist half, seventh century, Aristonothos Krater, naval battle scene 
 
Fig. 16 – Stary (1981), Tafel 22.2 
Walters (1893), 69 B60 
Etruscan Balckfigure Hydria, Vulci 
 
Fig. 17 – Cherici (2006), 355 (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2) 
(L) Oinochoe with picture of a palm, Columbia, Missouri University 
Basch (1987), n. 870 
(R) Acqua Acetosa Laurentina, tomb 65 
Cerchiae (2002) 
 
Fig. 18 – Spivey and Stoddart (1990), 130 (79) 
Müller-Karpe (1974b) 
Villanovan helmet, tomb 871 Veii 
 
Fig. 19 – Stary (1981), Karte 1 
(Top) Crested helmet with spike 
(Bottom) Crested helmet ‘skullcap’ 
 
Fig. 20 – Stary (1981), Karte 2 
Cap Helmets 
 
Fig. 21 – Iaia (2013), 109 Figure 8.3 
Collection of cap helmets with knobs 
 
Fig. 22 – Harding (1999), 165 (Fig. 5) 
Idealized Urnfield culture warrior 
 
Fig. 23 – Barker and Rasmussen (1998), 78 Figure 29 
Notizie (1970) 
750-700, Contents of Tomb AAI, Quattro Fontanili, Veii 
 
Fig. 24 – Stary (1981), Karte 13 
Oblong shield, synthesis of examples found in miniature replica 
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Fig. 25 – Stary (1981), Karte 14 
Sample pectoral 
 
Fig. 26 – Stary (1981), Karte 17 
Sample antenna sword 
 
Fig. 27 – Stary (1981), Karte 19 
Sample mushroom hilted short sword 
 
Fig. 28 – Martinelli (2004), 138 
Examples of Early Iron Age axe heads 
 
Fig. 29 – Stary (1981), Karte 3 
Example of a dome helmet 
 
Fig. 30 – Stary (1981), Karte 15 
Example of a kardiophylax 
 
 
 
Fig. 31 – Stary (1981), Tafel 61 
Moretti (1936) 
Capestrano Warrior 
 
Fig. 32 – Malnati (2008), 177 Tav. 6.2 
Idealized depiction of late Villanovan warrior 
 
Fig. 33 – Malnati (2008), 173 Tav. 2.4 
Fig. 34 – Stary (1979), Plate 24.a 
Barnett and Lorenzi (1975) 
700-630, Assyrian soldier, Niniveh 
 
Fig. 35 – Spivey and Stoddart (1990), 132 (81) 
Example Corinthian helmets 
 
Fig. 36 – Stary (1980), Tafel 39.1 
Mühlenstein (1929), 234 
Head of a warrior, from Orvieto, open faced Etrusco-Corinthian helmet 
 
Fig. 39 – Stary (1981), Tafel 32.1 
Paribeni (1938) 
Cippus from Chiusi, perhaps showing porpax/antilabe 
 
Fig. 40 – Stary (1981), Tafel 24.1 
von Vocano (1955), 124 
Warrior statue, from Falterona 
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Fig. 41 – Aldrete et al. (2013), 76 (Fig. 4.2) 
Third century Palestrina 
Bibliography see Aldrete et al. (2013), 205, M-66 (L) and M-68 (R) 
 
Fig. 42 – Stary (1981), Karte 22 
Examples of curved blade swords 
 
Fig. 43 – Stary (1981), Karte 26 
Examples of Etruscan short swords 
 
Fig 44 – Stary (1981), Tafel 4.1 
Mühlenstein (1929), 155 
Horse face guards from Marsiliana 
 
Fig. 45 – Stary (1981), Tafel 19.1 
Ducati (1927), 74, 222 
Decorated ostrich egg, Tomb of Isis, Vulci 
 
Fig. 46 – Stary (1981), Tafel 22.1 
Boitain (1974), 213 
Etruscan blackfigure amphora, Tarquinia 
 
Fig. 47 – Winter (2009) 
Frieze plaques from Tuscania 
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